The new Schengen Border and its impact on the Romanian-Moldovan relations by -
Institute for Public Policy
Bucharest
The New Schengen Border 
and Its Impact on the 
Romanian - Moldovan Relations 
actual 
implications of 
the secured 
border at the 
political, 
social, 
economic and 
operational 
levels 

THE NEW SCHENGEN BORDER 
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
ROMANIAN - MOLDOVAN RELATIONS 

The New Schengen Border 
and Its Impact on the 
Romanian - Moldovan Relations
actual implications of the secured border 
at the political, social, economic and operational levels
New Schengen borders and their social and human 
impact on the “outsiders” of the re-integrated 
Europe - the Moldovan case
 
Project within the program 
October 2002
Partners
 Institute for Public Policy - Bucharest
Centre for International Studies - Bucharest
Constitutional and Legal Policy 
Institute - Open Society Institute
Budapest 
Open Society Foundation 
Bucharest
Project funded by
4Note
The remarks included in this report do not entirely reflect the 
official point of view of the listed institutions. Where appropriate, 
necessary observations have been included. Chapters and 
articles drafted entirely by one author have been mentioned as 
such.
5The study The New Schengen Border and Its Impact on the 
Romanian-Moldovan Relations, actual implications of the 
secured border at the political, social, economic and operational 
levels was elaborated by the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) in 
Bucharest and the Centre for International Studies, with funding 
from the Constitutional and Legal Policies Institute - Open Society 
Institute in Budapest and the Open Society Foundation, 
Bucharest, as part of the program “New Schengen borders and 
their social and human impact on the “outsiders” of the re-
integrated Europe - the Moldovan case”. A substantial contribution 
was given also by the Institute of Public Policy in Chisinau. The 
study is part of a larger analysis project, started in 2001 on the 
basis of a partnership with the Chisinau Institute of Public Policy, 
involving experts working in institutions in the field of border 
control in both countries. The goal of this project is to contribute to 
the improvement of activities in securing the border between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova, to the benefit of stability in 
both countries and regional security.
The current study, drafted by experts in both countries, makes 
available concrete elements and guidelines for political actors, to 
be taken into account in decisions regarding bilateral relations in 
the present regional context, under the sign of European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Our thanks to those who contributed suggestions and 
opinions to the drafting of this study (in alphabetical order):
- Romania
Lt. Vladimir Cristescu, General Inspectorate of the Border Police; 
Adrian Mares, Advisor, Foreign Policy Committee, Chamber of 
Deputies; Gabriel Micu, Director, Moldova Directorate, Foreign 
Ministry; cpt. Narcis Dumitru, General Inspectorate of the Border 
Police; Valentin Popescu, Coordinator, Department for Customs 
Surveillance and Fighting Customs Fraud - Risk Analysis Bureau, 
General Customs Directorate; cpt. Adrian Popescu, General 
Inspectorate of the Border Police; Gentiana Serbu, South-East 
European Cooperation Initiative (SECI Center);
- Republic of Moldova
Nicolae Chirtoaca, Director, Euro-Atlantic Centre in Moldova; Iurie 
Dadeichin, Chief of the Division for Surveillance of Foreign 
Economic Transactions, Customs Surveillance Department; 
© 
Valeriu Gheorghiu, Program Manager, Institute for Public Policy; 
Oleg Graur, Expert, Institute for Public Policy; Eugen Revenco, 
Deputy Director, General Department for International Law and 
Treaties, Foreign Ministry; Viorel Sarghi, Interim Director, General 
Consular Department, Foreign Ministry
- and our guests and contributors
Stephan Dahlgren, Task manager, Justice and Internal Affairs 
Department, European Commission Delegation to Bucharest; 
Elena Jileva, Policy analyst, Constitutional and Legal Policies 
Institute (Open Society Institute, Budapest, Hungary).
We would like to thank Anton Niculescu and Oana Cinca with the 
European Integration Program of the Open Society Foundation, 
Romania, for their continuous support throughout the project.
Copyright
All rights reserved to Open Society Foundation, Romania and 
Institute for Public Policy.
Bucharest, October 2002
Gabriel Andreescu Centre for International Studies
Violeta Bau Institute for Public Policy
Gabriela Chiorean Institute for Public Policy
57 Unirii blvd., E4 building, 
th4  entrance, 92 suite
sector 3, Bucharest, Romania
phone +40 21 302 9520
fax +40 21 320 7490
e-mail ipp@go.ro
6
Table of contents
Methodology .............................................................................. 9
Introduction .............................................................................. 11
Chapter I
Political dimension of the topic. History and prospects 
of political relations between the two countries ......................... 16
Gabriel Andreescu
Republic of Moldova closer to the Schengen Border:
 regional and geopolitical framework ........................................ 16
Nicolae Chirtoaca
Romania - the Republic of Moldova: from the 
“flower bridge“ to the iron curtain ............................................... 45
Chapter II
 ............... 64
Chapter III
Policy recommendations regarding control 
procedures at border checkpoints ............................................ 80
Chapter IV
European dimension of bilateral relations - border 
control and integration requirements ........................................ 90
Chapter V
Border control and illegal migration ......................................... 118
Chapter VI
Conclusions ........................................................................... 123
Bibliography ........................................................................... 129
Shortcomings in bilateral relations regarding 
the legal and institutional border control framework
7

9Methodology
This study was conducted during July - October 2002, as a follow-
up of an analytical project initiated in 2001, based on a partnership 
with the Chisinau Institute for Public Policy. It involved experts in 
institutions working in the field of border control in both countries. 
The analysis of actual implications of a secure border between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova focused primarily on 
interviews with the representatives of institutions dealing with 
border-related issues in both countries and on the summary of 
discussions and materials presented at the International 
Conference organized by the Open Society Foundation, Romania 
and the Bucharest Institute for Public Policy in Sinaia, in June this 
year.
This information was expanded by the secondary analysis of the 
bilateral and regional legal framework, as well as to the domestic 
legal provisions regarding the organization and operation of line 
institutions in both countries. European standards were also 
carefully considered, as the legal analysis was mostly conducted 
in comparison with European regulations in the domain, and 
compliance standards, which the two countries have committed 
to.
Reports and statistics obtained from the institutions approached 
for stage analysis carry an important weight, as they may be used, 
in the future, to draw conclusions and issue recommendations.
Last but not least, official statements and figures were correlated 
with media articles on the topic of increased transborder crime 
and cases of illegal migration and trafficking in human beings.
The aim of the research is to identify the current situation on the 
Romanian-Moldovan border, at various decision-making and 
operational levels, and to forecast future development scenarios, 
with a view to Romania's integration into the European Union, as 
well as concrete ways of improving the bilateral working climate.
As a general note, the study has been drafted as to identify a 
common ground in approaching the discussed topic, based on 
10
presentations made by both sides during bilateral debates, and 
materials developed by officials, in order to improve and maintain 
a natural flow of persons and goods between the two countries.
11
Introduction
While drafting the conclusions of this study is in progress, the 
Romanian media reflects signals in the French press, on the 
inappropriate border control and insufficient measures passed to 
prevent and combat illegal trafficking in human beings and goods 
and illegal migration. These negative aspects may have 
consequences on Romania's integration into the EU and Euro-
Atlantic structures. Romania is in the process of acceding to 
NATO and to European Union, and therefore is making important 
efforts to meet the mandatory requirements and criteria as soon 
as possible, thus establishing priorities for each field of activity. 
When announcing the speeding up of accession reforms, 
Romania had assessed the efficiency of border control measures 
up to the present, as an integral part of the policies included in the 
“Justice and Internal Affairs” negotiation chapter. This context 
seems appropriate for the current study, which is meant to bring an 
updated vision on the need for cooperation between institutions 
dealing in border control, at a national, bilateral and regional 
levels, taking into account also that Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova have special and privileged relations.
The study is made public at a time when political relations 
between the two countries are being reassessed and reshaped. 
After a relatively tense period of official statements in both 
countries, Romania and the Republic of Moldova still have a 
number of aspects to clarify, in order to reach the stage where 
common issues can be approached and solved to the best interest 
of both parties (border control issues included).
These desires also require the development and implementation 
of coherent programs, through joint efforts, through capitalizing on 
existing financial and human resources and through more efficient 
foreign assistance, in projects funded by partner states and 
international institutions. The international community cannot 
solve some conflict issues such as that of Transdniestria, without 
the political and logistical support of Moldovan efforts.
To this end, regional security requires important efforts, both by all 
South East European states, and by states with a strong 
democracy which are however affected by inefficient border 
12
control measures. 
Another important aspect that was included in the study is the 
original assumption that the Romanian-Moldovan border should 
employ stronger security measures, with a view to the 
particularities of bilateral relations as well.
Romania is undergoing a process of EU and Euro-Atlantic 
integration, with specific objectives to be met in the following 
domains: economy, secure borders, customs union, all these in 
line with European standards and in the context of special and 
privileged relations with the Republic of Moldova.
Securing part of the border cannot be done on a unilateral basis. In 
this case, the Republic of Moldova cannot tackle the issue of 
Transdnestria's status, or that of securing the border with Ukraine, 
without political support and international assistance. The 
efficiency of such measures is directly reflected in regional 
stability, with an immediate effect over Romanian-Moldovan 
relations, if Romania is to meet its commitments deriving from 
European agreements signed by this country. 
At the same time, Romania must take into account a global and 
unified vision and strategy for its borders, by avoiding making one 
of its borders a distinct issue. Over the past few months the 
Bucharest media is sounding the alarm about groups of illegal 
migrants crossing the Romanian-Bulgarian border; this stands 
proof that border control should not focus on only one section of 
the border.
Romania is undergoing an institutional reform process, especially 
of the authorities in charge of border issues, which need to make 
border crossing procedures more efficient, to initiate a dialog with 
their neighboring counterparts at a bilateral and regional level and 
to identify common solutions to common problems. Foreign 
assistance, focused on meeting important objectives in the 
domain, has shown important effects, but such programs must 
continue and intensify throughout the process of upgrading and 
increasing efficiency of border procedures. A profound parallel 
analysis is necessary, however, based on modern principles of 
professional assessment and economic efficiency, with a view to a 
better appropriation of state budget resources.
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The monitoring of investment effects (all manner of investment) 
along the whole border is as useful today as the investment itself. 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova face budget constraints 
and need to make this methodology a natural working instrument 
to help identify, in a professional way, common interest fields 
where new regulations or amendments of the existing regulations 
are necessary. 
Similar authorities, operating on the very border between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova, have clearly different 
responsibilities, limited by the legal framework of each country. In 
this respect, cooperation with other institutions holding useful 
information for border procedure activities is of the utmost 
importance. The study, therefore, comes to emphasize the 
importance of cooperation with other state institutions, to 
complete the current moves of border police and customs 
departments.
Political players have an important part in bilateral relations 
between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, as they can 
speed up or hinder certain measures. Of the elements analyzed 
for this study, worth mentioning is the crucial role of political 
decisions in the efficient approval of administrative measures at 
the border checkpoints. Unfortunately, the de-centralization of 
decision-making is still in the beginning, both in Romania and in 
the Republic of Moldova, but especially in the latter. For this very 
reason we insisted on the encouragement, by both states' political 
leaders, of a permanent contact, exchange of information and 
mutual assistance between those in charge of border checkpoints 
on either side of the border. The formalization of information 
exchanges at the border checkpoints must be the result of political 
consultation, to include the evaluation of various issues and 
identification of common priorities. All these elements are well 
known by both parties, in theory, but one of the main hindrances is 
the lack of trust between counterparts.
There can be no efficient exchange of information and border 
management in the absence of appropriate equipment. The 
Romanian-Moldovan border has, indeed, modern specific 
equipment, but there is still a need for upgraded technology to be 
divided fairly to all the checkpoints along the border. There should 
be consistent communication between line institutions in both 
14
countries, as there are mutual interests, both in terms of budget 
resources that have been allocated or are about to be, and in 
terms of international assistance received for equipment, so that 
this equipment can be more efficiently used for a strict, but fluid 
control. 
The study scans aspects related to the cooperation between 
Romanian and Moldovan inspection teams, including joint use of 
equipment and implementation of similar checking procedures. 
We would like to introduce this concept of joint checking 
procedures, already used in specialized discussions, as we would 
like to see if this measure is considered timely by both parties, and 
under what circumstances. The text also includes other concepts 
and practices (some of them already in use in Romania), in order 
to propose concrete topics to support our conclusions about the 
central topic: cooperation - at various levels of public government - 
between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, for a fluid, 
integrated European management on the common border, in the 
context of Romania's accession to the Schengen space.
The topic of secure borders includes two major aspects:
1. Potential additional measures for border control should not 
affect the legal circulation of individuals and goods. For these 
categories, administrative measures should be encouraging 
and less limitative when it comes to traveling. There are 
proposals we have received during the elaboration of the study, 
like that about opening customs duty payment desks in the 
border checkpoint or the setting up of Euro-consulates, in the 
future.
2. Strengthening measures for secure borders is an action meant 
to discourage trafficking in human beings and goods as much 
as possible, not only in the two surveyed countries, but in the 
whole region. Faced with the huge dangers of transborder 
crime, each country should approve measures to strengthen 
border control, separately and in joint moves with its neighbors.
Combining crime prevention and control measures with a more 
fluid legal circulation of individuals and goods is of crucial 
importance for both Romania and the Republic of Moldova. These 
are concerns of European institutions and bodies both countries 
would like to join in their efforts.
15
There are domains and situations that require immediate 
measures. This study analyzes the relationship between decision-
makers in both Romania and the Republic of Moldova, 
emphasizing some actual measures meant to strengthen working 
relations between the two countries. Certainly, the study does not 
encompass all possible issues related to secure borders between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova, and has not tried to identify 
all types of potential joint actions. If the study manages to draw 
attention to certain shortcomings and opportunities, urging 
leaders to analyze the implications and advantages of 
cooperation (in all forms), then we have made an important 
contribution. 
However, there is a need for a medium and long-term vision on the 
part of decision-makers in both countries, on domestic issues but 
also on foreign strategic objectives (Euro-Atlantic and EU 
integration strategy, for Romania); this vision will then be shared 
with neighbors, on a transparency basis, so that measures are 
taken in a timely manner and effects are responded to as 
efficiently as possible, prior to their achievement.
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Republic of Moldova closer to the Schengen Border: regional 
and geopolitical framework 
Gabriel Andreescu
Centre for International Studies, Bucharest
1. The Republic of Moldova: regional and geopolitical framework 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova are nowadays facing 
regional and geopolitical reorganization, a decisive move for their 
future. In relation to the current situation and potential 
1developments, NATO and EU enlargement will include Romania.  
This means that the border between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova might become, historically speaking, part of the border 
between the greater intergovernmental Western bodies and the 
2rest of the world.  There are two questions to be asked here: is this 
border definitive and “what will then happen in the vicinity of the 
3enlarged NATO and EU".
The two questions condition each other and assume the fact that 
the Republic of Moldova has a future that does not necessarily 
pursue the current policy of the Voronin Government; that there 
are trends favoring the establishment of a Western democracy, 
compatible and willing to be one day part of the formal Western 
structures, when the time comes. Such pro-Western civic and 
political opinions and movements have constantly been present in 
4the Republic of Moldova after 1991.
But, even if the pro-Western option eventually wins the day in 
Moldovan domestic policy, the question still remains about the 
extent to which NATO and the EU will ever have a new 
enlargement on the agenda. Romania can become an advocate 
of this cause and define a strategy to promote within NATO and 
Chapter I
Political dimension of the topic. History and 
prospects of political relations between 
the two countries
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the EU. It can, at least, bring its contribution to a positive policy of 
the two bodies as to their close neighbors, the Republic of 
Moldova in this case.
A fourth player with an impact on the future of the Republic of 
Moldova (alongside the EU, NATO and Romania) is the Russian 
Federation, whose opinion weighs a lot in Moldova's relations with 
both Romania and Western bodies. When the establishment of 
the NATO-Russia Council was signed, on May 28, 2002, the 
relations between the two military powers, and especially the 
relations between Russia and the US changed. The new 
cooperation is not restricted to the military. “The partnership in 
energy”, previously signed by presidents Vladimir Putin and 
George Bush in the context of Council negotiations, provides 
room for action to American companies. They will be able to take 
part in all stages of exploiting the oil resources in Russia and the 
Caspian Sea. This development shows the scope of interests at 
stake and the importance of the recent agreements between the 
two main opponents during the Cold War.
In this context, we can also discuss a fifth factor of impact for the 
former Soviet republics in the region: US interests in the Caspian 
area. Georgia is the beachhead of US interests there. But, while 
the Bush government is trying to instate new relations with the 
Islamic world in the context of the war against terrorism, the whole 
region - from Georgia to Afghanistan - becomes a geopolitical 
pillar of importance for the United States. The effects of these 
strategic developments in the former Soviet regions are not 
univocal. When it comes to Chechnya, for instance, Russia seems 
to now have more freedom of action than it could ever have 
dreamed of before September 11, 2001. A country like the 
Republic of Moldova could also become an object of competition 
between the Russians and the Americans.
More generally speaking, there are certain implications of the new 
partnership between Russia and the West. It is hard to foresee 
what the effects are over Russia's policy in its own “sphere of 
influence”. The most optimistic scenario would be that Russia 
shows more respect to the free world principles, and, 
consequently, promotes democratic values in the satellite 
countries. Russia might as well see these developments as a 
”green light” to act in its neighboring countries, the Republic of 
18
Moldova included, being somewhat immune to Western criticism.
There are more arguments in favor of the second alternative. 
Right in the middle of the debates for the NATO-Russia Council, 
the Russian Federation created the Organisation for Collective 
Security, based on joint foreign policies and military structures. 
There are three other “regional groups”, the Russia-Belarus 
union, the Southern Caucasian Group, made up of Russia and 
Armenia, and the Central Asian Group, which would be made up 
of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tadjiikistan. The project 
stipulates the contribution of each group to the joint military forces 
under Russian command, while all groups are subordinated to a 
central apparatus in Moscow. So far, only Belarus President 
Aleksandr Lukashenko has joined the Russian plans 
unconditionally.
As far as Moldova is concerned, some analysts say it "is emerging 
as another Kaliningrad, a Russian military outpost at a strategic 
5crossroads in Europe outside Russia's borders" . The aims of the 
Russian offensive are obvious in this part of the world. For ten 
years Russia has equipped, funded and organized the separatist 
authorities of Transdnestria, whose leaders are Russian citizens 
or officers. Although Russia should have withdrawn its troops and 
arms, according to OSCE commitments, Moscow refused to fulfill 
its international obligations. On the contrary, it seems to have 
decided to stay on Moldovan territory for an indefinite time. This is 
why Moscow obviously supported the Chisinau regime of 
communist origin and tried to attract the Moldovan economy into 
the CIS system.
2. Developments with an impact on the future of the Republic of 
Moldova 
2.1. First factor: NATO enlargement 
The European Union enlargement is a relatively slow and hesitant 
process, when compared to developments in Eastern Europe. For 
the former Soviet states, part of the Soviet Union until 1991, the 
most important process for their development seems to be NATO 
enlargement. Certainly, the relations between the former Soviet 
countries and the European Union will reflect the legal borders of 
NATO and the area of its influence.
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The Big Bang scenario of NATO enlargement in 2002, with seven 
6countries , Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic States, Romania and 
Bulgaria, has a number of explanations. Vladimir Socor finds four 
7main motivations for this substantial enlargement.  The first would 
be the strategic value of the region for the United States and its 
anti-terrorist plans. The second, in connection with the first, 
expresses the strategic link between the Black Sea basin and the 
Southern Caucasus region, whose oil and gas makes it part of the 
Western economic security. The third would be that both Turkey 
and Greece support Romania and Bulgaria for NATO integration. 
The fourth would be that the United States wants to be the engine 
of all these trends and motivations. If the statement made by 
President George W. Bush in June 2001, in Warsaw, regarding 
NATO enlargement “from the Baltic to the Black Sea” could be 
seen more as a symbolical than as a practical speech, it gained full 
strategic weight after the September 11 events. 
For the long term Moldovan prospects, a special interest lies in the 
example of the Baltic States. As former Soviet countries, the Baltic 
States were seen as part of the Russian Federation sphere of 
influence. Russia was a loud opponent of the idea of their 
integration into NATO, which was unthinkable for Russian 
representatives in 1996-97, before the summit that was to set the 
first NATO enlargement wave. The Russians' plan was, at the 
time, not only to stop the Baltic States from acceding to the 
Western structures - which they could not stomach - but to stop 
any NATO enlargement whatsoever. The statements made by 
Russian representative A. A. Kokoshin in the Conference on 
International Security Issues (Munich, February 3-4, 1997) show 
how arbitrary Russian political imagination was. The Russian 
dignitary had been sent by Moscow to the meeting to state, among 
other things: “The destruction of the buffer made up of the today-
neutral states in Central Europe, as a result of the dismantling of 
the Warsaw Pact, deepens the feeling of vulnerability in Russia, 
with unpredictable political implications..."; "NATO enlargement, 
that violates the commitments made by the West not to expand the 
Alliance after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR's 
consent to the reunification of Germany might fundamentally 
undermine Russia's trust in Western policy.”; "The West must 
understand that it should not push Russia to retaliate for the loss of 
the Cold War, as the effects would be destructive for the powerful, 
yet complicated and in many ways vulnerable modern 
20
8civilization”.
In 1997, NATO decided to enlarge with three countries and 
promised to continue the process, without “pushing Russia to 
retaliate for the loss of the Cold War”. Despite Russia's rhetorical 
threats and the now commonplace idea that they would be 
9
“impossible to defend“ , Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania desperately 
clung to their wish to become NATO members. They continued to 
develop systematically the necessary capacity to become “Host 
Nation Support for Allied Forces“. The contribution of the GDP to 
the defense budget was raised to 2%, most of it in connection with 
the participation to NATO programs. Baltron, the mine sweeper 
fleet, Baltnet, the radar surveillance system for the air space, 
Baltbat, the peace-keeping battalion, Baltdefcol, the Baltic 
Defense College, make up an integrated defense system, an 
outcome of the cooperation among the three Baltic States, with a 
10view to becoming part of the NATO integrated military.  This 
system was built with an impressive tenacity and precision in 
pursuing the ultimate aim.
The examples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the whole 
development of the Baltic area stand as arguments for the 
Moldovan decision-makers not to think their long term fate strictly 
based on current impressions. The idea that Moldova might once 
become part of the Western defense system seems unachievable 
today. The speed of global geographical redesign, after the end of 
the Cold War, might, however, change the security assumptions in 
the area.
This statement, supported by the Baltic example, also finds 
leverage in the options of Ukraine. Ukraine had developed an 
international strategy, in the early 90s, based on refusing “block 
11policy” and a “multi-vector foreign policy”.  At first, there was 
tension between the pro-Western and pro-Eastern groups, after 
the declaration of Ukraine's independence. But the scandal 
around president Kucima strengthened the pro-Russian political 
wing.
The latest elections showed an erosion of the communists' force 
and of the pro-Moscow left. The project of joining Russia was 
therefore taken over by the economic interest groups, under the 
new circumstances, by the Ukrainian businessmen with main 
21
12trade partners in the East.  They are the ones to launch the slogan 
“to Europe with Russia”, which is an obvious disguise of ideas.
These are the circumstances under which, on May 23, 2002, the 
Ukrainian government decided to make the first steps towards 
NATO accession. To this end, on May 28, the secretary of the 
Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, Yevhen 
Marchuk, met in Kiev the chairman of the U.S. Committee on 
NATO, Bruce Jackson. On May 29-30, 2002, the Ukrainian 
Foreign minister, Anatoly Zlenko, sent NATO a message from 
President Leonid Kucima, restating this option. The Kiev 
authorities speak about 7 to 10 years needed for their Soviet type 
13military forces to adjust to NATO requirements.
It is possible that the developments in Ukraine were also given 
impetus by the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. 
Although Ukraine has shown more cooperation at a political and 
military level, since 1997, it came to be outrun by Russia, in this 
relationship. The event also emphasized the difference between 
political and practical relations established between the Alliance 
14and Ukraine.
Romania and Bulgaria's NATO integration will continue to feed the 
pro-Atlantic trends in Kiev. A close cooperation between Ukraine 
and NATO - to say nothing more - will leave a much wider 
maneuvering margin for Moldova in its relations with the Russian 
Federation. This is why we can say that NATO enlargement is 
decisive for the future of the Republic of Moldova, an 
indispensable landmark for its politicians. Its current dependence 
on Russia is not an implacable fate.
This understanding can also be found with some analysts in 
Moldova. It was at least implicit, when Octavian Sofransky noted 
“the persistence of political forces acting to reinstate a political and 
economic union within the CIS”, “the relative distance set by 
Moldova to developed market economies” and “the continued 
presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory, after their 
withdrawal from Central Europe and the Baltic states” show “that 
Moldova remains under the Russian sphere of influence, after the 
collapse of the Berlin wall”, but “there are other factors indicating 
15that the current situation is not status quo”.
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2.2. Southern Caucasus and the geopolitical competition between 
Russia and the United States
The geopolitical game arising from the September 11 events is 
important for the whole former USSR space, the Caucasus in 
particular, and especially the Southern Caucasus space in 
particular. Currently, this is the confrontation space for Russia and 
the US. Russia is playing its trump cards firmly, as seen in public 
speeches and in the political or military actions developed in the 
region. Before the Russian public, Vladimir Putin has assumed 
the role of the leader, and even sole player of the international 
system that has coalesced to combat terrorism. In his address to 
the nation on April 18, 2002, in Parliament, President Putin said: "It 
was Russia's principled position that made it possible to form a 
durable antiterrorist coalition. In the context of allied relationships, 
we - together with the leaderships of a number of CIS countries - 
took corresponding decisions... Through joint effort we managed 
to resolve a most important strategic task-to eliminate the highly 
dangerous center of international terrorism in Afghanistan, to put a 
stop to its adverse impact on the situation in other regions of the 
 16world (Russian Television, April 18)”.
The countries with a consistent pro-Western option in the 
Southern Caucasus area, a gateway for the Americans into the 
17region, are Georgia and Azerbaidjan.  Russia tried to promote its 
interests by setting up a regional security mechanism, “The 
Caucasus Four”, including Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia and 
Russia, where Moscow retained the leader position. Vladimir 
Putin launched the plan at the first CIS meeting he chaired, in 
January 2000, and he insisted on the plan in all consequent 
18summits.  Armenia, the only remaining ally of Russia in the 
region, seems to have also regarded the project with suspicion.
The first meeting of the “Caucasus Four” secretariat took place on 
19March 30, 2002, in Soci.  The meeting was dominated by the 
bilateral and domestic issues faced by Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaidjan and the arrival of the American troops in Georgia. On 
this occasion, Russia asked that the “Four” should not allow “the 
development of military and political competition in the 
20region”. Another basic idea was that there should be a difference 
between security cooperation - to be controlled by means of “The 
Caucasus Four” - and humanitarian and economic cooperation, 
open to other states. This perspective was in line with an older 
23
Russian idea, that the security issues of the region should be 
discussed with Iran and Turkey, as neighboring states, but 
exclude the US and European Union, as they are not regional 
actors - contradicting the stability pact suggested by president 
Eduard Shevardnadze and the Turkish ex-president, Suleyman 
Demirel (accepted by Azerbaidjan) that relied on a 3+3+2 formula 
(Georgia, Azerbaidjan, Armenia, Russia, Iran, Turkey, the United 
States and the European Union). The document released by the 
Soci meeting showed the lack of substance of the “Caucasus 
Four” project.
Russia's attitude cannot develop because of the Central Asian 
leaders, whose positions rely on the American involvement in the 
area. Tadjiik president, Imomali Rahmonov, thanked the United 
States and not Russia in his annual speech, for leading the anti-
terrorist war at the Tadjik border: "We are thankful to the United 
States, and to other countries in the international antiterrorist 
coalition, which played the decisive role in suppressing and 
destroying the Taliban's system and the international terrorist 
21centers in Afghanistan” (Tadjik Television, April 22) . This position 
of the Tadjik president is even more important if we think that, until 
the September 11 events, this was the only Moscow supporter in 
the region, with Russian troops stationed on its territory. 
Meanwhile, Tadjikistan made its own arrangements with the 
United States. On April 19, 2002, President George W. Bush 
signed a presidential memorandum approving grants in defense 
materials and services to Tadjikistan, under the cover of the 
22Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Control Export Act.  
Concurrently, the massive increase of Tadjik claims for the use of 
the Russian bases - rent and services for the military installations - 
show some pressure to drop the previous agreements between 
Dushanbe and Moscow.
Kazakhstan also took a stand regarding the Russia-US 
competition. Together with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan refused to 
take part in the joint military exercises with Russia, under CIS 
umbrella, in April 2002. In his speech before Parliament on April 
22, 2002, Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokaev called for 
support for US presence in the area. President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev had even offered access to the Kazakh airports to the 
***
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US, but the latter declined the offer. A working group on defense 
and security was set up, whose agenda also includes the 
establishment of a motorized infantry unit and the adjustment of 
the Caspian see military infrastructure.
The pro-American agenda is also prevalent in Uzbekistan. In 
March 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Uzbek 
counterpart Abdulaziz Kamilov, signed a document on the 
cooperation between the two countries, under the new 
circumstances created by the war against terrorism. The 
agreement covers a number of domains, from assistance for 
democratic institutions to aid for education, health and the 
23environment.  President Islam Karimov synthesized his country's 
attitude: "We in Uzbekistan supported the United States and its 
allies right from the beginning, because they had an interest in 
destroying terrorist bases. We are grateful to the United States 
because it has done something that others could not. [We] had 
been threatened by terrorist formations that had made incursions 
from Afghanistan and Tadjikistan into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
in 1999, 2000 and 2001. All discussions in the CIS ended with 
empty statements and even sarcasm. (…) We have been talking 
too much in the CIS framework, setting up various rapid reaction 
units, drawing up treaties, thousands of documents and so on. 
This is continuing even now. But, in practice, it was the United 
States and its allies that delivered the severest blow to terrorist 
bases. I declare that the decisive role was played by the United 
24States." (Uzbek Television, April 14).
Over the past few years The United States have had serious 
difficulties in their relations with Armenia and Azerbaidjan, since 
the beginning of the war between the two countries, in the early 
90s. At the end of 2001, the US cancelled the Act limiting military 
assistance to Azerbaidjan, by means of which the Congress had 
shown its support for Armenia, for a number of years. But, due to 
the circumstances, Armenia did not benefit from American aid, 
25either.  On March 29, 2002, the State Department announced its 
26intention to deepen military cooperation with the two countries.  
The American delegation, led by the U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Eurasia Policy, Mira Ricardel, signed, in 
Baku, the agreement between the US and Azerbaidjan regarding 
security assistance, including: (1) an upgrading of the air space 
control system, for the civil and military airports, according to 
25
NATO standards; (2) training for officers in the US; (3) training for 
officers in border defense; (4) development of navy capacities in 
order to secure maritime borders and protect waters in the 
domestic and economic area. Concurrently, the US reiterated its 
older suggestions for solving he conflict between Azerbaidjan and 
27Armenia.
At the same time, Serge Sarkisian, an Armenian high military 
representative, visited Washington to discuss American 
assistance for security in Armenia. This was also the occasion for 
discussion on Armenia's cooperation in the NATO Partnership for 
Peace and the need for Armenia and the US to cooperate on 
security issues. On April 4, 2002, in Yerevan, Serge Sarkisian and 
Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian presented the adjustments 
made to Armenia's foreign policy in the new international context: 
(1) opening multilateral contacts with Turkey; (2) establishing 
military relations with the US; (3) promoting good neighborly 
relations with Georgia and supporting stability in this country.
The above-mentioned events show that the Caspian Sea area is 
under pressure, so that it becomes difficult to foresee what could 
happen in the long term, what trends will finally prevail. The 
Russian solution for the Caspian Sea area is still military force. 
Moscow's actions stand proof of its not being ready to see the 
division of the area in the light of mutual interests. The Summit on 
April 23-24, 2002, in Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) did not manage to 
bring about consensus regarding the division of the Caspian Sea. 
On the contrary, after the summit closure, Vladimir Putin 
announced that Russia would maintain its navy forces in the 
Caspian Sea and develop a large scale military exercise, with a 
clearly stated purpose: "We must strengthen our [military] 
presence as an essential factor in promoting our political and 
economic interests in the Caspian Sea. Our Flotilla constitutes a 
unique instrument in promoting the interests that I just 
28mentioned."  Vladimir Putin's strategy was even more clearly 
29described by Astrakhan's Governor, Anatoly Guzhvin , who 
welcomed Russia's military actions as follows: "Russia has 
dominated the Caspian for centuries until recently, when its limp 
diplomacy allowed the Caspian to be claimed by certain countries 
30from across the ocean."
***
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For as much as we can follow current developments in the region, 
we can conclude that the Caspian Sea area is the place for 
geopolitical competition in which both the Putin and the Bush 
Governments are trying to gain as much influence as possible. 
The old concept about the ex-Soviet space, seen as a Russian 
sphere of interest, where it enjoys legitimate influence and priority, 
has collapsed. It collapsed for the Baltic States and for Southern 
Caucasus. This would be the most important conclusion for the 
political decision-makers of the Republic of Moldova.
2.3. European Union enlargement: EU policy towards close 
neighbors
A second regional factor that has just begun to take shape is the 
sketching of EU policies for its close neighbors. At the end of 
September 2002, the EU presented some ideas of a local strategy. 
A special place among the neighboring countries for which the EU 
needs a specific policy is held by Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, 
which, as described by Honor Mahony “will stand for the European 
31Union border along 5 member states”. 
All three of them signed partnership for political cooperation with 
the EU, in 1994, relying on well-known democratic values. 
Ukraine has, by far, the most developed and stable relations with 
the Union, of the three above-mentioned countries. The fact that 
the EU is the most important international donor for Ukraine 
explains the close relations between the two partners.
As far as Belarus is concerned, the EU decided on sanctions to be 
applied to this country in 1997, for not instating free access to the 
media and holding unfair elections. The cooperation agreement 
was practically suspended in 1998. If no dramatic changes 
happen in the years to come, the EU should take into account its 
vicinity with a dictatorship.
Some observers of the EU enlargement process stated that “the 
32situation in the Republic of Moldova is somewhere in-between”  
that of Ukraine and that of Belarus, as the EU is concerned over 
Transdnestria, with its high potential for conflict, corruption and 
organized crime.
The current concern for the European Union is the integration of 
Poland, in 2004. New regulations will be needed in order to ensure 
27
easier access to the Schengen space for the citizens of countries 
33left outside the Union: Croatia, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.  
Certain types of permits have been designed for the inhabitants of 
border regions - especially for those who work across the border, 
in order to allow for small border trade to take place.
The European Union's attitude was influenced by that in Warsaw, 
when they negotiated the entry into Poland of Ukrainian citizens of 
Polish origin. On the other hand, Poland has economic benefits 
related to the border trade that it would not want to lose after 2004. 
Some solutions can be found in studies prepared by various 
experts and organizations, in order to make EU enlargement as 
painless as possible for the countries that would be left outside the 
Schengen space. In a report on “The Consequences of EU 
Eastern Enlargement: Poland, Ukraine, and Border Questions” 
we find such recommendations as: “the EU must simplify visa 
procedures to the greatest extent possible by offering long-term, 
multiple entry visas” and “free of charge. An additional possibility 
is the introduction of one day (18 hour) visa that could be 
convenient for persons living in border regions”; consular services 
of EU members states must significantly expanded in countries 
bordering an enlarged EU”; “While applications for a first-time 
Schengen visa will almost certainly require a personal interview, 
the possibility of renewing visas either by mail or via electronic 
means should be considered”; the flexibility that already exists 
within Schengen must be maximizing - among other things, 
issuing so-called “bona fide“ visas; “measures must be taken to 
improve efficiency, modernize technical infrastructures, promote 
a stronger service mentality, and reduce possibilities for 
34corruption at border crossing points” etc.
What is to be gained in direct relation with the Warsaw policy will 
become an asset of EU policies in the countries neighboring 
Romania and Bulgaria, when (and if) these countries are 
accepted as Union members. Romania thus has the opportunity 
to prepare a package of measures to simplify the entry of 
Moldovan citizens in Romania. The experience of implementing 
EU specific regulations, starting 2004, and own efforts to define a 
more flexible EU policy for citizens in the near vicinity make up one 
of the most important landmarks of Romanian-Moldovan bilateral 
relations. Romania has the duty to translate the “special and 
28
privileged partnership” relations into the terms of EU policy, as 
special and privileged as the previous one, for close neighbors. 
3. Romania and the relations with the Republic of Moldova 
3.1.  Attitude of the Republic of Moldova population 
Any analysis of regional and geopolitical factors influencing the 
future of the Republic of Moldova must be rely on the attitude of 
the population and its future projects. The effects of external 
factors over the Moldovan society depend on the way the 
population filters these factors, and the way it interacts with them. 
What are the underlying options of Moldovan citizens nowadays? 
To a certain extent, this attitude was reflected by the evolution of 
political representation until 2002. The victory of the Communist 
party in the latest elections shows a prevalence of conservative 
mentalities, less receptive to democratic values. Despite the 
difficulties of the Voronin Government to keep its promises, the 
discontent of the population seems to have little impact on its 
attitude. Unfortunately, there are no detailed investigations as to 
the civic and political behavior of the citizens of the Republic of 
Moldova. Not so long ago, the Institute of Public Policy in Chisinau 
managed to get a rather qualitative image, although based on 
figures. The Institute launched an opinion poll regarding the 
change of attitude of the population as a result of the rallies in 
35Chisinau in the spring of 2002.  The initiators wanted to know if 
the measures taken by the communist government, including 
closer relations with Moscow, and the protests of the Christian 
Democratic Popular Front had any impact on potential voters.
Data was collected between March 20 and 31, and the analysis 
was made public on April 17 and 18. Professionally speaking, the 
research was managed by IMAS - Bucharest, as the Republic of 
Moldova does not have the facilities to organize a trustworthy 
opinion poll. Results confirmed the conservative attitude, also 
reflected in the evolution of political representation in Moldova.
If in February 2001, 50.5% of Moldovans had voted for the 
communists, in March 2002, 73% would have voted for the 
communist party (the option in a November 2001 opinion poll was 
68%). The Christian Democratic Popular Front got 6% of the 
options, while the Braghis Alliance of former Prime Minister 
Dumitru Braghis only got 3%. Mircea Snegur's party received 1% 
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of the options. On the question if the Republic of Moldova needed 
only one party, 54% of the polling subjects said yes, while only 
10% gave their option for a multi-party system.
The ranking of party leaders followed party ranking closely. PCM 
leader Vladimir Voronin, got 45% of the votes, Braghis - 3%, Iurie 
Rosca - 2%, just as the Chisinau mayor, Serafim Urecheanu. The 
other political figures: Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev, Parliament 
speaker Eugenia Ostapciuc, Mircea Snegur and social-democrat 
leader Oazu Nantoi only received 1% of the voters' options each. 
The number of those undecided about potential candidates for 
Moldova's presidential seat was 40%.Data shows that Vladimir 
Voronin enjoys striking success. If the President were still elected 
by direct general elections, he would win on the first ballot. 
Moreover, 84% of those queried in the poll want an amendment to 
the Constitution, so that the president could be again elected by 
direct vote.
Data on the population's attitude towards state and public 
institutions is relevant for Moldovan mentalities. The Orthodox 
Church enjoys the confidence of 79% of the adult population; the 
Presidency (now led by a communist) - 65%; local mayor - 56%; 
Government - 49%. The Army follows, with 48% confidence; 
Parliament - 39%; Judiciary - 32%; banks - 23%; trade unions - 
23%. Political parties are only trusted by 21% of the population. 
61% of Moldovan citizens have confidence in the public television 
(controlled by communists) and the Russian television, while only 
24% trust Western media and 22% Romanian media.
 This attitude towards democratic institutions, as suggested by the 
polls, is replicated by the attitude towards identity. Only 28% of the 
sample supported the Communist party's decision of January 
2002, to introduce mandatory Russian courses in primary and 
secondary schools (this decision was meanwhile suspended), as 
65% preferred its status as an optional language. Nevertheless, 
46% of the sample would like to see Russian as a second official 
language, alongside Romanian, which involves much higher 
stakes than the first option. While 39% of the sample believes 
Russia interferes in Moldova's domestic affairs, 46% think that 
Romania does the same. 41% of the citizens support Moldova's 
participation to the CIS, as compared to 40% who would rather 
have Moldova a member of the European Union. Meanwhile, 71% 
30
accept that Moldova needs credits from the International 
Monetary Fund.
3.2. Moldova's relations with Romania
The opinion poll conducted under the umbrella of the Chisinau 
Institute of Public Policy proves the complex attitude of the 
population towards Romania and the Romanian spirit. This was a 
major topic of domestic political competition within the Republic of 
Moldova, partially discussed in the study of CEAM Director, 
36Nicolae Chirtoaca.  According to him, the nomenclature-like 
attitude of the leadership in Chisinau explains the failure of 
Moldova's relations with Romania (possibly turned into 
“profitable” relations), while the simple solutions of an 
“equidistant” foreign policy with the East and the West place the 
Republic of Moldova “in an area of quasitotal indifference, 
including major risks for a small state, recently emerged on the 
 37political map of Europe”.
The observations made by the analyst of the Euro Atlantic Centre 
in Moldova should be accompanied by another remark: political 
leaders in Bucharest also contributed to the deterioration of 
Moldovan-Romanian bilateral relations. During the term of the 
nationalist coalition made up of PDSR-PUNR-PRM-PSM, a 
number of actions of the Romanian authorities led Chisinau to 
believe that the very sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova was 
in question. On April 14, 1994, the Chamber of Deputies of the 
Romanian Parliament adopted a Declaration, protesting against 
the decision of the Moldovan Parliament to integrate the Republic 
in the Community of Independent States: “Unfortunately, the vote 
of the Chisinau Parliament regretfully reiterates, the criminal Pact 
and irresponsibly cancels the right of the Romanian nation to live 
in a complete historical and spiritual space (…) In view of their 
geography, culture, history and tradition, the natural place for our 
brothers across the river Prut is undoubtedly together with us, in 
the great family of European nations, and not as part of a Eurasian 
structure”.
The content and wording of such a statement could not be seen 
otherwise but as opposing the right of the Moldovan Parliament to 
establish relations with other states, according to its free will. On 
August 1, 1994, the Government of Romania made a Declaration 
on the new Constitution of Moldova, passed by the Moldovan 
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Parliament and endorsed by presidential decree on July 29, 1994. 
This time, the Declaration blamed the institutions of the Moldovan 
state for changing the name of the official language: “The national 
language characteristic is eroded and areas of special status are 
instated, instead of applying internationally accepted practices to 
ensure large-scale government decentralization; these are 
premises for an atomization of the state, all the way to possible 
federalization, with serious consequences on the independence 
of the Republic of Moldova.”
 
This barrage of statements made in 1994 by Romanian authorities 
(Parliament and Government) were followed by a number of 
opinions expressed by president Ion Iliescu, in October that year. 
During some press conferences or visits throughout the country, 
he said that the Republic of Moldova got its independence from 
38the Soviet empire, and not from Romania.
All these actions had negative effects on the relations between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The declaration made by 
the Moldovan Government, regarding the above mentioned 
Declaration of the Romanian Government, on August 1, 1994, 
said that Romania had the ambition to be “like an elder brother, 
having the right to give advice and practice the same dictatorial 
39and supremacy policy” . Chisinau threatened to bring the 
situation between Romania and Moldova to be debated by the 
OSCE. An international dispute between the two countries was 
barely avoided. But the tensions developed in the mid-nineties 
can always be invoked and used against the deepening of 
relations between the two countries.
The behavior of the Bucharest nationalist regime until 1996 raised 
the West's suspicion as to Romania's attitude towards its 
neighbors. The main reason for concern was however Romania's 
attitude towards Hungary and the Hungarian ethnic minority living 
in Romania. Famous specialists, institutes and institutions viewed 
40the situation under crisis circumstances. John Mearsheimer , in 
1990, the draft Special Report on Romania, presented before the 
North Atlantic assembly by Huberte Hanquet and Javier 
41 42 43Ruperez , in 1992, the SIPRI Report , in 1993 or UNIDIR , the 
same year, drew the attention of the international community on 
the danger of ultra-nationalistic movements in the country, in very 
harsh terms. Romania's attitude towards the Eastern neighbors 
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was not forgotten, either. In a 1992 issue, the magazine, Politique 
Étrangère noted "this position expressed by Romania is, first and 
foremost, part of the claims this country has towards Ukraine, 
regarding Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, but it 
definitely contributes to a tense Balkan climate, at a time when 
44borders around the world are discussed”.
The image of a nationalist and traditionally aggressive Romania, 
in relation with its neighbors, has been in place since the early 90s, 
in parallel with the events that led to the dismantling of the USSR 
and declaration of the Republic of Moldova. There are more 
angles to be discussed here. That was a very complex period, 
when nationalism in the former USSR countries was of an 
ambivalent nature - in many cases nationalism brought about 
freedom, as national solidarity was put forward to serve 
democracy, but this situation is treated superficially in Western 
analyses. Here is a description of the 90s' events, made in 2000 by 
the prestigious RAND Corporation: “In the early 1990s, Kishinev 
tried to distance itself from Moscow. It did so by refusing to carry 
out a republican referendum on the fate of the USSR, as well as by 
ignoring the invitation to participate in the crafting of a new Union 
Treaty. This effort to exit the Soviet Union was accompanied by the 
infusion of "Russophobia" at the governmental and popular levels. 
The most extremist elements of the national-unionist movement 
(the supporters of uniting Moldova and Romania, even before the 
abolition of the USSR), introduced a new political program that 
stressed Moldova's immediate withdrawal from the Soviet Union, 
the disbanding of the "army of invaders," and consolidation within 
the borders of Moldova of "all previously occupied Romanian 
territories--such as Bessarabia, the trans-Dniester region, 
Northern Bukovina and a number of other regions in Southern 
Ukraine - and the subsequent unification with Romania. On 
August 27, 1991, immediately following the failed coup attempt in 
45Moscow, Moldova declared its independence.
Formal mechanisms were refused in the process of liberation from 
the Soviet empire, and a Russophobic attitude also came along, to 
express a revolution that stood for historical reparations. Such 
breaks in international realities cannot be treated in the same 
terms as stability periods. Once the new international order is 
reinstated, societies and state authorities must learn its principles 
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and apply them. The rule is also valid both for the former Soviet 
space - where Russophobic motivations had to be overcome - and 
for neighboring countries - under the obligation to observe the 
existence of newly independent sovereign states.
We should, therefore, note the large debate held in Romania over 
Romanian-Moldovan relations following the crisis in the mid-
46nineties.  Public debates also brought about a change of attitude 
for the Bucharest authorities. Romanian political forces 
understood that they had to take all the consequences related to 
47the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.  
Starting 1997, this attitude has been part of the new government 
programs in Bucharest, because the relations with Moldova were 
defined as special and privileged. Concurrently, documents were 
issued that stated an explicit respect for the Republic of Moldova 
as an independent state.
The political change in Bucharest came at a different moment from 
the developments in Chisinau. The Voronin government shifted 
towards Moscow, thus starting on a conflict path in the Romanian-
Moldovan relations. The climax of these tensions was reached in 
2001, when the Justice Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Ioan 
Morei accused Romania of expansionist moves in Strasbourg, 
where the Court was to decide on the case of the Orthodox Church 
of Bessarabia versus Moldova. The ambassador of the Republic 
of Moldova to Bucharest, Emil Ciobu, said in a letter that Romania 
started “the campaign to regain Bessarabia on economic 
grounds, and to continue the spiritual expansion over the 
Romanians in Bessarabia ”; “... we are under the impression 
that the Romanian side has an interest in granting Romanian 
citizenship to as large a number of Moldovan citizens as possible, 
with the ultimate purpose of discrediting the state institutions in 
our country and facilitating the process of gradual annexation of 
the Republic of Moldova, populated by Romanian citizens”; “...we 
can also note another procedure used by Bucharest: to present 
our realities in a biased and twisted manner, thus casting a 
negative light over our countries, in an attempt to isolate it from the 
48international business communities”.
Under the circumstances of such statements, the relations 
between Romania and the Republic of Moldova went down on a 
path of reticence and suspicion, in the early 2000s. Things are not 
« »
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likely to change significantly in the relations between the two 
countries, if there are no political transformations in Chisinau, or 
no large-scale regional evolutions emerge. 
3.3. Democracy in the Republic of Moldova as an issue for 
bilateral relations 
Ethnic and cultural diversity in the Republic of Moldova can be 
described by the following figures: 64.5% Romanians, 12% 
Russians, and 13% Ukrainians. There are 169,300 inhabitants in 
the Gagauz autonomous region, of which 82.5% are ethnic 
Gagauz, and the rest are Moldovans, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and 
Russians. County  has 30,000 inhabitants, of which 65% 
are ethnic Bulgarians, and the rest are Moldovans, Ukrainians and 
Russians. The population of Transdnestria amounts to about 
700,000 (1989 census), of which 42% Moldovans, 28% 
50Ukrainians, 24% Russians.
Historical complexity adds up to the ethnic and cultural complexity. 
51The Republic of Moldova, with the current borders, (Bessarabia  
and Transdnestria), was created by a decision of the USSR 
Supreme Council in 1940, under the name of the Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist Republic. In 1812, Bessarabia had been annexed to 
Russia, to be united with Romania at the end of World War I. 
Transdnestria was established in 1924, as part of Ukraine, “as a 
bridge for expanding communist ideology towards Romania, and 
52especially Bessarabia” . This explains the development of a 
whole anti-Romanian ideology in Transdnestria, with the attempt 
at introducing a “Moldovan” language of Slavic origin, with a 
Cyrillic alphabet and full of Russian words. The anti-Romanian 
feelings were also stimulated by the behavior of the Romanian 
army during World War II, when it committed real atrocities against 
Jews and “Bolsheviks”. Genuine Romanian-phobic feelings thus 
emerged, along with an irrational fear of a potential unification of 
Moldova and Romania. These developments played a decisive 
part in 1992, when the “Transdnestrian Republic” refused to obey 
the laws of the Republic of Moldova.
Under these circumstances, various social and cultural measures 
taken by the Chisinau authorities have a direct political 
connotation and are often described as trying either to 
Romanianize or Russify the Republic.
Taraclia 
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The theme of Romanianization of the Republic of Moldova must 
be analyzed under its double dimension and, at the same time, 
ambiguity: on the one hand, there is a process of regaining the 
rights of the majority - for instance, the obligation for officials to be 
able to speak Romanian, and the provision of enough 
broadcasting frequencies for the Romanian-speaking media; on 
the other hand, it is seen as putting minorities under pressure, as a 
nationalistic mobilization that shifts the attention of the public from 
the issues of rights and liberties, and as a potential source of 
interethnic conflict. It is also difficult for civil servants to speak 
Romanian, although a law was passed to this end, providing for 
enough time for those who did not speak the language to learn it.
A second aspect is the domination of Russian in the mass media. 
In 1998, the Coordinating Audiovisual Council initiated a law 
regarding the use of 65% of the broadcasting time for programs in 
53Romanian, for both the public and the private media.  The 
initiative was a complete failure, though, as Moscow called the 
Moldovan representatives to order. One of the arguments used in 
the competition for identity in Moldova was the interpretation of 
these actions as “Romanianization”.
The complementary topic of Russification is pointed out by the 
unionist and pro-European groups in the Republic of Moldova, 
and by the Romanian public opinion. Several steps were made in 
2002, which were considered as an attempt at Russification. A 
decision was made for Russian studies to be compulsory in 
education - but the measure was postponed, because of the 
protests of the Romanian-speaking population. Another proposal 
was that Russian should become a second official language. The 
population's attitude towards these measures was assessed in 
the opinion poll presented in point 3. Another decision in the same 
line was that of introducing “the history of Moldova” as a subject in 
Moldovan schools, instead of “the history of Romanians”.
It would be interesting to see to what extent various social and 
cultural measures target rights and not mere public policies of the 
Chisinau Governments. The topic of national identity is of 
international interest, and its protection if seen as part of the larger 
system of human rights; the intervention and pressure of foreign 
governments as to the observance of these rights thus becomes 
legitimate.
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When it comes to using Russian, the compulsory study of this 
language in schools is not a matter of rights, but of politics. There 
are arguments in favor of the current bilingual situation, which in 
fact is an asset for the Moldovan society. There are also 
arguments that can be put forward to limit the domination of 
54Russian, as it gives way to issues of national sovereignty.  As far 
as the “history of Romanians” is concerned, it should be pointed 
out, despite the many opinions against this idea, that the “history 
of Moldova” is a natural development. Studying the history of 
Moldova is natural, because the Republic of Moldova is an 
independent state, and its history expresses its self-
determination, where each of the ethnic groups - other than 
Romanians - has the right to find its place.
The authorities of the Republic of Moldova are called to observe 
all the rights of individuals and minorities. International bodies - 
OSCE and the Council of Europe - stepped forward to call for the 
observance of the Russians' rights in the Republic of Moldova, as 
they were a minority. Sometimes, Moscow itself asked for such 
interventions, which are beneficial in trying to stop the 
Russophobic tendencies in Moldovan society. At the same time, 
an analysis of the situation in the Republic of Moldova shows that 
the documents invoked by these institutions - especially the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minority 
Rights - cannot be applied to the Russian minority, for the reasons 
stated below.
The whole system of protecting ethnic minorities is based on the 
fact that these minorities are in a vulnerable or underprivileged 
position, as compared to the majority, and special measures are 
therefore necessary to induce a de facto equality of opportunities 
for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic and cultural origin. When 
there are no disadvantages coming from lesser numbers, there is 
no point in discussing about minority protection. The doctrine of 
minority protection is applied to non-dominant minorities. But the 
issue of Russians in the Republic of Moldova should take into 
account the current situation, as Russians have a dominant 
position in the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, “non-
specific” instruments for the protection of ethnic minorities: strict 
observance of rights and liberties for the members of the Russian 
community (or other communities) and the principle of non-
discrimination is also applied to the Russians.
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The setting up of autonomous regions is another issue connected 
with identity. Parliament decided in 1994 to grant the Gagauz 
territory a special legal status. Together with the autonomy of the 
Taraclia County, this attitude of the Chisinau authorities proved to 
be modern and open, in order to solve the issues relating to the 
55complex multicultural diversity of Moldova.
There is another issue connected to those above: the 
federalization of the Republic of Moldova, somewhat inevitable, 
as Transdnestria has separated de facto from Moldova. 
Federalization is an instrument that has already proven itself in 
international experiences. Federal states enjoy stability and 
functionality. At the same time, recognizing the value of a federal 
option for the Republic of Moldova does not necessarily mean that 
any concrete federal project should be appreciated. Early in 2002, 
the ambassadors of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE submitted a 
federalization project to the representatives of Moldova and 
Transdnestria. According to this proposal, Moldova was supposed 
to become a federation made up of Bessarabia, Transdnestria, 
probably Gagauz and Taraclia, through a process guaranteed by 
56Russia, Ukraine and OSCE.
Vladimir Socor, one of the specialists in the region, makes a 
57pertinent analysis of the federalization project.  He criticizes the 
fact that this project is supervised neither by any Western country, 
nor by Romania. But, as Socor also points out, Russia has a veto 
right in the OSCE and it can influence Ukraine, which leaves it in 
full domination of the whole situation.
Instead of speaking about the creation (deployment) of 
peacekeeping forces, the project refers to “maintaining” these 
forces. This might mean maintaining the 2.600 Russian troops - 
close to the Tiraspol group - and their arms, which Moscow 
deployed to Transdnestria some years ago, against international 
law provisions. The army of the future Moldova federation would 
be made up of the current armed forces of Moldova and 
Transdnestria. But the latter are considered illegal, and have been 
involved in questionable activities. The proposal on army 
unification is difficult to accept.
The most important matters of the Federation would be decided 
upon by one of the legislative Chambers, in which the 
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representatives of Bessarabia, by far the most important part of 
the Federation, would be a minority. In terms of the importance of 
federal components, this situation is difficult to accept from a 
political point of view. This is the final, and maybe most important 
objection, explaining why the current proposal for a federal 
Moldova should be regarded with skepticism. In October 2002, 
the federalization project was blocked, as the United States 
(directly, or as an OSCE member) reject the project they seemed 
to agree in the beginning.
The handling of the multicultural diversity of its society tests 
democracy in the Republic of Moldova, as balance should be 
instated in the symbolical competition among various 
communities, especially between the Romanian majority and the 
Russian minority. Chisinau has shown a positive attitude towards 
the issue of national minorities. However, its efforts, local 
government initiatives included, cannot provide a solution as long 
as the Moldovan state is weak and unable to secure its 
sovereignty throughout the republic, under the conditions of 
economic (and, indeed, political) dependence from Russia. One 
can say at the same time that the importance of the identity issue 
requires an internationalization of the democracy issue in 
Moldova. Most often, internationalization has a positive effect.
4. The Schengen border between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova: the policy of close vicinity 
The positive scenario of Romania's integration into the European 
Union - provided there are no crises along the way - set 2007 as 
the date for this process. The recent Report of the European 
Commission about Romania confirms this date. Until then, the 
Union itself will go thorough a whole process of integrating the first 
new candidates - starting 2004 - and “deepening the relations 
within the Union.” The latter process is also the most relevant one 
for the political implications in the region outside the Union. The 
European Commission made a recent proposal as to the “joint 
control and management of the borders, together with a 
58community policy for immigration and asylum ".
Romania could take active part in the international debate 
***
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regarding the measures to be taken so that EU enlargement does 
not affect security within the EU, while controlling damages at the 
Schengen border as much as possible. The trends within the 
Union, to make the Schengen space more efficient - as is the idea 
of creating a common border structure for the EU - prove that the 
border inspected actions on the border between Romania (and 
the Union, implicitly) and the Republic of Moldova cannot be 
shaped by Romania, in the future. Bucharest authorities will have 
a relatively restricted freedom of action on border inspection and 
travel documents, and generally speaking on applying Schengen 
rules. The gains remain only at the level of EU general policies 
towards the near vicinity.
On the other hand, showing solidarity with the Moldovans can be 
useful for the political and economic relations between Romania 
and the Republic of Moldova. The activities of the Romanian 
Embassy and the Consulate in Chisinau are of a strategic nature 
in defining the relationship between Chisinau and Bucharest, in 
shaping the relations between Moldovan and Romanian citizens 
and in granting political assistance to the Republic of Moldova.
Human contacts, exchanges of ideas, circulation of individuals, 
encouraging humanitarian efforts and punishing extremist 
movements, cultural solidarity and support for the democratic 
models are values that should suffer as little as possible by the 
instatement (erection) of the Schengen wall.
5. Conclusions 
The topic of internal solidarity within the European Union is 
complementary to the solidarity with the peoples outside the 
Union - starting with the nations in the close vicinity. It is obvious 
that a negative impact deriving from the EU enlargement process 
on surrounding democracies - with direct or indirect causes - 
would be contrary to the spirit of international ethics. It seems to 
stand to reason that the democratic future of the Republic of 
Moldova will be endangered if the Schengen border diminishes 
the connections - difficult anyway - of the Moldovan citizens with 
Western Europe and Romania.
On the other hand, such solidarity is not possible if Moldovan 
citizens, and especially the political elite, do not ensure a genuine 
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and operational democracy. The European Union, Romania and, 
on a more general note, the globalization phenomenon, have a 
positive role in this respect. However, Moldova still depends 
strongly on Russia, both economically and politically. On a long 
term, it could be expected from Russia to at least promote 
democratic values in the satellite countries, provided it manages 
to build its own decent society. But, even if Moscow continues with 
its current policy, remaining immune to Western criticism, this 
does not mean that decision-makers in Moldova should be 
prisoners of Russian policy - except for the situation when they 
themselves promote vassalage.
The most important argument here is that the old concept of the 
ex-Soviet space, as a sphere of influence for Russia, with 
recognition of its legitimacy and priority is no longer valid. The 
Baltic States have broken free of this tutelage, and Southern 
Caucasus is on the same track. Pro-Atlantic trends in Ukraine may 
win as well, and this will bring about a friendlier climate for 
Moldova, with more room for maneuver. Once Moldova has 
common borders with NATO and the EU, its security can only 
enhance. It remains for Moldovan decision-makers to think the 
long-term fate of their country starting from these regional and 
geopolitical developments. If we have in mind the dynamics of 
reshaping the world after the end of the Cold War, the idea of 
Moldova becoming part of the Western security structures is not 
completely gratuitous.
 
A key role for the democratic development of the Republic of 
Moldova and for its European identity to be asserted, is played by 
the “special and privileged partnership” between Romania and 
59Moldova.  The prospect, rather than the current situation, 
envisages the relationship with Romania as an expression of the 
pro-Western aspiration of the Moldovan society. The issue still 
stands, however, of the domestic elites wanting to have such a 
project of European identity. In order for the European option to 
prevail in Moldova, the intelligentsia will have an important part to 
play. Some Moldovan analysts with respect to national awareness 
60have supported the idea of the intelligentsia as an engine.  This 
topic is even more valid when it comes to a European awareness. 
***
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As an artifact springing from the emergence and evolution of the 
European Union, the European identity of the Moldovan 
population needs to be thought over before it is assumed and 
turned into a political factor, with and ever greater burden of 
responsibility for the intelligentsia living between the Prut and 
Dnestr rivers. 
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Romania - the Republic of Moldova: from the “flower bridge“ 
to the iron curtain
Nicolae Chirtoaca
Director of the Euro-Atlantic Centre in the Republic of Moldova
Moldova's history and geographical position have always 
determined its relations with the outside world. Throughout the 
centuries, the country was always in a special geo-political 
position, at the crossroads between empires and regional 
superpowers. In the Middle Ages, the Republic of Moldova was 
the border of Ottoman expansion to the East, while at the end of 
ththe 18  century it became the western border of the Russian 
Empire. Between the two World Wars, the Republic of Moldova 
was reintegrated within the Romanian borders, serving as a buffer 
zone between Soviet expansionism and actual Europe. After the 
end of the cold war and after declaring its independence from the 
USSR, the Republic of Moldova made many efforts to overcome 
this status of a border between influence zones of regional and 
global superpowers, and it viewed European integration as a 
historical chance to achieve this objective. 
The establishment of the new European Union and NATO borders 
along the western border of the former Soviet Union (except for 
the Baltic states) will undoubtedly have a great impact not only on 
geo-political changes in the new Central and Eastern Europe, but 
also on bilateral relations with the countries neighboring this area 
of Europe. The Eastern expansion of the new Schengen borders 
already emphasizes at least two possible trends in the 
development of these relations. The justified intentions of 
Schengen countries to secure their external borders, in order to 
find an adequate response to the new threats that emerged from 
the disintegration of the socialist world and the liberalization of 
border crossing regulations, might result in the building of new 
barriers against the free circulation of individuals, goods and 
services. The new Iron Curtain, maybe more permissive than the 
Cold War's, but erected by the West this time, will certainly 
jeopardize one of the fundamental human rights - the right to free 
circulation. On the other hand, approaching the issue of new 
European borders from the point of view of preserving the 
achievements of democratic and national liberation revolutions in 
post-communist Europe, and avoiding the creation of “outsider” 
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states, excluded from the integration processes, can bring about 
the creation of a new European order without violating the 
European and general human principles and values.
Despite a relatively low economic, political and military potential, 
as compared to neighboring countries, the Republic of Moldova is 
able to play a constructive part in the efforts to ensure stability and 
security in this area of the Balkan-Carpathian space. The 
dynamics of Romanian-Moldovan relations and their nature will 
play an important part in normalizing relations with this part of 
South-East Europe. An unbiased approach of Romanian-
Moldovan relations, seen from the point of view of cooperation 
between states with a common border and similar responsibilities 
towards the international community, to strengthen order and 
stability, to have a less political and ideological perception of these 
relations, to extend the context of bilateral dialogue by an active 
involvement in European integration, can set the conditions for 
overcoming the contradictions and differences that have been 
present in these relations lately.
I would like to mention from the very start, that the beginning of 
bilateral relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania 
does not refer to the period that followed the collapse of the USSR 
and declaration of independence by the former Union republics. 
Right after the former Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) 
declared itself a sovereign member of the former union, both 
parties initiated decisive measures to establish bilateral relations, 
bypassing the former Union center. On the initiative of the 
Moldovan Popular Front, supported by the MSSR and Romanian 
governments, a “Flower Bridge over the Prut” was proposed for 
May 6, 1990. On this date, according to the USSR-Romania 
Agreement on simplified procedures for border crossing, between 
1 and 7 PM, Romanian citizens visited the towns and villages 
along the MSSR border. According to the opinion of Mircea 
Snegur, then president of the Republic's Supreme Soviet, this 
event was a joint contribution of Chisinau and Bucharest to the 
building of the “common European house”.
One of the first documents concluded by the MSSR Government 
with the Romanian Government was the Convention on 
cooperation in Tourism, on September 27, 1990, signed in 
Chisinau by Moldovan Prime Minister Mircea Druc, and Romanian 
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Minister of State Anton Vatasescu, under which the parties 
granted mutual facilitations for border procedures and formalities, 
as well as for accommodation and tourist services. On December 
6-7, 1990, Mircea Druc, head of the Chisinau Cabinet, met with 
Romanian Prime minister Petre Roman in Bucharest, after a 
European tour. “I hope, said Mircea Druc on that occasion, to see 
a more fruitful cooperation between the two Romanian states - 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova - in the economic domain.” 
Reacting to the danger of MSSR's territorial split-up, as a result of 
separatist forces activities in the south and left of the Dniestr, on 
October 25, 1990, the Romanian Parliament declared its solidarity 
with the population of the Republic of Moldova in their desire to 
keep the country whole, understanding “to develop according to 
their own will and conscience, in understanding and harmony with 
all the citizens of the Republic.” Ion Ungureanu, Minister of Culture 
of the MSSR, stated the idea of a cultural confederation. Without 
questioning in any way the decisions of the Helsinki Agreement on 
Borders, the parties were convinced that a new iron curtain would 
not fall on the Prut, as democratic changes had created the 
conditions for a fast development of political, economic and 
cultural relations.
During his official visit to Romania in February 1991, Mircea 
Snegur called the talks with president Iliescu “a council between 
two leaders, who want deeper connections between their 
countries, to the benefit of Romanians left and right of the Prut”. In 
his speech before the joint chambers of the Romanian Parliament, 
Snegur said that the Republic of Moldova promoted a policy of 
strengthening bilateral relations with the sovereign Union 
republics, wishing to conclude such cooperation agreements with 
other states, Romania included, and bypass the Center. Snegur 
finished his speech with a phrase that made a lot of headlines: 
“…we must stick to our kin.”
In the relations with Romania, Snegur chose the policy of small 
steps. The MSSR President was convinced that “step by step, but 
constantly” the Moldovan-Romanian relations would strengthen 
in a natural way. Lack of consistency was, however, a 
characteristic for the personal style of Snegur, the president and 
the politician, over the next 4 years. On April 4, when Ion Iliescu 
went to Moscow to sign the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of 
Cooperation, Good Neighborliness and Friendship, with Mikhail 
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Gorbachev, Snegur said in an interview, trying to reassure those 
who suspected relations between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova were getting too tight too soon, while some of his party 
members had accused him of that outright: “We do not have any 
intention of uniting with Romania. This should be clear to 
everyone. There are too many suppositions being made around 
this matter.” Moreover, Snegur mentioned the need and 
availability for a cultural and economic confederation with 
Romania, emphasizing that: “We are one people, with the same 
language. We have a common national heritage, cultural and 
historical monuments. We cannot just look at each other over the 
river Prut, as we have until recently.” 
During an official visit to Chisinau in March 1991, the Romanian 
Foreign Minister, Adrian Nastase, said that in building relations 
with the Republic of Moldova “…we must take into account the 
European realities, we should consider Moldova's statement of 
sovereignty, and we should take into account the desire of this 
republic to embark on the road to full sovereignty and 
independence. We should accept, for the moment, the existence 
of two Romanian states, hoping to travel together towards a deep 
cultural and economic interference, and a cultural and economic 
confederation, and to be able to preserve the present with a view 
to a future that will allow us to think about a border, even spiritual, 
that will no longer have any significance to the left or to the right of 
the Prut”. “…having in mind the community of history, ethnicity, 
language, tradition and culture, with the majority population in the 
Republic of Moldova, our relations with this republic that 
proclaimed its sovereignty on June 23, 1990, acquires special 
dimensions and nuances”, said Romanian Senate President 
Alexandru Barladeanu, early in 1991. 
President Iliescu expressed his opinion about the Romanian-
Moldovan relations during his visit to Moscow, to sign the Soviet-
Romanian Treaty. In a press conference in the USSR capital, the 
Romanian president said that the signed Treaty took into account 
the assertion of the soviet republics' sovereignty. “As we all know, 
said the Romanian president, the Republic of Moldova has 
declared its sovereignty and, in this context, it can develop 
bilateral relations with any country, Romania included. If you wish, 
president Iliescu concluded, we can say there are two sovereign 
Romanian states.” After the Treaty with the USSR was signed, the 
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Romanian Government decided to set up an under-secretariat, 
later turned into a permanent secretariat for the Republic of 
Moldova with the Foreign Ministry, “to systematically follow the 
development of activities, both in the economy and in science, 
culture, politics and human relations.”
In the field of economic cooperation, the two states set a target of 
100 Moldovan-Romanian joint ventures. On June 10, 1991, the 
Ministries of Culture on both sides of the Prut signed in Chisinau 
the Protocol of Cooperation in Arts, Cultural Animation, Libraries, 
Publishing Houses, Education, Theater and Film. In the 1990-
1991 academic year, 1,150 students and Ph.D. candidates were 
already studying in Romania, and 1,200 Moldovan students 
received scholarships from the Romanian State. As a 
confirmation of the consistent efforts of spiritual integration, the 
cultural activities of the second “Bridge of Flowers and Romanian 
Language” took place on June 16, 1991, when, according to data 
from the Moldovan Ministry of the Interior, 240,000 citizens of the 
republic crossed the Prut and entered Romanian territory.
Between the revolutionary events in Romania, at the end of the 
80's, and the collapse of the last empire, Moldovan-Romanian 
relations were perceived in Chisinau and Bucharest as a sort of 
Soviet-Romanian relations. These relations were based on the 
joint efforts of the two countries to come back to a natural order of 
things, where there was recognition of the fact that Moldovans and 
Romanians belonged to the same nation, with one language and 
one culture. Chisinau and Bucharest were both convinced that, 
under circumstances of freedom and democratic development, 
economic and cultural cooperation would lead to privileged and 
special relations between the two Romanian states. Certainly, in 
its relations with the European countries, USSR included, 
Romania was guided by the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Agreement, reasserted in by the Paris Charter for a New Europe. 
Romanian authorities also had to consider the political 
developments within the former USSR, under “perestroika” at its 
fullest, which was to result in a more democratic regime, with a 
higher degree of independence of the Union republics and more 
openness towards the outside world. 
The Romanian Government received the Republic of Moldova's 
declaration of independence with great satisfaction, on August 27, 
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1991, as it was “part of the logical process of democratic renewal, 
of dismantling the communist totalitarian structures” in the Soviet 
Union. The Romanian Government met “a noble duty in saluting 
the historic act of self-determination of the people in the Republic 
of Moldova, of fulfillment of their legitimate desire for freedom, 
democracy and national self-determination”. “The proclamation of 
an independent Romanian state on territories that were forcefully 
annexed as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact secret pact 
stands for a decisive step forward towards the peaceful removal of 
its consequences, that were directed against the rights and 
interests of the Romanian people”, the Romanian Government 
continued in its Declaration. Romania recognized the Republic of 
Moldova immediately, as an independent state, stating its 
readiness to establish diplomatic relations, as it saw in the 
proclamation of independence of a second Romanian state a 
decisive step forward towards the removal of the unfortunate 
consequences of the secret Soviet-German pact of August 1939, 
and it considered this step as a stage towards the achievement of 
a Romanian unified nation state. 
At the end of October 1991, President Snegur took part in the 
meeting of the former chiefs of Union republics, held in the capital 
of Kazakhstan, Alma Ata, where internal administrative borders, 
turned into real borders between new independent states in the 
former Soviet Union, were recognized as inviolable. Speaking 
about the matter of a potential union of the Republic of Moldova 
and Romania, the Moldovan President said the option was 
supported “in fact by the leaders of the Popular Front, whereas 
95% of the population does not agree”, choosing to have a 
sovereign and independent Moldovan state. These statements by 
Mircea Snegur showed a definite change in the position of 
Moldovan political leaders as to the special and privileged 
relations with Romania, in the context of relations with the Russian 
Federation and other Union republics, seeking new avenues of 
cooperation.
At the end of December 1991, the leaders of 11 independent 
States, except for the three Baltic States and Georgia, signed in 
Alma Ata a set of documents, founding the Community of 
Independent States (CIS). In his speech before Parliament, 
President Snegur justified the participation in the Alma Ata 
meeting by claiming the Republic of Moldova's right to join unions 
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of states, to delegate some powers of its own free will, to take such 
powers back or leave such unions, as per the procedures set in 
the respective Treaty. After the Republic of Moldova joined CIS, 
differences between the Popular Front, supporting the union, and 
the central authorities of the young Moldovan state, more 
concerned with consolidating independence and combating 
secessionist trends in the South and East, grew more and more 
obvious.
Moldovan leaders justified joining the CIS through the need to 
preserve partnership relations with the former metropolis, in order 
to defuse the conflict with Transdniestrian separatists and to 
thobtain the withdrawal of what used to be the 14  Soviet Army, as 
well as its ammunition and weapons, from Moldovan territory. 
Actually, the Republic of Moldova did not even manage to get 
formal guarantees from Russia regarding these two crucial issues 
for the consolidation of its territorial integrity. By joining this 
community of former soviet republics, the chances of soviet 
supporters were reduced drastically. This political objective of the 
forces supporting the strengthening of the Republic of Moldova's 
independence, which did not perceive the integration with 
Romania as an immediate objective, was noted in the Declaration 
of the Popular Front on December 21, 1991, after the signing of 
the Alma Ata documents by the chief of the Moldovan State.
The development of events in the Republic of Moldova, as well as 
the changes within the political forces that fought for democracy 
and national emancipation played an important part in the 
representation of these trends in foreign policy and the relations 
with Romania. Using the terms that were later introduced in the 
Moldovan political vocabulary, we can say that the minority pro-
Romanian unionism coexisted peacefully with the majority 
Moldovan “fundamentalism”, as part of the general democratic 
trends of that period of assertion of the anti-totalitarian and pro-
democratic opposition in the Republic of Moldova. After the 
declaration of independence, an important part of the Popular 
Front considered the right moment had come to formulate the 
union of the Republic of Moldova and Romania as a main strategic 
goal, which came in blatant contradiction with the heterogeneous 
nature of the movement itself, with the real motivation and state of 
mind of most of its members, with the high degree of Russification 
of the population and with the economic dependence on other 
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former Union republics, about to be surpassed. This decision was 
also speculated by separatists in the South and East of the 
Republic of Moldova, to justify the conspiracy against the State's 
independence and the political support for the armed rebellion 
that followed, resulting in the territorial division of the country.
As the Front was divided in the first year of sovereign existence, 
since one of this mass organization's primary goals - maximum 
independence from the former Soviet Union - had been achieved, 
political forces in the Moldovan Parliament were also drawn closer 
together. The activists of national emancipation could be found in 
a number of political parties, which did not wait to engage in a 
fierce struggle for power, following the traditions of the Balkan-
Carpathian space. The unionist option was embodied and 
manifest in the radical-nationalist Popular Front, and the 
Intelligentsia Congress, later renamed as the Democratic Forces' 
Party, a moderate and liberal version of the same political 
direction. The middle chain link was the national nomenklatura, 
represented by the rulers and their followers and made up the 
parliamentary fraction “Rural Life”, the foundation of the future 
Democratic Agrarian Party in the Republic of Moldova. Some 
deputies, who did not feel they belonged in any of the main 
parliamentary groups, declared themselves independent, to 
further join those with more chances to remain in power.
I can take the risk to say that the popular characteristic of the 
democratic and national liberation movement in the Republic of 
Moldova, in 1989-1991, can be mostly, if not fully, explained by the 
Moldovans' effort to keep their identity and stop the sovietization 
and russification processes, by rejecting the soviet regime, unable 
to stabilize the economic situation and to improve life standards. 
Only a minority of intellectuals plunged into the fight due to their 
national and democratic ideals. The Popular Front, as a social and 
political movement, as the engine of the events priori to the 
collapse of the last empire, was supported by most Moldovans, 
who saw in it a real alternative to the impotence of the soviet 
regime, in agony and disintegration. 
Because the high degree of uprooting and sovietization of most 
Moldovans was ignored, and the complex issues of going back to 
the civilized, therefore European and free, development were 
treated simplistically, premature political goals, impossible to 
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achieve, have been formulated. The opposition, artificial for many 
reasons, of the Romanian and Moldovan identities, which are 
actually different only in intensity and not in deep contents, was 
the most destroying and costly initiative that fed many internal 
conflicts and turned local political thinking to a destructive path, 
without any future. The reintegration of Moldovans in the common 
ethnic space, exclusively by uniting the two Romanian states, 
raised a lot of suspicion from the former metropolis that made 
important efforts to hinder these plans and complicate the 
Republic of Moldova's existence as an integral and independent 
state. 
Under the circumstances of the quick collapse of the socialist 
block followed by the downfall of the former USSR and the need to 
identify a secure role and place in the new international context, 
Romania promoted a somewhat prudent policy in its relations with 
the Republic of Moldova, trying to support its effort to gain and 
consolidate its state independence. The destabilized domestic 
situation in the Republic of Moldova, as a result of the separatist 
actions by Tiraspol and Comrat authorities, the presence of a 
Russian army in the Republic of Moldova, especially in the 
eastern counties, the uncertain Romanian-Russian relations 
conditioned Bucharest to support the Moldovan policy of 
strengthening its independence and assuring the territorial 
integrity of the neighboring country, granting Moldovan leadership 
diplomatic assistance, support in international bodies and 
institutions and developing privileged and special bilateral 
relations, in the political, economic and cultural fields, first and 
foremost. 
Therefore, a number of main trends followed one another during 
the period between the statement of sovereignty of the MSSR as 
part of the former Soviet Union and the Republic of Moldova's 
accession to CIS, few months after declaring its state 
independence, depending on the evolution of the domestic 
situation and the relations with the former metropolis: 
1. Establishment of special relations between the Republic of 
Moldova and Romania, as two Romanian states, recognizing 
the historical, cultural and linguistic community; 
2. Obtaining the independence and development of the special 
and privileged Moldovan-Romanian relations and pro-Western 
policies of the Republic of Moldova;
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3. Consolidation of the state independence first attempts at 
solving the issue of territorial and political separatism by 
maintaining priority relations with the Russian Federation and 
other former union republics, by joining CIS. 
When the majority parliamentary group “Rural Life” took over the 
political initiative in the Moldovan government structures, after the 
division of the Popular Front, in the 1989-1991 structure, there 
was also a change of emphasis and priorities of the foreign policy 
promoted by the young Moldovan state, leading to changes in the 
Moldovan-Romanian relations as well. The victory of the 
Democratic Agrarian Party in the parliamentary elections of 
February 1994 allowed the agrarians to introduce the changes 
they wanted in the country's foreign policy in keeping with their 
own philosophy which started from a set of simple ideas, 
understandable for the voters in rural areas, and opposing the pro-
Romanian and unionist options, promoted by most social and 
political parties to the right of the political range. These changes 
and amendments were eloquently expressed in the Concept of 
Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova, passed by Parliament 
on February 8, 1995, a document that aimed mainly at structuring 
and formalizing the trend of foreign policy in the Republic of 
Moldova, also standing for a political credo of the new ruling 
majority. 
The Concept starts from the need to capitalize on the 
geographical location of the Republic of Moldova, which, 
according to the authors, is crucial in establishing mutually 
beneficial relations with European countries, providing the 
Moldovan state with the opportunity of becoming an important 
regional crossroads for transportation, telecommunication and 
other routes. This basic document for the foreign policy of a young, 
almost unknown, state does not attempt to place the Republic of 
Moldova in a dynamic context of changes on the old continent and 
at a regional level, as the conceptual and analytical approach was 
replaced by a schematic and declarative one. Anyway, this 
document notes the status of friendly and neighborly relations with 
Romania and Ukraine, as priorities for the moment, also 
mentioning that “it is very important to extend and deepen 
relations with the Russian Federation, Byelorussia, other CIS 
countries, with the seven industrialized states”. Another priority 
direction of the Moldovan foreign policy is the establishment of 
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mutually beneficial relations with all CIS member states, in the 
political, economic, technical, scientific and cultural fields. 
Referring to the “particularities of historical development, specific 
traits and geopolitical situation”, bilateral relations with the Slavic 
states in the former USSR are considered priorities. These 
relations are important because, says the Concept, “political 
stability and the success of economic reforms in the Republic of 
Moldova depend on them”. 
The relations with Romania, “a neighboring country”, are 
considered of great importance for Chisinau, both because of the 
actual vicinity, and because of “historical and cultural reasons”. 
The cooperation with Romania is taken into account “in order to 
overcome unilateral economic dependence (on CIS - author's 
note) and integrate the Republic of Moldova into the European 
space”. The Foreign Policy Concept aims at “including the 
Republic of Moldova in the idea movement for the development of 
the New Europe concept, integrating the country as an equal 
partner of other countries in the structures, development and new 
spirit of cooperation, shaping and maintaining a framework of 
relations with the whole international community, to ensure 
stability and prospects to the Republic of Moldova's relations with 
other countries”. Finally, the document stipulates that the 
dynamics of international, regional and sub-regional policies 
imply a continuous adjustment of the promotion strategy of the 
Republic of Moldova, according to its national interests, as a topic 
of international law. 
This Concept expresses the visions of the ruling classes, agrarian 
and nomenclature based, russophile and opportunistic in its style 
of seeing new challenges and risks in the post-communist 
development period. The attempt to combine integration in the 
Euro-Atlantic and post-Soviet spaces at the same time, in an 
eclectic manner, and of placing the Republic of Moldova in this 
contradictory context, derived from “national interests”, to be 
taken into account, as it were, by both the Russian Federation and 
the seven industrialized states, shows a dangerous level of 
dilettantism in the new ruling political class, most of it springing 
from agrarian and former party nomenclature. On the one hand, “a 
major and future perspective objective” of the Moldovan state is 
“the gradual integration in the European Union”; on the other 
hand, the final goal of CIS cooperation is “the creation of a 
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common economic space, based on the principles of a market 
economy”: Chisinau was trying to promote a policy that was to be 
assimilated by one agrarian leader to shooting two birds with one 
stone. Another aspect of equal importance in the behavior of the 
new political class in the Republic of Moldova, mostly made up of 
former “kolkhoz” presidents and high dignitaries of the Soviet 
regime, could find its manifestation in this Concept, as a sort of 
peasant “diplomacy” of appeasing all those who may be crucial in 
solving one matter or another. 
Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, in his capacity as special emissary of 
the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe said, in October 2001, 
at the end of a short visit to Chisinau: “Moldova has the harmful 
policy of a village accountant, who makes a careful inventory of 
pro-European or Eastern policies, classifies and directs them 
based on very fluid priorities, keeping them for months and 
months in a portfolio, finally forgetting about them and losing any 
track of them. What follows - sudden, non-professional reactions, 
without any care for details and awareness of consequences. This 
delicate relationship cannot improve the European path of the 
Republic of Moldova, less of all to rehabilitate its economic 
situation.” 
After the spectacular failure of the Agrarians in the 1998 
parliamentary elections, democratic and reformist parties made 
up the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms, which drafted a 
Government Program for 1999-2002, called “Supremacy of the 
law, economic rehabilitation, and European integration”. The 
Cabinet led by Ion Sturdza tried to review the Foreign Policy 
Concept passed by agrarians. The government's priorities in 
foreign policy were connected to the consolidation of 
independence and integration in the European Union. In terms of 
bilateral cooperation, the government aimed at deepening 
partnership relations with Romania and Ukraine, including a final 
legal framework of cooperation and development of a tripartite 
cooperation between Romania, the Republic of Moldova and 
Ukraine. The new policy also encouraged continuous 
“constructive relations with the Russian Federation, based on 
mutual respect - as the Federation is the main supplier of energy 
resources and the main consumer of national agriculture and 
processing industry products.” 
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The Sturdza Cabinet wanted to diversify economic and trade 
relations within CIS, emphasizing their bilateral components. CIS 
relations remained an important section of foreign policy for the 
government of the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms, but they 
no longer were an absolute and irrevocable priority. Although the 
activities of the Sturdza Cabinet did not involve a radical change in 
foreign policy and bore the obvious mark of IMF and World Bank 
memoranda signed by the Republic of Moldova, this document 
lays the ground for a more realistic policy, less dependant on the 
ideological clichés of the old bureaucracy returned to power. As 
the Sturdza Cabinet was ousted in November 1999 by the 
“monstrous” coalition made up of communists, frontists and 
followers of president Lucinschi, this executive did not have a 
chance to ensure a considerable change in foreign policy. The 
Cabinet led by Dumitru Braghis took over most of the priorities of 
the previous government, trying to re-launch relations with the 
international donors and improve relations with the major 
European bodies. 
When the communists came to power in February 2001, with their 
pro-Russian and anti-Western orientation, local and foreign 
political analysts were expecting to see a sudden change in the 
country's foreign policy, according to the election promises made 
by the party, which would reflect on Moldovan-Romanian relations 
as well. But this leap back in the past was the beginning of a period 
of paradoxes in the new government, especially as far as the 
foreign policy was concerned. Although they focused on the 
election promises to join the alliance between Russia and Belarus 
and consolidate CIS, Moldovan communists finalized the 
complete accession to the Stability Pact for South East Europe in 
no time, restating the pro-European direction as one of the major 
priorities of the policy promoted by the Moldovan state over the 
past years. the Republic of Moldova has been accepted as a 
member of the World Trade Organization and the communist 
government is about to unblock the relations with the IMF and 
World Bank, for continuous assistance to complete the necessary 
reforms for the setting up of a liberal capitalism in the Republic of 
Moldova. 
It is obvious that communist party leaders realize the 
consequences of a rapid change of direction to the East, resulting, 
inevitably, in economic and financial difficulties, as Western 
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funding organizations are the main providers of technical and 
financial assistance to the Republic of Moldova. There is also a 
domestic psychological and social factor. The communists who 
came back to power are still marked by the huge popular rallies in 
the late 80's and early 90's, they remember the big national 
assemblies that destabilized the communist regime in the 
Republic of Moldova forever, and created the context for 
democratic and reformist forces to accede to power. This situation 
was obvious during the political crisis of this winter-spring in the 
Republic of Moldova, after ruling circles tried to put into practice 
election slogans referring to the introduction of Russian as the 
second national language and mandatory Russian studies in the 
schools with Romanian tuition. 
The visit of the new Moldovan prime minister to Bucharest, in July 
2001, for talks with Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase 
about the priority bilateral cooperation segments gives the 
impression of new opportunities arising for the development of 
bilateral relations based on pragmatic visions and mutual 
benefits. “We must be more active in promoting Moldovan goods 
on the Romanian market. To this end, we believe it is necessary to 
open a branch of the Moldovan Chamber of Commerce in the 
Bucharest Trade Center”, said Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev on that 
occasion. The Romanian side expressed their wish to open a 
business center in Chisinau so as to give more impetus to 
economic and trade relations based on mutual benefits and to 
contribute to the establishment of closer relations between 
companies in both countries. Romania also confirmed its interest 
in taking part in the privatization process in the Republic of 
Moldova, especially in the energy field, spirits and tobacco 
products manufacturing. Concrete cooperation projects were also 
discussed, as the joint construction of the Iasi-Chisinau railroad, 
according to European standards, as well as building the bridge 
over Prut in the area of Radauti-Lipcani, connecting the electrical 
network between Russia and Ukraine with South East Europe, via 
the existing networks in the Republic of Moldova and Romania. 
The European Union urged Romania to ensure higher security on 
its borders, including the introduction of passports, which meant 
that this country allocated one million USD to facilitate passports 
for certain categories of Moldovan citizens. Almost 30,000 citizens 
benefited of these measures: students in Romania, inhabitants of 
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the areas along the border, people with low incomes etc. 
Bilateral relations started seeing a deep crisis as a result of the 
address made by the Moldovan Justice Minister, Ion Morei, before 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in October 
2001 when the Chisinau dignitary blamed Romania for interfering 
in the Republic of Moldova's domestic affairs by providing support 
to the Bassarabian Metropolitan Church. This political move 
placed Bucharest in a delicate situation, also feeding the 
suspicions about a possible conspiracy against Romania in order 
to keep this country under the Russian sphere or influence, by 
jeopardizing its approximation to European bodies and 
institutions. The Moldovan-Romanian relations deteriorated after 
the expulsion of the Romanian military attaché, colonel 
Ungureanu, on the pretext of his involvement in the protest rallies 
organized by the Christian-Democratic People's Party of the 
Republic of Moldova. 
One month after this speech, the Chisinau media made public the 
famous directives of the presidential apparatus about the changes 
of priority in the Moldovan foreign policy. These directives urged 
state structures in charge with foreign affairs to embark upon the 
development of a new foreign policy concept, starting from the 
country's economic interests, and rely on the pragmatism and 
realism promoted by Voronin, as basic principles of the new ruling 
power, in order to strengthen the state independence of the 
Republic of Moldova. The assumptions, however, blatantly 
contradict the perception of the relations with neighboring 
countries, great European powers-to be, Romania and Ukraine. 
Without considering the idea that the Republic of Moldova is a 
second Romanian state, and disclaiming recent statements in this 
respect made in Bucharest, the presidency identifies as a main 
danger similar political and economic interests of our neighbors to 
the East and West of the Danube Delta (?!). The example given in 
this text is that of the Giurgiulesti terminal, which, allegedly, 
opposes the interests of Bucharest and Kiev to maintain the 
importance of ports in the Odessa-Iliciovsk and Galati-Braila 
areas. The aberration continues with the open (!?) 
recommendation of the presidential strategists made to the 
executive power, to use the differences between Romania and 
Ukrainian order to promote Moldovan interests. The indications 
become more and more bizarre, if we take into account the fact 
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that the Moldovan terminal on the Danube was an almost entirely 
political business, and the economic and financial benefits of this 
project are still obscure. What about the provisions of the Stability 
Pact, then, which stipulate neighborly and cooperation relations 
with neighboring countries as one of the main principles to ensure 
stability and security in this area of Europe? 
Special relations with Romania are turned into more profitable and 
“more constructive” relations, as the Western neighbor is a real 
candidate for EU membership, and this might influence the 
approximation of the Republic of Moldova to the same EU. This 
shift is apparent in the approximation of Chisinau rulers to certain 
democratic, non-nationalistic and non-revanchist forces, 
allegedly existing in the neighboring country. The communist 
language and superficial approach of this crucial issue for the 
Republic of Moldova disclose a primitive nomenclature trying hard 
to appease political rhetoric and the realities of the new 
international order shaping up in South-East Europe. 
Irrespective of the communist rulers' visions about the relations 
with Romania, this country has been accepted into the Schengen 
space and started full accession negotiations with the EU, which 
will have an influence over bilateral relations as well, as this 
process is already influenced at the continental and sub-regional 
level. Many statements have been made about these potential 
political developments, on both sides of the Prut, but a deep and 
coherent study of the issue at stake remains to be done. 
Unfortunately, neither the politicians' statements, nor media 
articles cast any light over possible development scenarios on 
either side of the Prut, which is now becoming a border river to 
Larger Europe. 
Bucharest officials hurried to say that Romania's accession to the 
European Union would not affect special relations with the 
Republic of Moldova. Ruling institutions in Chisinau had no 
particular reaction, as the politicians' speeches and media articles 
were more or less ambiguous. The parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary right wing parties expressed their concern that 
Romania might give up these “privileged and special relations”, in 
order to advance approximation to the EU. Most leaders of centrist 
parties, however, think that a common border with the EU will be 
beneficial for the Republic of Moldova, especially in terms of 
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surpassing its social and economic crisis. On the contrary, left 
wing parties seized the opportunity to put a distance to integration 
processes in Europe, to restate their interest in integrating the 
Republic of Moldova in the post-soviet and Eurasian spaces. 
Anyway, according to the opinions of most non-committed political 
analysts in Chisinau, the establishing of European borders on the 
Prut River does not mean that Europe opens more to the Republic 
of Moldova, as hopes for a closer cooperation with the EU focus 
more on attracting foreign investment and a diplomatic solution to 
the Transdniestrian conflict. 
One of the main consequences of the EU expansion to the East 
will be the establishment of the new borders of Europe in this part 
of the continent. This new delineation will start from Narva-
Ivangorod on the Estonian-Russian border, winding along the 
Western Belarus border, separating this former soviet republic 
from Latvia, Lithuania and Poland even more, then Ukraine from 
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, going down along the Moldovan-
Romanian and Romanian-Ukrainian border in the Danube Delta. 
From a symbolical and practical point of view, the establishment 
and management of the new border of a unifying Europe will have 
a strong impact on the relations with the states outside the 
integration area and the European Union. A new iron curtain in the 
middle of a continent which, geographically speaking, is limited by 
the Gibraltar straight and the Ural Mountains, will undoubtedly be 
an obvious anachronism and a reminiscence of the cold war. 
Secured stability and development of Eastern and South East 
Europe, undertaking a longer way to get in line with European 
rules and principles in order to be fully accepted in the family of 
European nations is one of the most important challenges of the 
European Union in expansion. Certainly, similar or overlapping 
long term interests of the “outsider” countries and the EU which 
are objectively interested in completing democratic reforms, in the 
economic and social field, first and foremost, in strengthening 
state institutions and structures and the civil society, may be able 
to turn these countries back to the path of European development. 
The strengthening of pro-European trends in the large Eastern 
states, as the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will prevent the 
division of Europe into various areas of divergent geopolitical 
interests. This situation is of utmost importance for the Republic of 
Moldova, because smaller states depend on the confrontation or 
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cooperation relations in their geographical area. 
One of the main psychological and social issues in the perception 
of states outside the EU will be the feeling of isolation, which 
means, for the Republic of Moldova, a new separation from the 
natural space of Latin influence and European culture. The lack of 
coherence and consistency in EU policies in the main fields, 
foreign relations, enlargement and justice and internal affairs 
might lead to a new division of Europe. After the geopolitical 
changes taking place in Europe at the end of last century, the 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and other newly 
independent states benefited from an open border policy, seen as 
part of a larger strategy to establish and maintain neighborly 
relations between European states. Such relations, based on 
openness and mutual interests, were encouraged by the West in 
the beginning of the democratic changes of the post-soviet space. 
Bilateral and regional cooperation is considered a main condition 
in preventing a destabilization of regional and sub-regional 
situations. The open border policy encouraged millions of people 
on both sides of the borders and brought its contributions to the 
overcoming of old prejudices, stereotypes and mistrust, in the 
years following the collapse of the bi-polar world. 
 
The Republic of Moldova was among the first to launch market 
reforms and the first of the former “sister-republics” to bring the 
communists back to power. Irrespective of political directions, the 
main Moldovan social and political forces, and political class as a 
whole, realize that the Republic of Moldova has to find its place in 
Europe. As an independent state, after almost 500 years of lack of 
freedom, the Republic of Moldova is in the difficult process of 
abandoning its totalitarian past, and has proved unable to find, at 
times, coherent means to surpass the identity crisis deeply rooted 
in the historical past and the high level of denationalization and 
sovietization, continuously promoted by Moscow over the whole 
post-war period. The economic and social difficulties, the political 
and territorial breakup which maintains the country in a state of 
division, the chronic instability springing from the general crisis 
which started with the separation from the old metropolis make it 
even more difficult for the Republic of Moldova to define its 
priorities in relation with the international world and to promote a 
consistent policy regarding the country's relationships with its 
neighbors and in the context of the European integration. As they 
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have to face more and more difficulties and risks, ruling circles of 
various political affiliation in Chisinau were often tempted to use 
simple solutions in promoting an equal distance policy to the East 
and the West, placing the Republic of Moldova in an area of a 
quasi-total indifference, extremely risky for a small state, recently 
emerged on the European map. 
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Taking into account the specific issues related to a secured border 
between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, a pyramid 
approach is needed to tackle the legal framework, regulating the 
bases of border cooperation, by means of framework laws 
completed and harmonized with provisions of sectoral 
agreements. Each country has the role of making an inventory of 
its own legal framework with respect to this topic (and one 
important regulatory aspect would be a border treaty between the 
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as the lack of such a treaty has 
direct disadvantages for the Romanian-Moldovan border), but 
also to use specific perspectives in identifying those particular 
fields where a joint analysis with the neighboring country is 
necessary, in order to find solutions that meet each country's 
needs. 
As far as each country's priorities are concerned, there are 
differences on the working agenda. Moldovan experts 
approached for this study consider the state border between the 
Republic of Moldova and Romania to be clearly delineated, 
therefore, from their perspective there are other priorities to 
discuss. Romania, on the other hand, believes that the inheritance 
of the right to implement USSR treaties and agreements by the 
Republic of Moldova needs to be examined together with 
Romania and not generally dealt with, based on the legal 
inheritance principle. This comes in response to the point of view 
expressed by the Republic of Moldova (we are discussing the 
views of participants representing border institutions) referring to 
the taking over by the Republic of Moldova, after the dismantling 
of the USSR, of the responsibility to implement certain treaties on 
the Romanian border, which do not necessarily imply a new 
1delineation procedure, but rather joint technical actions.  
Moreover, a number of documents and decisions do not as yet 
have the legal format and power deriving from a bilateral 
Chapter II
Shortcomings in bilateral relations regarding 
the legal and institutional border control framework
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agreement. The issue is not necessarily related to certain 
decisions, but to the legal weight carried by each of them, for 
example the decisions regarding the opening of border crossing 
points, passed by the Interministry and Sectoral Groups 
Committee, with a view to facilitating border traffic. Verbal 
agreements have not been published in the legal register of the 
Moldovan state, which means that the relative provisions are null 
and void. 
The European legislation in the field is also important, as countries 
with a strong democracy have institutionalized these principles 
and practices. The harmonization process should take into 
account the content of international agreements and 
commitments each country has signed and is bound to observe. 
Last but not least, especially for Romania, its concern is 
commendable; to take into account European trends regarding 
various aspects of secured borders, as is the status of border 
crossing for citizens engaged in small traffic, an idea that is not 
applied in the Schengen space. Thus, for this category of citizens, 
Schengen countries apply the same rules as for other citizens. 
Starting from this perspective, both countries should: 
D evelop new legislation in completion of the current legal 
framework regulating border securing activities to be 
achieved with the support of the authorities in both 
countries; one important legal document should be the 
drafting of a border treaty.
Provide a bilateral climate for assessing the implications of 
bilateral treaties signed by the USSR and Romania, and 
inherited by the Republic of Moldova, with a view to 
changes that have taken place. Further discussions are 
necessary in both countries, regarding the timeliness of 
amending or completing some of these provisions, 
depending on the current interests of the two nations. Some 
of these should be reassessed in Romania as well, before 
they are taken over and assumed as such by the Republic 
of Moldova. 
Update existing agreements, even by renegotiating some 
of them, starting from current border realities; 
Review the results of some previous discussions and 
decisions, in order to pass new decisions on their 
timeliness, using the best legal formulas (one example is a 
!
!
!
!
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decision made during a joint session of the Sectoral Group 
for the facilitation of border trafficking, in 2001, about a draft 
agreement to be developed for joint checking. Another 
decision was made, on the same occasion, to implement a 
pilot project in two border crossing points, using these 
approaches); 
Synchronize provisions for a specific border with other 
provisions, regarding relations with neighboring countries, 
in order to obtain a global vision, to identify and implement 
unified border checking standards; 
Monitor the implementation of existing agreements - a 
recently implemented practice for both Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova,
but also:
Implement other agreements, already in force. 
Mentions have been made: 
Fields where regulations must be enforced. Especially if 
Romania joins the EU, there should be a regulation of the 
border crossing status for Moldovan, and Romanian, 
citizens, traders and individuals who cross the border more 
than once a day, for business purposes. As far as the 
Republic of Moldova is concerned, self-employed 
entrepreneurs make up for an important part of the 
population, as they try to add to their income and cope with 
daily economic pressures. The Republic of Moldova has 
proposed the unification of these procedures with the 
current procedures in the Upper Prut and Lower Danube 
euro-regions, of which Romania, the Republic of Moldova 
and Ukraine are members. This proposal is analyzed in 
detail in another section, referring to the crossing of the 
border using an ID card, in the larger context of particular 
border crossing procedures. As far as Romania is 
concerned, the issue of small border traffic should not be 
the object of separate procedures, on the contrary, it should 
observe the requirements assumed by Romania as part of 
European integration, regarding all Moldovan citizens 
crossing the border to Romania. 
On the other hand, the border checking requirements and the 
European standards in the field, impose the drafting of sectoral 
agreements between the two countries, in order to bring them as 
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close to the local issues as possible. Debates have been held 
about the timeliness of the sectoral agreement on: 
The exchange of information at the border checkpoints, at 
the same time with the setting of technical conditions for a 
permanent and fluent transfer. 
The operations of border crossing points and the opening of 
new points, if appropriate. None of the suggestions coming 
from the Moldovan team should be ignored, referring to the 
listing of all joint agreements and memoranda (including 
drafts) about the opening of new border crossing points, to 
be acknowledged by both parties.
A decision to be passed, about the status of border crossing 
in the future, for the inhabitants of border counties. The 
study of European practices, especially in the context of 
their increased weight for Romania, as they express a 
current working mode Romania wants to be able to use, as 
it joins the EU.
There are other particular issues, as for instance: 
The status of motor and river communications etc.
In other situations, the legal framework should be completed with 
regulations to urge the implementation of existing laws, by 
suggesting: 
The urgent draft of a protocol regarding the implementation 
of the re-admission treaty. 
The following aspect was considered timely: 
Conducting an analysis on the renegotiations of the free 
trade agreement between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova related to the setting up of a free trade exchange 
area. The agreement was drafted on February 15, 1994 
and ratified by a law, the same year (Law 94/10.11.1994). 
The experts approached in the current project have often 
referred to the timeliness of updating. The same debates 
pointed out the important expertise to be brought by the 
Stability Pact, as it provides connections with other 
countries dealing with the same issues. 
The need was also specified:
To monitor the implementation of the agreement on 
customs cooperation and administrative assistance in the 
!
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field. 
The practice of monitoring the effect of enforcing current 
legislation is not sufficiently implemented in the area; European 
countries with a stronger democracy and a more coherent pace in 
amending legislation usually monitor and analyze the impact of 
legislation by metering malfunctions and using these analyses to 
draft new legal texts completing the existing body. For countries 
with budget constraints, the assessment of investment (including 
that in border checking equipment) would contribute to more 
efficient expenditures of public, and also international, funds. The 
impact analysis does not measure only the relationship between 
investment and impact, but also the impact of the global border 
management, what seems to be necessary to implement in 
current practices. 
Last but not least, there are situations where regulations are not 
unequivocally linked with the legal framework (though they are 
influenced by it). Legal methods can be found to help implement 
standards as flexibly and comprehensively as possible. The 
Customs Authority and the Border Police, institutions dealing in 
border-related issues, have ethics codes to complete the 
legislation on the setting up and operations of the line institutions, 
where behavior and uniform rules are specified, for officers 
working in these institutions. 
Some elements connected to the Romanian-Moldovan border 
that require additional regulations are already mentioned in the 
current legal framework, and they should be updated, according 
2to the new situations along the border.  Reality shows that, at the 
moment, both Romania and the Republic of Moldova have 
initiatives and concerns regarding the review and completion of 
legal standards, their harmonization with the European principles 
in the field, but also with the legal provisions in connection with 
other relating sectors of the same importance. There have been 
debates about the harmonization of the legal provisions regarding 
border control with those regarding aliens, asylum-seekers or 
refugees, to mention only a number of important elements of our 
concern.
As the Romanian Customs Department is concerned, starting 
with 2002, it introduced new provisions “regarding anti-fraud 
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activities in customs offices, planning of anti-fraud customs 
checking, by consultations with the institution members and 
counterparts in the neighboring countries, in order to establish 
priorities for the prevention and disclosure of customs fraud. 
Specific tasks have been stipulated and the enforcement staff has 
3been assigned” .
In general, debates held with representatives of governmental 
institutions and NGOs show openness from both the Romanian 
and Moldovan institutions, while most remarks refer to the 
enforcement of laws, rather than the lack of laws. Romania 
passed many laws and agreements with the Republic of Moldova 
in 2001, in order to give impetus to bilateral cooperation for border 
control issues. The Romanian General Border Police Inspectorate 
and the Moldovan Border Troops signed a protocol, based on a 
previously concluded agreement, on the mutual trips of citizens in 
both countries, using passports; this protocol included the 
exceptions for students, pupils and workers. In July the same 
year, the Alien Readmission Agreement was signed, which is a 
very important legal document for the listing and solving of illegal 
crossings. 
There are also elements related not to the lack of legal standards, 
but to various hindrances. One eloquent example (also detailed 
below, in the chapter on illegal migration): the Presidents of 
Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine signed in 1998 a 
Memorandum of cooperation in combating crime, and in 2001, the 
three governments signed an Agreement on the same topic, 
identifying cooperation mechanisms (and even the framework for 
a systematic exchange of information and data), but these did not 
lead to an automatic implementation of the provisions. 
Notwithstanding the minimum exchange of opinions and contacts, 
Moldovan representatives have only recently started to attend the 
meetings on combating cross border crime, organized in Galati, 
Romania, where the Republic of Moldova sent a Border Troops 
representative. We have information that the situation has 
improved, but the fact is still eloquent: although there are legal 
provisions, there is a lack of participation in the debates on the 
implementation of the same provisions. 
We should emphasize, however, that existing habits should be 
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translated into clear and coherent provisions, in order to 
institutionalize relations and practices along the Romanian-
Moldovan border, both in existing and newly-opened border 
crossing points. The ratification procedure is also important, as 
parliamentary approval carries more weight than ratification by 
Government Decision. Both countries noted shortcomings in the 
field, the Republic of Moldova also facing the need to regulate the 
status and checking procedures along its Eastern border. On the 
other hand, the Republic of Moldova has already ratified the 
bilateral agreement with Ukraine, regarding border delineation. 
There are concrete suggestions, as the mutual recognition of 
border usage certificates, and there are even more examples on 
the need to harmonize measures and provisions. 
One of the factors that could have a decisive contribution to the 
cooperation between similar institutions is the harmonization of 
the main responsibilities at the same level of competence. There 
are differences between the ratio of responsibilities shared by the 
Border Police and Customs Offices at the border check points on 
the Romanian and Moldovan sides, as in the Republic of Moldova 
the Customs Service has more responsibilities. Certainly, each 
country has a domestic policy regarding the responsibilities and 
competence levels of the institutions involved in border crossing 
activities, matching local needs and the hierarchy in the public 
government of that particular state. 
It is also important for the legislative agendas of the two countries 
to match, for them to be examples for each other, in order to bring 
political debates to closer stages. We are, of course, discussing 
the agenda of debates and approval of bilateral legal documents, 
as each country has a legislative body to regulate domestic 
institutions. For example, Romania delayed in ratifying the alien 
readmission treaty as compared to the Republic of Moldova, 
which led to a number of malfunctions still pending in practice. We 
do not want to state that this is the reason why the authorities of 
the neighboring country delay in taking over aliens who crossed 
the Romanian border illegally, but a synchronized ratification of a 
bilateral agreement would definitely contribute to more efficient 
activities related to border control. 
Last but not least, the accountability of institutions in charge in 
each country and encouraged cooperation at the political level, as 
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well as between experts and practitioners should be supported by 
measures taken by other countries in the region. The issue of 
border crossing between Romania and the Republic of Moldova 
does not refer only to the citizens of these two countries, and 
moreover, it does not imply stability and security only for the two 
countries divided by the respective border. Necessary measures 
are less and less the responsibility of only two nations, directly 
separated by the border, and depend more on the involvement of 
third countries in the region. Trafficking in human beings, for 
instance, has effects not only in the neighboring country - no 
matter which country that may be - but also in all the countries 
these individuals travel through - be it in Europe or on other 
continents. This explains the participants' concern not to exclude 
from the analysis the role and responsibility in the field of a country 
such as Ukraine. 
There was a concrete proposal in this respect:
T he implementation of the Tripartite Agreement on 
cooperation against crime signed by the Governments of 
Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in Kiev in 
1999, especially through the border Contact Center in 
Galati. 
Discussions often focused on the role of third countries in the 
updating and completion of the legal framework. Thus, in the 
context of the discussions on treaties other than bilateral treaties, 
whose legal value and regulations surpass Moldovan-Romanian 
bilateral relations, recommendations were made to examine the 
legal grounds from a global perspective. For instance, the 
Republic of Moldova believes that the problems which are specific 
to the border between Romania and the Republic of Moldova are 
directly linked to identifying those ex-USSR treaties that are still 
applicable in the bilateral relations between the two countries in 
the conditions in which the Republic of Moldova assumes the role 
of the rightful continuator of the former Soviet Union regulations 
on the common border with Romania, adopting however a 
4selective succession line.  International law does not refer to the 
principle of inheriting the right to implement legal regulations. The 
Republic of Moldova should be careful in analyzing this aspect, 
taking into account the fact that this inheritance should not 
exclude consultations with the country at stake, to analyze the 
timeliness of applying this regulation in the current situation. This 
!
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is why, if such consultations with Romania did take place, they 
should be mentioned as such. 
The participants from the two states represented in the project 
often mentioned the role of international institutions, both in the 
effective improvement of border management and in terms of 
political decision, especially when it comes to such a complex 
topic of interest for the whole region and continent. Concrete 
proposals have been made regarding international practices, but 
also diplomatic decisions for which Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova needed to cooperate. Moreover, Moldovan 
representatives suggested Romania to coordinate the actions for 
a simplification of visa procedures for Moldovan citizens in 
Western countries consulates. More details about the technical 
aspects of this topic in chapter IV. 
Nowadays, it is more and more obvious that the regulation of the 
legal framework on certain topics needs the support not only of the 
countries at stake, but also of other European countries, which are 
not necessarily neighbors. There are elements that are translated 
by countries into domestic or bilateral legal regulations, if they are 
appropriately assumed, but these elements are not enough to 
regulate international situations. Affected countries raise more 
and more often the issue of international cooperation, of initiating 
foreign impact projects, with the support of countries in the region. 
For example, apart from the suggestion that Romania should take 
international actions to support a neighboring country, there were 
also talks about the involvement of other international players who 
might have the expertise and authority, to provide support in 
solving the Transdniestrian conflict, as this is one of the 
permissive areas when it comes to illegal crossing of individuals 
and banned products and merchandise. 
We must highlight the realistic and responsible approach shown 
by the Moldovan representatives in the discussions with 
Romanian experts in similar institutions about the securing of the 
Romanian border, in relation to the measures that need to be 
taken to secure the border with Ukraine. The need was also 
mentioned in the conference, for the Republic of Moldova to 
delineate its Ukrainian border at the same time with the measures 
taken to enhance security. As compared to the situation of the 
Romanian-Moldovan border, there are achievements that could 
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be made public and capitalized on, in order to increase security for 
the crossing of the Ukrainian border. 
At the same time, Moldovan authorities admit that security 
measures for the Romanian border are strongly influenced by the 
situation of Transdniestrian citizens, or other individuals crossing 
this territory, as it is crucial to enhance checking measures in 
those areas. The representative of the Moldovan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs recognizes that “the fact that the Republic of 
Moldova has not solved its border issues up to now is also a 
consequence of the inefficient management of this issue by the 
Foreign Ministry, which did not have a special border section 
during the delineation debates with Ukraine, and does not have 
one now”. We, therefore, signal the recommendation that came as 
a result of debates between Moldovan and Romanian experts, for 
the Republic of Moldova set as a priority to sign its own 
readmission agreements with countries of a migration potential. 
Supposing that both the national legal framework and the bilateral 
agreements between Romania and the Republic of Moldova can 
provide the necessary climate for efficient border checking 
activities, legislation remains crucial, but not sufficient to have a 
properly secured border. More often, as it can be seen, border 
activity sets requirements that can only be met by an appropriate 
investment in staff and equipment, and, last but not least, by 
communication and institutionalized exchange of information 
between both institution leaders and - which is more important for 
this particular border - between those who actually perform the 
checking at the border crossing points. Some aspects which, 
apart from the legal framework, have an impact on the 
management of the Romanian-Moldovan border will be 
approached below since they, along other factors, could bring an 
improvement of the situation. 
Recommendations
To speed up the signing of the border treaty between the 
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (Foreign Ministries of 
both countries) 
To reconsider the bilateral legal framework taken over from 
the USSR as a result of the declaration of independence of 
the Republic of Moldova, regarding the relations with 
Romania, to update and complete it as needed. (Foreign 
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Ministries of both countries) 
To monitor the implementation of existing agreements and 
update them based on the new border control requirements 
(authorities in charge in the field) 
If Romania joins the EU, to regulate the border crossing 
status of the categories of citizens who cross the border 
frequently for business purposes, studies or family matters, 
facilitating the crossing by means of new categories of 
documents (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in line 
with the Schengen Aquis) 
To decentralize decision making on border issues as close 
to the border as possible (line ministries in both countries) 
To sign sectoral agreements for an exchange of information 
in the border checkpoints, for the organization and 
operations of border crossing points as well as for ecology, 
communications etc. (authorities in charge in the field) 
To ensure a rapid implementation of signed agreements, by 
drafting the protocols between authorities in charge 
(especially for the recently enforced readmission treaty) 
(signing authorities) 
To analyze the timeliness of the renegotiation of the free 
trade agreement between the Republic of Moldova and 
Romania, for the establishment of a free trade exchange 
area, depending on the economic situation. (foreign trade 
services of both countries) 
Remarks about the history of legal relations after 1990
After the 1989 events in Romania and the 1991 events in the 
Republic of Moldova, the legal framework of cooperation between 
the two states was amended as to be able to provide a foundation 
for the development of relations at various levels. Romania 
developed a number of laws, in the beginning of its diplomatic 
relations with the new sovereign state, the Republic of Moldova 
(recognized and welcomed officially), consequently reviewed and 
completed in the years to come. We will now list the main legal 
regulations, with the fields they regulate, in an attempt to identify 
political, social and economic priorities that have been concerns 
for leaders in Romania and the Republic of Moldova as well. 
In the first years of diplomatic relations between the two countries 
(1991) the legal framework was mainly developed in order to set 
up and operate liaison institutions between Romania and the 
!
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Republic of Moldova (e.g. Decree no. 85/1991 for the opening of a 
Romanian Embassy in Chisinau, or government decisions on the 
cooperation of the Foreign Ministries or Ministries of the Interior). 
One year later (1992) a decision was passed, for the setting up of 
the Interministry Committee for Romania's relations with the 
Republic of Moldova; it is still operational and it systematically 
assesses the stage in implementation of cooperation projects with 
the Republic of Moldova. 
In order to achieve a comprehensive cooperation with the 
5Republic of Moldova, the Romanian Government  drafted a 
number of decisions of economic and social importance, as for 
instance: customs duty exemptions for goods imported from the 
Republic of Moldova (G.D. no. 591/1991), development 
measures for the Romanian-Moldovan trade relations in 1991 and 
1992 (G.D. no. 777/1991) or the decision, amending another 
decision on the same topic, regarding the granting of 
scholarships, doctor's degrees and special training for Romanian 
youth in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, and printing of 
school textbooks for the Republic of Moldova (G.D. no. 757/1991). 
In 1992, Romanian authorities supported (on the basis of a legal 
framework that was settled then) the Moldovan staff hired in the 
local public government or the Ministry of the Interior, with 
technical assistance. Assistance programs for scholarships, 
doctor's degrees and special training as well as other forms of 
material support for Romanian youth in the Republic of Moldova 
6and Ukraine, continued (G.D. no. 235/1992)  and funds were 
allocated for the printing of school textbooks for Moldovan pupils 
(G.D. no. 343/1992). Other government decisions regarded the 
enhancement of cooperation and economic assistance for the 
development of the Republic of Moldova (clearing operations - 
G.D. no. 263 and G.D. no. 320/1992, or forest management in the 
Republic of Moldova - G.D. no. 351/1992). Romania's decision to 
support the development of the Moldovan state can also be seen 
from the analysis of legal regulations developed and approved at 
the moment. Here are some concrete examples. Funds were 
allocated from the Romanian state budget (actually from 
Romsilva budget) for the expenditures of the Bucharest Institute 
for Forestry Research and Planning, to help with the planning and 
management of Moldovan forests (G.D. no. 351/1992). G.D. no. 
859/1992 approved the delayed return of a certain quantity of 
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wheat, borrowed by the Republic of Moldova from Romania in 
1991 - 1992. 
The year 1993 brings the institutional mechanism for the 
Romanian state to be able to allocate funds and assistance. Thus, 
although temporary at the moment, Government Decision no. 
473/1993 stipulated the use of the Romanian Government Fund 
for the Republic of Moldova as a “technical credit”. A number of 
new cultural projects were funded in 1993 (from the building and 
restoration of churches, training of staff and providing literature 
and orthodox religion materials for the Republic of Moldova - G.D. 
no. 612/1993 to the endowment of the National Library and the 
public network of libraries in the Republic of Moldova with valuable 
Romanian books - G.D. no. 634/1993, and also funding for the 
building of the Chisinau Village Museum - G.D. no. 754/1993). 
Moreover, interministry cooperation in various domains led to 
road rehabilitation programs for the Republic of Moldova - G.D. 
no. 753/1993, other projects in the Ministry of Tourism - G.D. no. 
747/1993, and the Ministry of Public Works and Land Planning in 
Romania and the Ministry of Municipal Services and Housing in 
the Republic of Moldova - G.D. no. 500/1993.
Another important piece of legislation is that on the funding of 
economic and cultural integration measures between Romania 
and the Republic of Moldova, a first legislative document of such 
weight (Law no. 36/1993), funding until that moment being 
possible only based on circumstantial government decisions. 
The year 1994 also brings new concerns for cultural and training 
assistance to be provided to Moldovan youth; consequently 
substantial funds were given to provide Romanian books and 
send Romanian teachers to the Republic of Moldova - G.D. no. 
900/1994 and to conduct scientific researches in the Republic of 
Moldova - G.D. no. 901/1994. Scholarships were granted to 
Moldovan pupils and students to study in Romania, a tradition that 
continued every year, as the Romanian government allocated 
annual funds for these objectives. Particular funds were granted 
for youth that wanted to be trained in Romanian military education 
institutions - G.D. no. 95/1994.
It is important to mention that in 1994, Law no. 94 was adopted in 
order to ratify the Free Trade Agreement between Romania and 
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the Republic of Moldova. The agreement was concluded on 
February 15, 1994, in Bucharest and it is a legal instrument, which 
initiated a new period for the economic co-operation between the 
two countries. At present, the need is felt to review and improve 
the relevant laws, which only proves how critical such laws are for 
the trade relations between the two countries. 
The Romanian government has been constantly providing 
support for the Romanian cultural activities organized in the 
Republic of Moldova. The funds for the research and study 
programs have been mainly channeled to archeology and history, 
without neglecting other domains. Students coming from 
Bassarabia have been benefiting from scholarships in Romania; 
in the mean time funds have been allocated for their practical 
training in Romania, according to the Government Decision no. 
637/1993. As to the socio-economic level, funds were allocated to 
build bridges in the Republic of Moldova (G.D. no. 794/1995) and 
also to pay for the equipment supplied to the first welded pipes 
manufacturing line at the Protos Factory at Falesti, Republic of 
Moldova (G.D. no. 1037/1995). It is worth noticing another 
Government Decision no. 546/1995, meant to foster public local 
administration co-operation projects. Law no. 79 was also 
adopted in 1995. The law ratifies the Agreement between the 
Romanian Government and the Government of the Republic of 
Moldova on the railway transport co-operation principles and was 
signed on February 21, 1995, at Chisinau. 
The 1996 powershift did not modify Romania's strategic 
objectives in its relations with the Republic of Moldova. The co-
operation programs went on, both in 1996 and during the first year 
after the elections, following the same trends and still proving 
support for cultural activities and education. The inter-institution 
co-operation reached a more formal stage, as, both in 1996 and in 
1997, decisions were adopted to approve various protocols and 
agreements between the Romanian Ministries of Tourism, 
Education, Health and Public Works and their counterparts in the 
Republic of Moldova. Notice should be given to the Romanian - 
Moldovan Treaty on civil and criminal legal assistance signed on 
July 6, 1996, at Chisinau, and ratified in 1997 by a special law 
(Law no. 177/1997). 
In 1998, the Governments of the two countries signed the 
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Agreement on the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and 
scientific titles awarded by the education institutions accredited in 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The Agreement was 
signed on July 20, 1998, at Chisinau. The draft law that ratifies the 
Agreement was also initiated in the same year, but it was finally 
adopted in 1999 (Law no. 39/1999). The bilateral co-operation 
continued in 1999, as well, focusing on agriculture and the food 
industry. 
During the year 2000 (election year in Romania), the same co-
operation and assistance programs continued, while focusing on 
public works, land planning and developing. In June 2000, the 
Romanian Government adopted an emergency ordinance which 
stipulated that the National Electricity Company should be 
exempted from paying part of its debt to the state up to an amount 
of money equal to the price of the electricity delivered to the 
Republic of Moldova. It is also important to mention the 
Government Decision no. 247/2000 which has two important 
provisions: a number of assets pass from the public state property 
to the private state property and, at the same time, they are 
donated to an Association located in Chisinau, namely the 
Association of the Communist Occupation Regime Victims and 
also to the Red Army war veterans. During the same period, 
Romania acknowledged the East-West Society, which exists in 
the Republic of Moldova (G.D. no. 307/2000). The legal status of 
the Moldovan school and university students who were in 
Romania during the 2000 elections was legally regulated only in 
February 2001.
A new Government Decision was published in 2001 (G.D. no. 
288/2001) in order to set up an Inter-ministry Committee for the 
Romanian-Moldovan Relations. Also in 2001, a law is adopted to 
ratify the Emergency Ordinance no. 79/2000 on the debt 
exemption for the National Electricity Company (Law no. 
209/2001). Remember that the year 2001 is important for the 
present survey, moreover as the Government Decision no 
802/2001 was adopted. The Decision refers to the Romanian-
Moldovan Agreement on their citizens' trips to the other country.
Even if the strategic trends have been established ever since the 
early 90's, the inter-institutions co-operation protocols are 
renewed every year, bringing an updated approach to all issues 
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and priorities. While going through this general overview on the 
Romanian laws after 1990, we have been trying to identify 
Romania's priorities in matters of public, economic, social and 
cultural relations with the Republic of Moldova, and also the 
domains in which the co-operation between the two countries 
generated bilateral agreements beneficial to both countries. Still, 
one thing is obvious, namely the assistance granted by Romania 
to the Republic of Moldova, which also explains the privileged and 
special relations that Romania has established with its neighbor. 
Formally speaking, there has been a series of decisions that 
facilitated access to some government funds to finance various 
activities ranging from research and development to railways, 
agriculture and forestry. Thus, Romania has tried to find various 
practical institutional formulas for its co-operation with the 
Republic of Moldova for those sectors considered a priority, Since 
1993, the Romanian Government has established a constant 
support fund for the Romanian - Moldovan co-operation activities. 
Notes
1. Eugen Revenco, Shortcomings in bilateral relations regarding the legal 
and institutional border control framework, 2002, p. 3
2. A short history of the legal framework regarding the relations between 
Romania and Moldova after 1990 can be found below, in the sub-chapter 
Remarks about the history of legal relations after 1990.
3. Insp. Valentin Popescu, Coordinator, Department for Customs 
Surveillance and Fighting Customs Fraud - Risk Analysis Bureau, 
General Customs Directorate, Inspection Procedures for the Border 
Checkpoints. Similarities and Differences, June 2002.
4. Eugen Revenco, idem, p. 3
5. The legal documentation for this study showed that, in 1991, the 
Government was the initiator of draft laws and decisions, which started 
diplomatic relations with the sovereign Republic of Moldova. 
6. The whole legal framework on scholarships has in view both youth in 
the Republic of Moldova and that in Ukraine.
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The recommendations that follow do not offer the ultimate 
solutions to make the border surveillance more efficient. These 
are but practices and suggestions, which are working in the 
present Europe, some of them having been implemented in 
Romania in the past. Obviously, these are not the only possible 
measures to be adopted to secure the Romanian-Moldovan 
border, but they approach some efficient methods, as well as local 
solutions which could be added to the necessary legal framework 
and which provide more border control. If such suggestions 
referring to concrete measures are discussed (first separately, 
then during the bilateral talks), it might be beneficial for both 
countries, as long as both Romania and the Republic of Moldova 
are open to suggestions to improve the management of the 
common border. 
On the other hand, one has to mention the fact that the present 
suggestions originate in the already tested European experience, 
while not really trying to impose their implementation without a 
thorough, complex local analysis.
Joint control
Joint control is a frequent practice in the Schengen countries in 
order increase the efficiency and to streamline the way the border 
resources are used, to the equal benefit of all countries involved. 
Aware of the fact that there are major benefits which are worth the 
costs, many post-communist countries, where the economic 
reforms are just beginning to be fruitful, have decided to consider 
the practice of joint border control. For instance Poland and 
Ukraine signed an agreement in June 2001 to define the 
necessary legal framework in order to organize joint inspections at 
border checkpoints. As a result of this joint action, Ukraine is left 
with the necessary resources to strengthen the other borders, 
mainly the Russian one, which is a priority. 
Even if a number of benefits can be identified as a result of the 
implementation of this method, the decision to institutionalize it 
Chapter III
Policy recommendations regarding control 
procedures at border checkpoints
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must rely on the local conditions, on the similarities and 
differences in matters of border management of all involved 
countries. 
Joint inspection is an advanced form of co-operation between the 
border control authorities, in order to decrease the time at the 
border checkpoint, to improve the human resources 
management, the investments and the way they are maintained. It 
presupposes the joint use of all devices and equipment (by both 
parties, while they belong to only one of them), and all the 
checking is performed only upon entry. Therefore, the idea that 
inspection officers belonging to the relevant agencies must co-
operate in a concrete manner is still a priority, as the very safe 
crossing of the border depends on the equivalent procedures and 
the thorough inspection. Such a procedure results in a shorter 
checking period (it practically eliminates the double procedure) as 
compared to what is happening at the borders at present. The 
Romanian - Moldovan border is not a unique case, but we shall 
tackle the opportunities and implications of implementing this 
measure for the above-mentioned border, as it is the focus of the 
present survey. 
Having said that, it might be important to mention the example of 
the joint border checkpoint inspection on the Romanian - 
Bulgarian border, for which the operation parameters are currently 
being established. This is the most recent argument to pursue an 
analysis, which looks into the need to establish joint border 
inspection procedures. All the agencies with direct border 
prerogatives from both countries need to be involved; it is also 
necessary to have a common opinion and the commitment of all 
the agencies which play a part in this domain. 
Over the last twelve years there have been talks between the two 
countries to simplify border traffic, and, at some point (in 2001, 
during a joint meeting of the Sectoral Group on the border traffic 
simplification) it was decided that a draft agreement should be 
prepared on the issue of joint control and the need to test it only at 
two border checkpoints initially. 
Still open to this project, the experts from both countries involved 
in the present survey have stressed the idea that now it is 
necessary to perform a complex analysis as to how timely such a 
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project is and also as to the formula to be used to implement the 
practice of joint border control. The Moldovan participants, 
especially, have stressed the idea that such an analysis would be 
necessary for all future decisions and recommended caution 
when adopting decisions which are not thoroughly documented 
so as to avoid consequences difficult to solve later on. 
The involved agencies refer to the joint inspection experience 
along the borders of the countries in the region or in Western 
Europe, as they want to have complete information and to reach 
the most efficient and also the most practical solutions in keeping 
not only with the local need but also with the European standards 
that both countries want to be in compliance with. 
Such decisions will have to be implemented while also setting up a 
series of performance indicators, which is the current European 
practice. For instance, the European efficiency average after 
implementing the joint inspection is ½, that is out of a total number 
of random joint inspections, about half are various crimes which 
are thus discovered. As a general rule, the following are analyzed:
! Q uality indicators - the results obtained by this method are 
compared to the effort involved
! Quantity indicators - the activity load is analyzed, the actual 
number of inspections. 
On the other hand, such an analysis should not exclude those 
proposals referring to intermediate solutions, if they can be 
instrumental in having secured borders between Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova. If all 9 border checkpoints along the 
Romanian - Moldovan border were analyzed and all the 
conditions and implications were studied on site, a conclusion 
might be reached that it would be strictly necessary and highly 
efficient to organize joint border control for some points and 
probably divide this activity in two stages, as the second stage 
shall be implemented only after monitoring the results of the first 
joint control border checkpoint. Certainly, such joint control border 
checkpoints shall be selected using transparent selection criteria, 
which each involved country has established and also agreed 
upon; moreover, such a procedure should be the result of a 
consultation process both among politicians and experts, if such 
an alternative method could also be feasible. 
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Both agencies that are directly involved in border inspection have 
been active in synchronizing their national and bilateral efforts and 
specific projects have been drafted. The Border Police General 
Inspectorate have been in charge implementing the Frontiera 
(Border) project, while the General Customs Department monitors 
the way the provisions of the Vama 2002 (Customs 2002) are 
implemented. This action program was initiated in Europe in 1997 
and it lasts until 2002, both European programs aiming at a unified 
and efficient control at all border checkpoints, along the relevant 
lines of activity.
  
“Mirror” inspection 
The representatives of the relevant agencies working at the 
border checkpoints are responsible for providing correct border 
inspection. On the other hand, the instances when the inspection 
regulations are violated have to be known and sanctioned, but at 
the same time, they have to be thoroughly prevented by the 
authorities immediately superior to the border checkpoint ones. 
Such complementary measures between the local level and the 
central authorities should not be an obstacle for the control officers 
whose activity is correct, therefore one must perform an attentive 
analysis of the “mirror” inspection procedure. 
The “mirror” inspection method means to check the entry-exit 
logbook at all border checkpoints and to see whether the number 
of entries (for the whole country) matches the number of exits on 
the other side of the border. Experience shows that such 
inspections result in disparities, which, had they been known in 
due time, might have generated highly beneficial prevention 
measures. In fact, it so happened that various freight transports 
logged in as exits could not be identified as entries on the other 
side of the border. Generally, such irregularities involved alcohol 
and/or tobacco with a view to recovering the VAT. The most 
frequent cases of this type refer to companies that have branches, 
and it is in fact with the branches that a series of accounting flaws 
were recorded. Such cases generally involve a freight transport 
organized by the branch of a company. Unfortunately, it is again a 
matter of how poorly some Romanian state agencies are 
equipped, which has a negative impact on the inspection speed 
and the sanctions. It is the case of the Financial Guard which does 
not have a national IT system, so it does not have the technical 
possibility to institutionalize a permanent information exchange 
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system among its units all over the country, and this is a situation 
which is beneficial to all those whose profession is to break the 
law.
“Mirror” inspection may be performed through a random control 
system, focusing on specific types of vehicles over a limited period 
of time. It may be used depending on the information and the 
notices registered with some border checkpoints, and the aim is to 
record irregularities which might be subsequently prevented or 
sanctioned immediately. It would be worth carrying out an analysis 
of the effects after implementing this measure, and also of the 
costs and benefits; such an analysis might generate comments 
made by the agencies involved, if such a practice were 
implemented over a longer period of time. 
The national database - a means to organize a permanent and 
structured exchange of information.
Even if the conclusion of a multisystem analysis were that, for the 
moment, it would not be appropriate to implement joint control, we 
consider that both countries have to boost their efforts to set up a 
permanent information exchange system so as to streamline the 
border control. Any systematic exchange of information can only 
be a real support in order to reduce the crime rate in that area, but 
also in order to create a border crossing procedure aimed at 
helping law-abiding citizens, so that they might spend as little time 
as possible at the border. If we look at things in this light, each 
country is obliged to create and manage its own national data 
base, which should collect, depending on the national law, all the 
information coming from all domains of activity that might be 
relevant for the present issue. Unless such a project is in place, no 
further levels can be build, so that various types of information 
generated by this lower level could be used for the regional and 
also international information exchange, beneficial to the security 
of all the countries in the area. 
2001 was an important moment as Romania revisited its outlook 
on the prerogatives and the modern operation of the two agencies 
involved in the border inspection. Crucial normative acts were 
drafted to modernize border inspection as a whole, such acts 
being applicable to the Moldovan border as well. In 2001, new 
laws were drafted on Romania's national border and, among other 
things, a new system was created - the National Information 
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System on the border flow of persons and goods. The system 
operates at the level of the whole country and it records, 
processes and uses information on transborder crime and border 
crimes, on persons and goods. Obviously, when the system was 
organized, the basic element was the overall outlook on the 
concept of Romania's border control and also the specific risk 
features for each of our neighboring states. 
In terms of agencies, we are practically speaking about the 
National Core (Focal) Point of the Center for Combating 
Transborder Crime - the SECI Center. The structure of the 
department is similar to other countries in the area and we are 
going to give a brief presentation of its role.
The National Core (Focal) Points are agencies of the central 
authorities and their activity is to systematize useful data and 
information for an efficient border control; they are also service 
providers in case of some international assistance requests with a 
view to combating transborder crime. Professionals think that 
Romania has the best organized national focal point in South-
Eastern Europe, its staff being a team made up of specialists from 
the Border Police Inspectorate and also from the General 
Customs Directorate, as well as from other agencies - the General 
Police Inspectorate, the IT Vital Records Department, etc. 
The National Point is in fact an interface between the Romanian 
agencies which supply important information for border control, 
which is but another proof of how important it is to foster co-
operation not only among agencies directly involved in border 
inspection but also among other agencies, such as the National 
Information Institute, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the 
General Police Inspectorate, the General Prosecutor's Office, the 
Financial Guard, the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Nevertheless, it is 
quite true that, for such a project which means building up a 
unique national data base, including information from various 
domains, it is necessary to gather together IT specialists and the 
appropriate software; what is also crucial is the appropriate 
equipment which could meet the requirements and give a quick 
answer to all the needs that might appear - and this continues to 
be a special financial effort for Romania. Therefore, it may be 
interesting to approach various international donor agencies and 
pose the question of assistance provided by specialists from 
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international agencies and institutions, as well as assistance 
provided when purchasing the equipment, not only for some 
specific areas, but also for as many border checkpoints as 
possible to cover all the territory of Romania. 
Having mentioned the need to buy the appropriate equipment to 
build an online data base via which information can be accessed 
at any time is just a means to discuss the present-day situation 
that the agencies directly involved in the matter of border control 
are confronted in Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The 
insufficient equipment somehow explains the present way in 
which information and data are organized at the General Border 
Police Inspectorate and also at the General Customs Directorate, 
namely by domains which are not sufficiently coordinated and 
synchronized, which makes it difficult, if not impossible 
sometimes, to use the stored information very rapidly At the same 
time, the scarce funds also explain the drawbacks which appear 
during the interaction of the state agencies in the Republic of 
1Moldova.  The financial problems slow down the implementation 
of the connection system via the local computer networks, making 
more difficult to organize meetings and have a quick information 
exchange. Referring to this topic, the Moldovan participants 
stressed how critical it is today to have well-equipped customs 
services. What is generally stressed by that is the need to have the 
necessary equipment to process specific information (further 
down in this chapter some technical data are included) and also 
various checking devices. The Moldovan participants signaled 
different levels of equipment and recommended that the 
equipment should be almost the same everywhere, depending on 
what is available and what is necessary, so as to avoid as much as 
2possible any unmotivated detention.
At present, Romania has an austerity budget, so it is conceivable 
that various analyses and surveys shall be conducted, depending 
on the domestic and foreign policy priorities; such surveys might 
result in granting additional budget allocation as to these agencies 
or modifying the structure of their budgets. We can only point out 
how dangerous it is to make plans, to establish policies and 
general objectives, without really assessing the existing and 
available logistic and financial support, as no plan can materialize 
and yield the expected results without such support. 
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At the same time, the National Focal Point facilitates the 
communication with the other international agencies involved in 
preventing and combating crime, such as the Regional Center of 
the South-East European Initiative for Combating Transborder 
Crime (the SECI Center), In fact, each member country is 
represented by a team of 'officers' located at the SECI Center. 
That is why, the national points, if they exist and are operational, 
are important information centers and there is permanent 
communication between these national points and the officer 
representing each country with the SECI Center. Last but not 
least, mention should be made of the European initiative to 
combat crime which, in the future, is meant to harmonize and 
centralize information, while keeping it available in an operative 
manner for all agencies in any of the countries which might be 
interested in it. This is the reason why, at present, the Center is in 
touch with international agencies, such as Interpol, for information 
and data referring to the issue of border inspection.
There is no opposition to the idea of sharing information between 
similar agencies, namely agencies involved in border control 
matters in order to grant each other mutual support for a more 
thorough inspection. Nevertheless, the authorities of the two 
countries recommended that an attentive and complex analysis 
should be made of the joint control procedure; the analysis should 
take into account the technical conditions as well as the 
opportunity and should also meet, as far as Romania is 
concerned, the standards of the Schengen information system, 
which Romania is committed to implement. Later on, each country 
needs its own cost benefit analysis. 
The first step is to centralize and systematize information at the 
national level; it is a critical step and all the strategy to combat and 
prevent crime in the area depends on its success. The whole 
system is to be harmonized with the European attempts to create 
an information system permanently available to all the countries 
and agencies active in the field of preventing and combating crime 
and illegal activities involving both persons and goods. 
The European Union policy is to eliminate the internal borders and 
to secure the external ones, so a complex information system was 
put in place - the Schengen Information System (SIS). The future 
role of the system is to facilitate data exchange on the persons and 
88
data which transit the member countries. What is to be noticed 
today is the European countries' concern to make this system 
more efficient, as long as it already contains information and data 
from a larger number of states than the initial number for which it 
was created. The SIS reform is an important issue in Europe and a 
number of new concepts and formulas (for instance SIS-NET) 
have already been debated upon as there is a real concern to 
create a data exchange system which should comply with the 
national law, but which should also facilitate the co-operation 
between the Member States and the candidate countries. 
Purchasing proper software is also part of the problem. For the 
custom services, for instance, there is an officially recommended 
operation system for those countries that do not have a modern 
statistics system, namely Asycuda. We are aware of the fact that 
the Moldovan authorities are familiar with this system, but actually 
each country is free to decide upon using it or not. Using Asycuda 
might improve the customs statistics currently produced, it could 
also improve data centralization and the way they are presented 
as statistical formulas as far as the foreign trade is concerned. The 
system allows access to information not only to the relevant 
agency but also to other agencies that have to be involved in 
securing the borders and which might supply important data and 
information. Of course, after each country has decided to 
implement this system and while various technical and logistic 
steps are taken, one can even think about discussing ways to 
harmonize its use by both countries involved in securing the 
borders. 
Therefore, both Romania and its neighbors need to invest in 
logistics and also in training of the staff that will be in charge with 
centralizing the data referring to the borders.
Recommendations
! Adopting the relevant European experience and adjusting it 
to the specific local features (authorities whose jurisdiction 
is the border) 
! Analyzing the opportunity and the concrete possibilities to 
implement joint border control in order to use the resources 
more efficiently and more sparingly (The General 
Inspectorate of the Romanian Border Police/the Moldovan 
Border Troops as well as the Romanian General Customs 
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Directorate/the Moldovan Customs Service) 
! Systematizing the relevant information in a national data 
base which could be used for the regional and also 
international information exchange, to the benefit of the 
security of all the countries in the region; creating structures 
that could store and process such information - for instance 
the Romanian National Focal Point (the Governments in 
both countries) 
! Clarifying the actual information exchange modalities, 
which should take into account both the technical situation 
and also the opportunity and which should, as far as 
Romania is concerned, meet the standards of the 
Schengen Information System; institutionalizing an 
information exchange system at the border checkpoint, that 
is a series of permanent, regular meetings to evaluate the 
problems that have appeared and identify the common 
priorities (local authorities whose jurisdiction is the border) 
! Monitoring the results of the investments made for 
equipment and border staff in Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova to harmonize and also identify the local needs 
from a joint perspective (the managing boards of the 
agencies with border prerogatives, with the help of the local 
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4.1. The visa issue against the background of the free movement 
of persons
To create a united Europe means to adopt protection measures 
against the dangers that affect the economic and social 
development of the member states. During the accession 
process, the candidate countries assume various responsibilities 
and, just like the member states, they must abide by various rules 
and regulations aimed at providing a safe life environment. So, the 
EU's common visa requirement is motivated by the demand to 
create an internal security space in Europe, but the way such visa 
policy is implemented still varies across EU member states and 
has generated some negative effects, especially for the non-EU 
states. 
The decision according to which the candidate countries are 
obliged to adopt the EU's visa acquis communautaire the way 
without any possibility to get derogation was included in the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The decision was mainly meant for the 
East European candidate countries, as this obligation had not 
previously applied to the other candidates. The treaty has an 
enclosed protocol which stipulates that the provisions of the 
Schengen agreement are part of the EU accession requirements 
and as the issue of the free movement was also a matter of 
common security concern, the relevant responsibilities have to be 
assumed by all those who want to be part of the united Europe, the 
more so as the visa policy goes beyond the scope of the EU 
member states' national policies. 
Consequently, to adopt the standards and the activities necessary 
to introduce the Schengen visa regime, the candidate countries 
are faced with a new type of relations with their neighbors, which 
are candidate countries or countries which are not currently 
negotiating for EU accession. Thus, when some candidate 
countries adopted such policies regarding the visa regime, they 
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generated discomfort in their bilateral relations as they affected 
family relations, the business environment as well as other social 
connections, which should become a constant concern both for 
the national leaders and for the international agencies. Romania 
will implement such measures, in keeping with the EU 
requirements that it is committed to comply with, but it also notices 
the effect they have on the neighbors. The effect on the relations 
with the Republic of Moldova, in particular, are being constantly 
analyzed, taking into consideration the common history of the two 
countries. 
Having said that about the obligations and the reasons why they 
were included in the EU documents, the following have to be 
discussed about visas as a general issue:
Standardizing visa fees;
A wider range of visa types so as to meet the complex 
needs of the most diverse categories - for instance, double 
citizenship holders;
Opening information and visa issuing points in the most 
adequate formulas and locations.
As expected, these issues were tackled during the Romanian - 
Moldovan debates on securing the borders. The representatives 
of the authorities and NGO's in Chisinau stated their 
understanding as to the measures to secure the borders 
(including the introduction of the visas), that Romania has to 
implement as part of the accession to the EU and Euro-Atlantic 
structures. The Moldovan participants stated that such issues 
have to be approached as early as possible, that Romania should 
inform them about its intentions and foreseen measures and that 
such an attitude would not only facilitate the implementation 
preparations which the Moldovan authorities also envisage, but it 
would play a crucial role in establishing an environment based on 
communication and trust between the two countries. Beyond the 
message of friendship and privileged relation that Romania 
addresses to the Republic of Moldova, emphasis was laid on how 
important it is for Bucharest to communicate the types of 
measures it envisages so as to secure the border with the 
Republic of Moldova and also on the expectations that the 
Moldovan authorities might have in order to reach the relevant 
European standards and also not to affect that much the relations 
that have always existed between the Romanians and the 
!
!
!
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Moldovans, especially those who live in the border counties and 
who are related. 
Before supplying examples to illustrate the way the EU standards 
are implemented along the Romanian - Moldovan border, we 
present an overview of the changes produced within the visa 
issuing procedures among the candidate countries and also of the 
problems encountered. It would be useful if experts and political 
leaders from the two countries involved continued the analysis of 
such problems. 
Visa fees
The candidate countries had their own visa policies, so they 
1adopted the recommendations of the Joint European Consulates  
to various degrees, and their overall aim was to harmonize the 
national visa issuing procedures with those of the Schengen 
member states. As part of the process, some countries adopted 
even the fees, so there were cases when the visa fees were 
practically larger than the monthly income of the visa applicants. 
In December 2001 the Council of Ministers issued a decision 
recommending that visa costs should be harmonized; this does 
not mean uniformity, it means that one should take into account 
the administrative costs involved. The reduced costs would 
reduce the negative impact this measure cannot fail to generate in 
the candidate countries, the citizens of which live on very low 
incomes. In order to consolidate their relations with the 
neighboring countries, some states agreed not to impose visas on 
their neighbors until the EU accession when it is going to be easy 
to get a visa. 
Visa-issuing procedures
As to the procedures to be followed to get a visa, there are 
important differences among the EU Member States and the 
candidate countries, while the latter are trying hard to tone them 
down until a common standard is reached. At present, the visa-
issuing process is rather cumbersome, most criticism being 
directed against the type of interview used, as sometimes it 
reaches such extremes that it infringes upon the most private 
aspects of the applicants' lives. The Member States, wanting to 
simplify this method within the limits of the necessary security, 
intend to standardize the interview and to limit it to questions 
referring to the financial means and the purpose of the trip, and 
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also suggest that the queues in front of the consulates could be 
avoided by inviting the applicant to come on an appointed date 
and hour when the interview is scheduled. 
The Romanian-Moldovan working team discussed in details such 
procedures, and the Chisinau participants launched various 
proposals to simplify the procedures to get a visa at present but 
also in the future, at the moment when Romania will introduce the 
visas. The following is a brief presentation of the discussions and 
the concrete proposals made in this respect. 
The Member States are really preoccupied how to simplify the 
visa procedures. Relevant analyses stress the fact that, in most 
cases, visa applicants coming from the non-EU countries are 
treated with suspicion and reserve. The employees of the Western 
diplomatic missions should change their attitude as long as they 
have no solid reason to act this way. For the non-EU countries' 
citizens, obtaining a EU visa must become more of a right than a 
privilege, a bonus granted by one country or another. Obviously, if 
there are indications that the applicant does not intend to do as 
he/she declares and does not offer solid information to support 
his/her visa application, the necessary measures must be 
severely adopted, irrespective of the country of origin of the 
applicant. 
Simplified methods have also been discussed, such as: filing the 
application form online, as the respective form is reachable also 
online. A first screening may be done electronically, and the 
applicant only has to go to the consulate for the subsequent 
interview, thus reducing the multiple costs for the repeated visits 
he has to make to the consulates to get or submit various 
documents. A relevant thorough analysis should take into account 
the current European practices, while looking into the 
implementation conditions and the results. For instance, there is 
an arrangement for Yugoslav citizens, to mention just one 
example from the neighboring area, who want to travel to Estonia, 
to file their visa applications with the Estonian Consulate in 
Budapest (Hungary). The difference between them and the 
Moldovan citizens who want to travel to Europe (and whose 
situation shall be presented in detail in a following chapter) is the 
following: in the Yugoslav case, there is a authorized tourism 
agency that provides all the necessary services, from filling the 
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applications to collecting the visas (such formalities may last 
between 7 to 10 days). So, Yugoslav citizens, unlike the 
Moldovans, are not obliged to pay for a trip to Budapest where 
they also have to find accommodation while waiting for an answer. 
Another problem is that sometimes the visa application have to be 
filled in the language of the country issuing the visa, but the ability 
to communicate in the language of that country cannot be a 
selection criterion for the applicant. This cannot be done today, 
even if the forms include other national languages of other 
Schengen Member States. Speaking about the Romanian - 
Moldovan situation, a high percentage of the Moldovan citizens 
speak Romanian. 
Adequate visa issuing points 
Member States and also candidate countries share the 
preoccupation to create visa issuing points which should meet as 
much as possible the real situation of the applicants. At present 
solutions such as issuing visas at the border checkpoints are 
being analyzed, as well as proposals for « Euro-consulates », 
especially for those citizens who apply for long term Schengen 
visas. The Euro-consulates are being currently discussed and 
they are supposed to be operating only in a few years, so the 
Member States decided to provide additional assistance to the 
busiest consulates, mainly those in the countries bordering on the 
external frontiers, that is the consulates of the states neighboring 
on the candidate countries. If visas are to be issued at the border, 
the border checkpoints must have the proper equipment so as to 
have access to a data base and check the applicant's correctness 
(namely the Schengen Information System - SIS, which is 
currently undergoing a functional review, as it is thought to meet 
only partially the needs of all the Member States and also the 
candidate countries). But such an efficient formula would be 
beneficial only to those applicants who have previously been 
accepted as guests in that country following the visa interviews. 
This method should be analyzed while looking into the possibility 
to open new border checkpoints, both along the Member States 
border and also along the borders of the candidate countries, and 
such a possibility should be a criterion to consider when taking the 
appropriate decision. For the Moldovan citizens, the idea that 
visas may be issued by offices located at the border checkpoints is 
only a subsequent matter, as for them the main concern is to 
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simplify as much as possible the visa procedures so that they 
should no longer be in a position to travel abroad to reach the 
consulate enabled to process their application. 
Types of visas
It has become increasingly clear that one single type of visa no 
longer meets the complex requirements of the applicants. People 
travel to other countries for a variety of reasons, so the destination 
countries envisage the idea to diversify the types of visas, 
especially for citizens living near the border and whose life is 
connected to family members and also social and economic 
relations located on the other side of the border. On the other 
hand, a new type of relation appears between the Schengen 
Member States and the non-member ones, a relation which 
cannot ignore a common past and history that they share. A clear 
illustration of this situation is the case of Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova - the history of the two countries is very 
special, as until 1940, the Republic of Moldova was a Romanian 
territory, then it became a Soviet republic and in 1991 it became 
independent. Experts in this matter consider that former 
candidate countries which have already become Member States 
can go on issuing national visas to their neighbors, making it 
easier for then to cross the border between the two neighboring 
countries, only if the holder of such a visa cannot travel further on 
to Europe. When a country has already become a Member State, 
the border control should be maintained for a while (such was the 
case of the German-Polish border or the Hungarian-Austrian 
one).
 
Another issue to be discussed was the situation of the Moldovan 
citizens who hold double citizenship; the issue was raised in 
relation to Romania's intentions as to the visa policy for the 
Moldovan citizens the moment Romania becomes a EU member. 
In case such citizens enjoy the same rights and obligations 
referring to their movement within the Schengen space as the 
regular Romanian citizens, it is necessary to clarify what the 
Romanian policy in this respect is. Now, the status of such citizens 
is special, as they go back and forth across the Romanian border 
as they hold a Romanian passport. Now that the Chisinau 
Constitutional Court has accepted the concept of double 
citizenship, on condition that bilateral agreements should be 
signed by the concerned states, both countries will have to 
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analyze soon the possible implications affecting the procedures 
that such persons must fulfill when crossing the border to 
Romania. Romania accepts the concept of double citizenship, 
and the Romanian authorities grant citizenship to all applicants on 
condition specific requirements are fulfilled. With respect to the 
present topic, it is necessary to clarify a few things referring to the 
conditions limiting the access of such persons to the territory of 
Romania, especially when, after becoming an EU member, 
Romania will be obliged to impose a visa requirement for the 
Moldovan citizens. 
Another policy option, in addition to national visas, is to allow 
citizens living in border areas to have multiple passes, granted by 
a special permit. It has been a real preoccupation for the 
Moldovan participants and they asked Bucharest to state its policy 
and intentions about the various types of visas Romania 
envisages in the near or more distant future for the Moldovan 
citizens. Romania intends to adopt much of the relevant European 
practices which tends to make no differences among various 
categories of citizens. 
The Moldovan participants stated that the fact that it is obligatory 
to cross the Romanian border only holding a passport has had an 
impact on the cross-border movemnet of people living in 
bordering counties. As compensation, the Romanian Government 
launched an initiative to allocate about 1 million dollars to cover 
the costs of printing and distributing passports to the Moldovan 
citizens, mainly to those with low-income. Nevertheless, all the 
Moldovan citizens who have family and friends across the border 
and whose livelihood depends on trading with partners across the 
border are still very discontent, although Romania has explained 
that it has to meet this requirement as part of its harmonization 
with the EU visa aquis. 
Such a practice is not specific only to the relations between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova. In case a person lives on 
one side of the border, in the towns near the border and he works 
on the other side, there is a possibility for him to cross the border 
based on a special permit. Such a person would hold a border-
crossing permit, which states the number of crossings and their 
purpose. Even if a person is justified to cross the border 
repeatedly, the border cannot be crossed unless the necessary 
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approval is obtained. The Schengen Agreement has provisions in 
this respect and recommends multiple entry visas. The Romanian 
- Moldovan case would involve such a multiple entry pass (permit). 
The relevant Schengen provisions are very clear. A person can 
cross the border several times if and only if such a person holds a 
permit (pass) recorded by the authorities of the two countries and 
the holder may be included in one of the categories defined by the 
Schengen Agreement. The holder must assume all the 
responsibilities deriving from this type of permit which is granted 
for short stays or multiple entries. The holder is granted such a 
visa for no more than six months a year, and he may apply for it as 
a fixed period at one time, or as two separate three-month periods. 
The multiple entry visas can be extended only in exceptional 
situations and for special categories of persons. Generally 
speaking, the categories of persons fitting this description are: 
Businessmen
Intellectuals; persons active in science and research
Scholarship holders
Students
Athletes
Persons visiting with their families
Citizens domiciled in town near the border
Representatives of the local public administration from the 
town near the border on both sides
Activists from various NGO's. 
Visas and inspection documents in the Romanian - Moldovan 
relation 
Out of the above mentioned problems, some have been 
highlighted by the Moldovan participants, namely the procedures 
to be fulfilled by the Moldovan citizens to get a visa to travel to the 
West-European countries and the need the diversify the types of 
visas, including the multiple entry permit (along the border to 
Romania) for the citizens living in the area or for those who do 
business there. This has become a topical issue for the Moldovan 
citizens, especially after 1998, when a number of countries which 
did not previously require a visa for the Moldovan citizens, started 
requiring it. Bulgaria was the first country to require visas for the 
Moldovan citizens, then the Czech Republic, Poland in 2002 and 
Hungary in 2001.
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Free movement to the EU - a problem of the Moldovan citizens
The Moldovan participants told their Romanian colleagues which 
is the normal route they have to follow to be able to file the 
documents and the application needed to get a travel visa or a 
business visa to a Western country, when in Chisinau only the 
German Embassy issues valid Schengen visas for trips to 
Germany and France and only 11 embassies (out of a total of 76 
accredited countries) have service-providing offices for the 
Moldovan citizens. 
Practically speaking, Moldovan citizens have to travel to Moscow 
or Budapest to submit their visa application in person. So, there 
are major financial implications and also situations which 
somehow violate the international legal rules. When an applicant 
goes to submit his passport at a consulate, he is in a position to 
travel through a foreign country without an internationally 
acknowledged legal document which could state his identity. 
Recently, things have turned even worse for the Moldovan citizens 
who want to travel to the West. Since July 29, 2002 Moldovan 
citizens applying for a tourist visa, a business one or a visa based 
on an invitation for the Czech Republic must make a $ 400 deposit 
at the Czech Embassy in Bucharest when they are granted the 
visa. They also have to submit the return travel ticket or the green 
card of the car. The guarantee is returned to the holder in person, 
when he comes back from his trip, which doubles the real costs for 
such a trip to the West for a Moldovan citizen. So far, only the 
Czech Republic has modified its traveling requirements for the 
Moldovan citizens. 
If Moldovan citizens want to obtain a visa for Canada, they have to 
come to the nearest diplomatic office of this country, the one in 
Bucharest. Independent experts who participated in the debates 
think that the Romanian Foreign Ministry should make a 
diplomatic attempt to persuade the Western embassies to simplify 
the visa procedures for the Moldovan citizens. The US Embassy in 
Chisinau and the United Kingdom Embassy in Bucharest would 
be positive examples in this respect. 
As long as such issues are not regulated in a transparent manner, 
various front tourism agencies are still operational in the Republic 
of Moldova as brokers for rapidly acquired visas. Since 1993 
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Moldovan citizens have benefited from the services of such 
agencies specialized in getting visas. Initially, when Moldovan 
citizens applied mainly for tourist visas, as the Republic of 
Moldova had not signed labor agreements with the Western 
countries, the price varied between 150 and 500 US dollars, later 
on between 650-700 US dollars and the agencies did all the 
paperwork. Even if such companies are more strictly controlled, 
they have not disappeared; on the contrary, new, front ones (nor 
registered with the Registrar of Companies) have appeared and 
the price for a visa obtained via this method goes as high as 1,500 
or even 1,900 US dollars. 
Another specific service provided by these agencies is traveling to 
Israel, as most applicants want to go to this country to find a job. 
This is an area where the Moldovan agencies compete with the 
Romanian ones, which have a pre-established tariff (about 4000 
US dollars) for which they promise to get the visa and find a job in 
Israel. The present survey does not aim to study such companies, 
but it draws attention to the practices which fall under the 
jurisdiction of both the Moldovan and the Romanian authorities.
The average monthly salary in the Republic of Moldova is 
approximately 45 US dollars. If we calculate the costs incurred by 
a trip to Hungary, for instance, to get a visa for another country, 
obtaining a visa for entry into the Eu territorz is prohibitively 
expensive for the average Moldovan citizen. The Moldovan group 
of experts attending the debates suggested that Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova should put up joint forces and persuade the 
Western countries to accredit their consular services located in 
Romania for the Moldovan citizens as well so that they could apply 
for a visa closer to their home, and reduce the costs and the period 
of time necessary to get a visa. The proposal takes into account 
the fact that in the near future the consulates of the European 
embassies in Bucharest will no longer have to provide visa 
services to the Romanians. Of course, such an initiative would 
oblige Romania to assume a wide diplomatic mission on behalf 
and with the consent of its Eastern neighbor, but such appeals 
should be analyzed as priorities both by Romania and the Western 
countries. All the prior discussions with the representatives of the 
Romanian institutions stress the fact that only the Republic of 
Moldova can have such an initiative.
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Visa for visa
The above-mentioned procedure obliges Moldovan citizens to 
travel to a country that asks for an entry visa in order to apply for 
another entry visa for the final destination country. For instance, to 
go to Macedonia, a Moldovan applicant must first apply for a 
Bulgarian visa, because only in Bulgaria can he apply for a 
Macedonian one. The more distant the final destination is, the 
complicated and costly is the procedure. To go to Mexico, a 
Moldovan must go to the Greek Consulate in Odessa (Ukraine) to 
get a visa for Greece. Then, he has to go to Athens where he will 
apply for a Mexican visa. 
Documents to be submitted at the border inspection checkpoint 
Another issue related to the above-mentioned topics, is the idea to 
go back to the old border crossing system to Romania, using only 
the ID card, which has been recently improved and which includes 
security elements complying with the European standards. As the 
Moldovan respondents interviewed for this survey put it, the 
problem is even more critical for the inhabitants of the border 
counties, who are persons who do not generally have a large 
income and who are involved in some kind of free trade for this 
very reason, so they take frequent trips across the border. As such 
trips are very frequent, such citizens will have to get a new 
passport much sooner. Initially, the Romanian Government 
provided financial assistance for the passports issued to the 
Moldovan citizens, but once the passports are out of use for lack of 
available pages, the costs to replace the passport will fall entirely 
with the holder. Therefore, the Moldovan authorities consider that 
such technical and financial obstacles will have an impact on the 
border traffic. This situation will not affect only the traders but also 
the citizens having family and friends across the border. And there 
is something else that needs to be clarified, namely the 
procedures to be fulfilled by Moldovan high school pupils and 
students coming to Romania to study.
The Moldovan participants placed a lot of weight on this proposal. 
The representatives of the Foreign Ministry who attended the 
conference organized by the Institute for Public Policy stated that 
the Chisinau authorities consider that the current ID's meet all the 
security requirements needed in order to cross the border. These 
are the new ID's introduced in 1997 by the Chisinau authorities, 
which are the product of high technology. They carry a lot of 
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information on the holder, information that can be read using the 
appropriate equipment, so they are machine-readable. So, to 
common objective of the governments of both countries should be 
to find financial resources to purchase the necessary machines 
which could check how valid the ID's of the Moldovan citizens are, 
even on the premises of the border checkpoint, maybe on one 
side of the border only, and not to provide additional resources so 
that each Moldovan citizen could have a new passport. This is just 
another way to highlight the common objectives that the political 
leaders of the two countries must reach. Practically speaking, it is 
necessary for both countries to establish their short term and long 
term priorities, namely either to conduct a very thorough 
inspection in compliance with the European standards and the 
practices institutionalized by the Western democracies, or to co-
operate in order to have a smooth flow of traffic across the 
Romanian - Moldovan border, while obviously observing the 
relevant European principles. In this respect, Romania stresses 
the idea that the passport is still the official document to cross the 
border and that it is committed to abiding by the relevant European 
procedures and practices. 
The Moldovan authorities favor an easy movement of Moldovan 
citizens across the Romanian border, while Romania favors a 
strict compliance with the European standards and practices 
which stress an exact and safe inspection, implemented in a 
unified manner for all citizens. The representatives of the 
Moldovan authorities who were involved in drafting the 
conclusions of the Institute for Public Policy project pleaded for a 
return to the old ID-based border crossing system, aware that this 
does not allow them to cross Romania's Western border to reach 
the Western space. At the same time, the Moldovan authorities 
believe that this system is compatible with the Council of Europe 
Regulation no 2317/95 and would match the spirit of liberalization 
of trade among the Baltic states, in the context of European 
integration.
Conclusions.
The reason why we have gone to such lengths over the matter of 
crossing the border under a special regime at present and 
especially the moment when Romania will require visas from the 
Moldovan citizens (once it becomes a EU member) is that the 
issue reaches a point where the two countries' approaches differ 
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widely. The present survey tackled this topic as it is a crucial issue 
for the future relations between the two countries.
Therefore, we can state that the Republic of Moldova, based on 
the special and privileged relations with Romania (as they are 
officially stipulated by the Romanian laws) is expecting a set of 
measures to have an easy flow of traffic across the border (namely 
the border trade), the more so when Romania will introduce the 
visas. There are also a lot of questions referring to the documents 
and procedures stipulated for high school pupils and students, as 
it is a known fact that a large number of young Moldovans study in 
Romania.
On the other hand, the Romanian authorities have precise 
arguments and stress both the current relevant practices and the 
European trends which attempt to standardize the border 
crossing procedures and not to have different rules for different 
categories. Romania has decided not to impose visas on the 
Moldovan citizens until its EU accession and it has also allocated 
1 million dollars to print and distribute passports to the Moldovans, 
mainly to those who could hardly afford it. At present, the 
Moldovan citizens cross the Romanian border using their national 
passports. 
At the same time, Chisinau still has questions referring to 
Romania's position in the matter of visas for the Moldovan 
citizens. Does Romania intend, once it has become a EU member, 
to require national visas from the Moldovan citizens or does it 
intend to switch from the current status (no visas) directly to 
Schengen visas? Moreover, as the Constitutional Court in 
Chisinau has recently accepted the concept of double citizenship 
in the Republic of Moldova, on condition that the involved 
countries should sign bilateral agreements, which shall be the 
policy of the Romanian authorities about the holders of double 
citizenship? 
Aware of the implications such events will have both on the free 
movement of persons and the free movement of goods, the 
representatives of the public administration and also of the civil 
society feel the need to conduct an analysis of the consequences 
and of the steps that have to be taken in due time. Any early 
analysis of the various factors that have an impact on the visa 
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issue may help one take such decisions that best meet the local 
requirements and also the relevant European standards. More 
than once during the conference did the speakers stress the 
requirements that Romania has to fulfill both at present and the 
moment it becomes a EU member and which will generate 
concrete changes of the border crossing procedure. If such issues 
are highlighted at an earlier stage, if expert debates are fostered in 
the countries involved or if more general ones are organized so as 
to involve various segments of the civil society, there will be better 
knowledge of the new situation and a more efficient inspection. 
In the future, such discussions should also consider the Moldovan 
visa policy referring to another country's citizens (mainly Western 
ones), so as to stimulate those countries to support the idea of an 
easy movement of the persons coming from the Republic of 
Moldova and going West. Speaking about their own visa policy, 
the Moldovan representatives considered it would be beneficial 
for them to eliminate, in the near future, the visas for the citizens of 
the Schengen countries, as a counterbalancing measure aimed at 
encouraging the countries which intend to support the cause of 
the Moldovan citizens' visas. There is another specific discussion 
on the Romanian - Moldovan relations, and the Moldovan 
representatives consider that, in the long run, the Republic of 
Moldova should promote a visa policy as beneficial as possible to 
Romanians.
In the long run, there is a solution that might be beneficial to the 
Republic of Moldova, namely that this country refrain from 
introducing visas for Romanians as a countermeasure to the 
measure Romania would have to adopt once it becomes a EU 
member. In fact, the Republic of Moldova did not do it this way 
when it came to the Baltic countries either (for which it is very 
difficult for a Moldovan to get a visa), the citizens of which can 
easily get a visa at the Moldovan border.
Generally speaking, the visa issue, and its implications for the 
special relation with Romania, as it was stressed by the 
representatives of the Romanian agencies, involves a set of 
international activities, related to the EU Member states, which, as 
one can see, are worried about the danger of uncontrolled 
migration coming from this part of Europe. As far as the Republic 
of Moldova is concerned, Romania was asked to undertake 
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certain international activities following which the EU policy 
towards the Republic of Moldova should undoubtedly be 
categorical and exacting, but as close as possible to the needs 
and possibilities of the Republic of Moldova. Such an initiative that 
Romania might undertake on behalf of the Republic of Moldova 
would be even more important now that EU has announced its 
intention to grant the Republic of Moldova (together with Ukraine 
and Belarus) a special status as a EU neighbor. In turn, Romania 
suggests that Moldova should be the first to take the initiative in 
this respect, as it is mainly an activity that could solve an internal 
matter of the Moldovan state.
4.2. Inspection of goods and their free movement 
To adopt the Schengen Agreement obviously brings about more 
obligations along the external borders of the Union, both the 
existing ones and the future ones, after the enlargement. Securing 
the borders involves not only obligations for the Border Police as 
far as the inspection of individuals is concerned, but also for the 
Customs Department as far as the goods' inspection is 
concerned. Lately the role of Customs has changed dramatically 
as a result of the newly developed inspection procedures in use 
throughout Europe as a result of the threats already observed in 
this area. But it is wrong to assume that only these agencies are 
responsible for securing the borders, as other agencies as well 
have direct and complementary prerogatives, and the first two 
agencies should co-operate with them on a regular basis. Even if 
inspection of goods and customs fraud prevention is an explicit 
prerogative of the relevant agency, providing secure borders is not 
a matter of mere sectoral policies, as it involves co-operation 
among many more government agencies.
Inspection of goods is an essential activity against a wider criminal 
background and against trafficking in illegal substances. Yet, not 
only the checking procedures but also the transport selection 
criteria have changed in Europe, giving more weight to the 
institutional co-operation between the similar agencies existing in 
two countries. Today, the aim is not to burden the checkpoints with 
the need to conduct detailed inspections but to implement a 
selective inspection system depending on several risk 
parameters, both the international ones and those which are a 
direct response to the specific problems of the countries involved.
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To make it easier for haulers to clear customs, the European 
Union has been investing exclusively in the creation of single 
offices where all customs duties should be paid, right at the border 
checkpoint, thus avoiding useless trips. Of course, such 
streamlining procedures depend of the equipment the border 
checkpoints have, and also on how harmonized the legislation 
(including the commercial one) is, these being requirements that 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova are intensely working on.
On the other hand, the current preoccupations in Europe include 
the need to reduce corruption or a tendency to corruption within 
such agencies as Customs, which are quite vulnerable to this 
scourge. The relevant reports indicate a worrying degree of 
corruption among customs employees, and to prevent it 
information and training programs are organized so as to impress 
a specific concept upon these employees about their position and 
the way they should exercise their duties. Still, one cannot ignore 
the real cause that generates corruption in the developing 
countries among the employees of the Customs Department, 
namely the poor economic level which is felt in the very low 
salaries these people have. This is the reason why countries 
which are currently experimenting modern inspection methods 
are still hesitant about replacing the old practice of the “routine 
inspection” by the method of the selective inspection, based on 
risk indicators. At present, the senior officials of the Romanian 
agency are trying to train the personnel and also to prepare a code 
of ethics specific to this domain.
The agency is currently learning a number of performance 
parameters complying with the reality and the local needs and it is 
also acquiring European practices and requirements, while 
Europe is adopting measures meant to harmonize the inspection 
procedures and institutionalize unified customs tariffs. The 
authors of this survey have been discussing both with the 
Romanian and Moldovan representatives of this agency and they 
have noticed the special care Romania devotes to complying with 
its current obligations, and also for the early training of all customs 
employees to abide by the relevant European standards. Inspired 
by the relevant European practice, Romania has prepared its laws 
on customs operations and the customs inspection. On the other 
hand, Romania has been trying hard to align with the customs 
tariffs system (which is now unified for the Member States), aware 
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that such measures will somewhat modify the structure of the 
micro and the macro economic relations. At the same time, 
Romania has already implemented measures to do business only 
with commercial entities registered with the Official Journal of the 
European Commission, and that gives rise to negative 
consequences for the commercial activities undertaken so far, as 
reality has already proved it.
One should also notice that the customs authority has a different 
role today. What is being discussed more and more is its mission 
to prevent illegal trafficking, which implies some specific training 
and a number of additional requirements placed on the customs 
employees, while at the same time the relation among the relevant 
decision-making factors is being reshaped, both horizontally 
(within the same country) and vertically so as to find solutions to 
decentralize the decision-making process and also to harmonize 
the national legislation with the European standards.
Customs inspection on the Romanian - Moldovan border. General 
remarks 
A key institution in matters of securing borders, the Customs 
Administration in both countries included in the survey carry out 
their activity by implementing the regulations included in their 
operation rules and abiding by the codes of ethics adopted by the 
boards of both agencies. The activity of these agencies, like the 
activity of their border police colleagues is also supported by 
bilateral agreements, more specifically the agreements between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova. Lately, the efficiency and 
the good activity of the border checkpoints (the Romanian - 
Moldovan ones included) depend on the harmonization of the 
national regulations, and also on the harmonization between the 
bilateral agreements and the regional regulations, which involve 
other countries as well in such securing activities, to the extent 
they are affected by that border activity. In other words, even if 
securing the borders affects primarily the two countries that have a 
common border, such an activity also involves common efforts 
made by Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Each 
country is responsible for its own problems, and it goes about 
securing its own borders; in this concrete example, if border 
control matters are not solved along the Western border of the 
Republic of Moldova there will be serious repercussions on the 
activity along the Romanian border.
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As a general rule, along Romania's state borders in general, and 
along the border with the Republic of Moldova, there are some 
expectations related to the border inspection activity of the 
customs officer. Here they are:
border investigations, an activity which has shown some 
malfunctions which shall be detailed later on, when 
discussing the harmonization of the border inspection 
procedures on both sides of the border;
activities which run simultaneously in order to prevent 
crime, to detect any possible risks and dangers, which has 
also allowed us to tackle issues related to the lack of a 
proper framework for the information exchange between 
the Romanian and the Moldovan parties.
Undoubtedly, the position of the customs representative at the 
checkpoint is crucial both for streamlined checking procedures 
and merchandise circulation and, in general, for an observance of 
proper standards. Just like in the case of the representatives of the 
second crucial agency there, the border police, the quality of 
current activities derives from the training of the official, from his 
intransigence (as he is constantly under pressure from corruption 
temptation due to the pay he receives and which is situated below 
the national average in Romania), but also from the equipment 
available at the checkpoint. Of course, the two agencies 
cooperate on multiple levels, and Customs can initiate the 
thorough inspection of a transport both ex officio, and based on a 
referral from the border police, based on probable cause.
On the border between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, 
there is an ongoing activity of equipping the checkpoints 
according to modern standards. The best-equipped checkpoints - 
based primarily on European funding - are those at Ungheni, 
Leuseni, Sculeni and Giurgiulesti; Romanian customs also has 
investment programs for the development of infrastructure at the 
latter two, out of its own budget. In that context, we should mention 
that those checkpoints are situated on land and, consequently, 
their procedures are those specific to land checkpoints. On 
reading the Implementation Regulations of the Romanian 
Customs Code, one notes that the first inspection procedure in the 
case of merchandise refers to the documentation and then the 
procedure is: inspection of the outside of the vehicle, inspection of 
the driver's compartments and, as the case may be, the 
!
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refrigeration system. In the case of vehicles that circulate empty, 
the inside of the cargo space will also be inspected (art. 23, par. 1). 
If the inspection of the vehicles outside reveals missing or 
deteriorated seals (…), the inspection will move inside the cargo 
space and will include the merchandise. The customs authority 
will take down the inspection results in a report that will be signed 
both by the customs inspector and by the carrier (art. 23, par. 2).
In the spirit of cooperation between the employees of the General 
Customs Department, in situations when, for tactical reasons, an 
appropriate customs inspection cannot be performed on a 
vehicle's entry into the country, such vehicles are taken - under the 
escort of the checkpoint's customs inspector - to the nearest 
customs office inside the country, on the route to the vehicle's 
destination, where the necessary conditions for an appropriate 
inspection are in place (art. 23, par. 3).
Just like in the case of debates on the activity of the border police, 
the customs inspectors have been found to suffer from an 
absence of communication and information exchange between 
counterparts. A common database, organized per domains that 
answer the requirements of both parties and that can be 
systematically accessed by both Romanian and Moldovan 
representatives would be a substantial contribution to streamlined 
activities; such a database would, of course, be the result of an 
analysis based on timeliness and cost and that would establish a 
system to satisfy both Romania and the Republic of Moldova. In 
fact, in a previous chapter, we have already approached the issue 
of organizing information at the national level first (see the chapter 
on the National Information System and the National Focus 
Center) and then at a bilateral or multilateral level, per domains 
and agencies. We must emphasize again, however, the role of 
such a joint information system, which would visibly streamline the 
circulation of cargo over the border between Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova. But beyond the obvious practical 
advantages, the system would also contribute to strengthening 
mutual confidence between partners on both sides of the border; 
such an effect has, in fact, been intensely discussed by the two 
sides.
During research for the present material and discussions with 
representatives of border agencies in Romania and the Republic 
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of Moldova, we noted the desire to have a joint inspection system 
implemented. Such a system is regarded as particularly useful for 
cargo trucks. Following discussions between experts, the 
conclusion shared by both Romania and the Republic of Moldova 
was that it was necessary to have a thorough, complex study first, 
which would yield the best formula, the consequences as well as 
the costs for each of the two countries, and then adopt the 
decision. Mention must be made that, as of 2001, Romanian law 
stipulates the possibility of a detailed inspection only for certain 
situations and primarily of the transport documentation and 
customs statement. 
The system involves the setting up of joint teams (made up of 
agency representatives from both countries) that would inspect 
the transport, “on entry”, and checkpoints will exist alternatively on 
both Romanian and Moldovan territory, according to a schedule 
agreed upon by both countries. The legal framework for peer 
cooperation between representatives of the key agencies in both 
countries is already in place, after Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova signed an agreement in 2000, which stipulates, under 
Art. 15, the possibility to have customs cooperation and mutual 
administrative assistance for the prevention, investigation and 
combating of customs violations. 
By decreasing the number of inspections down to a certain 
threshold, the intention is to put in place a selective system, based 
on priorities and risk analysis, so that the only targeted vehicles 
would be those that would match certain risk indicators and 
parameters the two countries have agreed upon. It is not by 
accident that the need to have a study in this domain was deemed 
necessary, because the new system would increase the risk of a 
customs inspector to miss an illegal transport and let it through, 
relying on his own indicators. There is also a European trend now 
to increase the level of responsibility of border checkpoint officials, 
but to also place more faith in the official's judgment and ability to 
use his equipment. And this also accounts for the reluctance some 
checkpoint officials have shown in implementing new inspection 
methods, since they are obviously afraid of incompetence 
allegations and, maybe, other unpleasant consequences. 
The biggest problem for customs inspection activities on the 
border between Romania and the Republic of Moldova (which is 
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not, however, a characteristic of this border) arises from the lack of 
trust between counterparts of he two sides' checkpoints. At 
present, a person traveling over that border, with or without a 
cargo, will be inspected by both the Romanian and the Moldovan 
side, without them communicating and exchanging information 
that could shorten the time spent by that person on the border. In 
the absence of inspection criteria that would be known, agreed 
upon and implemented on both sides of the border, the 
procedures are cumbersome and sometimes superficial; the first 
victim is the citizen, who wishes to cross the border lawfully, for 
personal or business purposes. A joint inspection, a practice that 
can only operate based on mutual trust, would greatly streamline 
the current practice and each of the two sides would automatically 
benefit from the activities of the other.
There continue to exist notable differences between the 
equipment used by both sides. The Romanian team, present at 
the expert debate organized by the coordinators of the present 
report, stated its readiness to share its own equipment and 
distribute it in a more organized and efficient manner among all 
checkpoints, based on their current situation and also on their 
geographical and economic context. It is useful to repeat here that 
it is of paramount importance for both sides to benefit from the 
results of equipment based inspection, irrespective of the physical 
location of the equipment. 
Not lastly, it is important to note that differences have been 
reported between the decision-making (political) and the 
executive levels (management of agencies in charge of 
implementing political decisions and, further on their 
representatives at the border checkpoints). Of course, insufficient 
communication exists all the time, and also in situations different 
from those involving agencies with jurisdiction on the border; 
better communication is a desire of all agencies that have 
representatives in the territory. However, because of the 
persistence of discussions over this issue, we wish to emphasize 
that the very representatives of agencies with jurisdiction on the 
border will admit that political decisions take very little account of 
realities on the border and, conversely, issues that arise out of 
practice on the border - and which could to contribute to improved 
border procedures between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova - have great difficulty finding their way into political 
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decisions. 
Based on a permanent exchange of information that should exist 
at the level of counterparts in Romania and Moldova, the drive 
should be towards the widest possible decentralization of 
decision-making, without, however, ignoring the role - especially 
at the level of global policies, of national regulations - that goes to 
national agencies. In he multitude of problems that arise at border 
checkpoints there is a need to have more freedom of decision for 
the people who are in charge at that checkpoint, so that 
unexpected criminal developments can be handled efficiently. For 
that reason, communication between Romanian and Moldovan 
counterparts cannot be an occasional occurrence, but a system of 
permanent consultations, aiming to assess the existing problems 
and identify both separate and common priorities that would 
counteract criminal trends. Given the extent of the criminal 
phenomenon and the unfortunate improvement of criminal 
methods both in the domain of circulation of individuals and in the 
domain of cargo movement, a systematic exchange of information 
and consultation between officials but also between inspection 
officers in their respective domains would be particularly 
beneficial in achieving border control. The exchange of 
information must start from the basics, from knowing the 
responsibilities and decision discretion of checkpoint officials and 
go upwards towards the vision each team has on making their 
checkpoint secure, a vision that can contribute to a common 
strategy.
Over the past few years, the European community (and primarily 
Germany) has been paying special attention to inspection 
procedures on the border between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova, but also on their border with Ukraine. Considerable 
amounts went into training inspection officers, improving the 
communication between headquarters and checkpoints and into 
buying equipment. The European assistance process is ongoing. 
There is a danger, however, that the concentration (i.e. 
investment) exclusively on the border between Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova/Romania and Ukraine will lead to losing sight 
of the fact that Romania's other borders have not yet reached the 
required European security standards. In fact, the Romanian 
media has covered a number of violations on the border between 
Romania and Bulgaria, which occurred - in part - because of very 
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2poor technical equipment.  Of course, the causes are quite 
numerous here, but we wanted to emphasize the importance of an 
integrated approach at a national level to Western assistance for 
Romanian border control, especially in the context of regional 
illegal trafficking activities which are getting worse and are 
becoming a threat to Romania and other countries in the region, 
and whose origin is not exclusively in the Republic of Moldova. 
The international community has already shown readiness to 
invest in assistance for this domain. Programs are underway, with 
substantial European financing, especially for border control 
between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, but not only. One 
other example would be the World Bank, which has financed the 
Republic of Moldova for the program “Streamlining trade and 
transportation in South East Europe”, aimed at improving 
management on the Moldovan border, at improving inspection 
efficiency, but also at  providing modern equipment for customs 
inspection and for communication between checkpoints. In fact, 
the most visible effect of poor border control occurs at the level of 
commercial exchanges, and that is why we will tackle this aspect 
separately, below. 
Customs and impact on commercial relations between the two 
countries 
The problem of merchandise entering Romanian territory (in 
transit or as a final destination) cannot be reduced to analyzing 
situations that are the exclusive result of customs regulations in 
the two countries. In fact, we can take an example we are all 
familiar with by now, namely that in Romania, the role of the 
General Customs Department - as regards boosting trade and 
putting in place a favorable climate for such activities - is to provide 
reports, data and surveys. On that basis, the agencies whose task 
is to establish complex strategies engage in technical, operational 
and diplomatic endeavors. In Romania, the Customs information 
is the basis for measures generated by a Department of the 
government whose task is to work out plans for its domain. That is 
why we feel we should again emphasize the importance of 
interagency cooperation, primarily at the national level, as the 
border control issue carries effects of the most complex order at 
the social and economic levels.
National interests to encourage trade, and good intentions for 
mutual support are now combined with (or conditioned by) 
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observance of international obligations. Our reference here is 
primarily to the obligations Romania undertook in the context of 
preparations for accession to European Union membership, but 
also on the long term, once it becomes a member of the Union.
European import/export requirements now have effects even in 
the trade between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. A recent 
example covered by the Romanian media is the Romanian 
government's decision, as of May this year, to allow imports of 
animal products from non-EU countries only from entities that 
3have EU's approval.  This situation has a special significance 
especially as the main products imported by Romania from the 
Republic of Moldova are: plant products - 20% and live animals 
and animal products - 14.9%. This is a statistics from the year 
2000 and only serves as an example. The eastwards enlargement 
of the Schengen border entails increasingly complex 
consequences at the level of commercial relations with countries 
that are still outside Schengen. It is, therefore, to be assumed that 
the new context arising from Romania's integration into the 
Schengen space (and the system of responsibilities deriving 
therefrom) and, further, from Romania's future integration into the 
European Union will bring about important changes in the 
import/export relations with the Republic of Moldova. The fact that 
some of the Republic of Moldova's products are now accepted 
only selectively on the Romanian market, based on transparent 
criteria that have been made public, means the Republic of 
Moldova will have to revise its foreign trade strategy. To the same 
extent, Romania's being a part of the European market will 
redirect its export strategy (as more exports will now be directed 
towards the CIS countries) and that will have a considerable 
significance for the imports of the Republic of Moldova in general, 
and imports from Romania in particular. We should not forget that, 
currently, the Republic of Moldova is one of the importing 
countries in the region. the Republic of Moldova will have to export 
primarily eastwards, in countries where the purchasing power is 
different from that of Western Europe, and import form the West; 
that means the Republic of Moldova will have to invest 
significantly in order to balance the two directions. At present, the 
Republic of Moldova's exports are facilitated, among other things, 
by the free circulation of merchandise/individuals towards 
4Romania and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
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As a consequence, the Customs representatives in the territory 
will now have additional obligations regarding accepted 
categories of goods, besides those which are banned to begin 
with, since their quality endangers the health and life of 
consumers.
Moreover, European procedures in the domain recommend 
exigency in analyzing not just the state of the products, but also 
their country of origin, an aspect which is difficult to establish, 
especially for goods whose documents are not entirely legal. 
Discussions have also approached the differences of customs 
duties between the two countries, an aspect which requires a 
detailed analysis, in keeping with the European requirements 
Romanian has pledged to observe and that we mentioned earlier. 
Eventually, the European standards and the efforts of the 
international community cannot replace a country's dedication 
and determination. Effective border control depends to a large 
extent on budget appropriations for activities and agencies with 
jurisdiction in the domain. Nowadays the border is no longer an 
obstacle for the movement of individuals and goods, but it is still 
necessary to adopt measures to reduce and control criminal 
phenomena that can even pose a threat to regional stability. 
Reports indicate that besides individual interests (in the sense of 
border officers adding to their income from looking the other way, 
in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, but also in many other 
countries in the region) there are organized networks, with insider 
contacts that import significant quantities of goods and derive 
substantial profits out of such activities. Such profits do not appear 
on a country's official records, but do affect the legal domestic 
trade. Customs statistics between 1996 and 2000 in the Republic 
of Moldova showed a considerable difference between legally 
imported goods and merchandise that was sold illegally on the 
consumer market. The most alarming figures referred to oil 
imports.
On the other hand, customs duties do represent a crucial 
contribution to a country's budget. This is an additional reason for 
which investment in this domain should constitute a political 
priority. The situation of undeclared oil imports (which were 
allowed into the Republic of Moldova by customs inspectors) 
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improved somewhat, when a the Republic of Moldova 
government decision came in force in 2001, that banned imports 
of gasoline and Diesel oil, but also increased the quantity allowed 
at each transport. The measure primarily affected small traders, 
who were also under significant suspicion of fraud.
On this point, we need to emphasize that nonexistent or 
superficial inspection on the border between the Republic of 
Moldova and Ukraine, on the one hand, combined with relatively 
easy illegal circulation from Transdniestria on the other hand, are 
the conditions that lead to illegal transports into Romania. This 
situation covers more than just fuel. There are other categories of 
goods that go uninspected as early as their entry into the Republic 
of Moldova, such as dairy products, cigarettes, vegetables, oil and 
alcohol. The transport documents do not always reflect the reality, 
and misrepresent either the amount or the category of goods etc. 
It is precisely because this is such a complex phenomenon that 
attacking such practices - worrisome not only for Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova, but for the whole European community - 
requires cooperation between a wide spectrum of agencies, from 
intelligence services to ministries of education, health etc., where 
a constant exchange of information must take place. It is also true 
that border inspection cannot be achieved through a total 
separation of officers on the two sides of the border. It is crucial for 
the counterparts on both sides to have constant communication 
and exchanges, to jointly use equipment that is evenly distributed 
throughout the length of the border. Maybe a joint inspection is not 
necessarily a good idea for the border between Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova, but a minimum of dialogue is, especially as 
regards merchandise (where most time and resources have to be 
expended). Such dialogue is an advantage for both the customs 
inspectors of the two countries and, more importantly, the honest 
traveler. 
It is ultimately necessary for a desire to exist among the 
representatives of the authorities in both Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova to put in place a compatible system that will 
ensure the elements of customs activities oriented not only 
towards the requirements of the international trade environment, 
but also towards developing and streamlining bilateral relations in 
the economic and other domains, especially in the light of the 
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special and privileged relations between the two countries. 
Recommendations
To take steps towards authorizing the embassies of the 
countries around the Republic of Moldova that do not have 
consular services in the Republic of Moldova, to issue visas 
to Moldovan citizens, so as to cut costs and time through 
the “visa for visa” procedure (Government of Republic of 
Moldova)
To consider the introduction of new personal documents 
that would meet the needs of citizens who travel frequently 
across that border, for purposes of small trade, studies, 
family relations, and for citizens who reside in border 
counties (Foreign ministries, with help from all involved 
authorities and in agreement with the EU requirements)
To analyze the implications of Romania's eventual EU 
integration on the transborder relationship between 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova, from the point of 
view of the movement of individuals and goods, with a view 
to mitigating negative effects (Governments of both 
countries at all tiers)
To examine the timeliness and technical possibilities to set 
up joint teams at the border checkpoints (made up of border 
representatives from both countries) that would inspect 
transports only once, at alternative customs checkpoints on 
either Romanian or Moldovan territory, based on a 
schedule established by both countries.
To have systematic consultations and exchanges on 
information between Romanian and Moldovan 
counterparts, based on entry/exit records, in order to detect 
criminal violations and establish a joint inspection strategy 
(Customs authorities on border checkpoints).
!
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One of the direct consequences of insufficient border control is the 
current dimension of illegal trafficking in human beings and goods. 
International reports draw attention to the fact that this 
phenomenon has reached unprecedented levels in the region 
where both Romania and the Republic of Moldova are situated, 
and that these two countries are both a source and a target for 
illegal migration. The phenomenon gathered momentum in the 
context of political changes that occurred in the region in the 90s, 
of the change of regime in both countries, of the degrading living 
standards for most of the population (including customs 
inspectors and border police, who became increasingly 
vulnerable to corruption), and of the still insufficient equipment 
available for border checkpoints. Thus, the Romanian-Moldovan 
border became increasingly permeable, while training for the 
detection of violations remained unsatisfactory. However, these 
are only a few of the causes. Other causes had to do with 
improved criminal methods employed by traffickers, with 
increased funds they invested in such activities - especially as 
they are financed by international illegal trafficking networks - and 
the list could continue, especially if we consider the inspection 
conditions on the other borders of the countries under discussion.
Trafficking in human beings
A phenomenon of great concern on the Romanian-Moldovan 
border is the illegal immigration of citizens coming from Asia in 
general, as well as from the Republic of Moldova, but also of illegal 
transports of goods and drugs. Also, there are still groups of 
persons being taken illegally across the border by illegal guides 
primarily towards Western European countries, where those 
migrants intend to engage in prostitution or criminal activities.
The problem has worsened after the disintegration of the USSR, 
as the Republic of Moldova was one of the top countries in the 
region in international statistics of migration, illegal border 
crossing by individuals or goods. It is noteworthy that such 
information demonstrates the perpetrators of such violations are 
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not necessarily citizens of the Republic of Moldova; a significant 
number of migrants, caught on the border with Romania, came 
from countries in Asia and were headed towards Western Europe. 
Most of them came from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and other 
countries in South and South East Asia and usually used counter-
feit identification documents. Most often they had no intention of 
stopping either in the Republic of Moldova, or in Romania.
The statistics of the Romanian Border Police General 
Inspectorate show that, in 2001, most migrants crossing the 
border illegally concealed in vehicles and using counterfeit 
documents were Moldovan citizens - 45.7%; far behind them 
ranked Ukrainians - 9.8%, Bulgarians - 4 % and Turks - 2.9%. The 
figures become alarming in the first quarter of this year, when the 
citizens from the Republic of the Republic of Moldova already 
accounted for 55.2% of the total attempts to cross the border with 
illegal documents or in illegal conditions.
Undoubtedly, the absence of security measures on the Western 
border of the Republic of Moldova is most visible in Romania, 
because, if this were not so, tough procedures on the border with 
Ukraine or with Transdniestria would cut down on the number of 
people trying to cross the border between the Republic of Moldova 
and Romania illegally. 
A characteristic of trafficking in human beings in this region - and 
the Republic of Moldova and Romania are, unfortunately, no 
exceptions - is the trafficking in women for purposes of 
prostitution. The organizers of such activities take women into 
Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Turkey or Western Europe. The 
phenomenon needs to be correlated to the precarious living 
means of the women who allow themselves to be trafficked. There 
are cases where these women are fully aware of what is going on 
and join the traffickers willingly, but there are many other cases 
where such women are simply victims (they are either taken away 
by force, or they are promised jobs like baby-sitter, companion for 
old persons, waitressing etc., in Western European countries). 
Over the past few years the phenomenon has worsened and even 
border police officers have become involved, from both countries. 
Both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, but also Romania are 
countries of origin and transit for groups of women trafficked for 
sexual exploitation.
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In solving the problem, the Moldovan authorities adopted in 2001 
a package of laws that included amendments to the Criminal Code 
and drastic punishments for organizers of such activities. 
Readmission agreements have been signed with countries in the 
region, like Poland, Hungary, Ukraine and the Czech Republic.
Romania, too, has revised and improved its legal framework, to 
meet the threats we are discussing in this chapter. Not only has it 
recently adopted new regulations on the State border, but also on 
the efficient organization and operation of the Border Police (June 
27, 2001), patterned from the European Union police forces; also, 
the Romanian border police has been organized into regional 
departments, to cover sections of the land border and the Black 
Sea. The number of non-operational positions has been slashed 
and resources were appropriated depending on specific 
conditions and issues in various specific areas. 
Studies on ways to reduce trafficking in human beings as much as 
possible, especially as regards the Republic of Moldova, must 
consider an aspect that has to do with everyday realities. The 
current economic difficulties of the Republic of Moldova make it so 
that many families are dependant on the money sent home by 
relatives living in the West or by friends who work in the West. This 
is no excuse, of course, but it does constitute an important 
element in the analysis, especially as it explains some of the 
reluctance to enact laws for harsher punishments in case of 
violation. 
All the above considered, in line with European Union policies, 
Romania has introduced restrictions in the issuing of visas for 
citizens coming from countries with high migrant potential, and 
some applicants were even denied access in Romania when their 
documentation on the purpose of travel was not conclusive. 
This phenomenon too, just like illegal trafficking in goods, arms 
and drugs, goes beyond the borders and concerns of just two 
states. It is necessary, therefore, to have a close cooperation 
between the authorities of all countries in the region, since they 
are all under the same threat, as well as the contribution of 
international organizations with expertise in the domain, like the 
International Organization for Migrations (IOM).
121
Trafficking in drugs, arms and stolen vehicles
Geographically, both the Republic of Moldova and Romania are 
located on the drug routes coming from the Middle East, Russia 
and Ukraine and headed towards Europe. Another route comes 
from the Transcaucasus republics, from Kurdistan or from Turkey. 
Most of the drugs have Western Europe as a destination, because 
that is where the purchasing power is, but there are buyers along 
the route as well, both in the Republic of Moldova and in Romania. 
There is a direct relationship between drug traffickers and arms 
traffickers, since drug money will usually buy arms. The current 
extent of the phenomenon is also accounted for by the various 
armed conflicts in the region over the past few years, and reports 
from the Yugoslav war only have demonstrated a direct 
relationship between buyers there and suppliers who had used 
the transit route through the Republic of Moldova and Romania. 
Statistics of the Border Police General Inspectorate demonstrate 
without doubt that Moldovan citizens rank either first or second in 
both arms and drug trafficking. A similar situation applies to 
trafficking in stolen vehicles, where the Republic of Moldova is 
followed by Ukraine and Turkey. 
Both countries need appropriate legislation to prevent, but also 
harshly punish, such violations. They also need appropriate 
equipment at their border checkpoints (including specially trained 
dogs), especially on those border checkpoints where trafficking in 
human beings is known to be most intense - Leuseni, Sculeni, 
Ungheni and Cahul. The same steps to provide equipment are 
needed on the border with Ukraine - Otaci, Ocnita, Briceni, 
Palanca as well as on the Chisinau checkpoint. 
In keeping with the general guidelines of the present study, it is 
important to discuss such issues also in order to emphasize the 
devastating consequences these violations have for the 
population's health, domestic stability and, not lastly, the 
economy. That is why countries with poor budgets like Romania, 
but especially the Republic of Moldova, should be the first to 
examine the social-economic costs of this huge problem, and 
assess investment needs for border control. It should also be said 
that measures on only one side of the border could bring no 
solution to the situation. Failure to address security on the 
Republic of Moldova's border with Ukraine, or disproportionate 
levels of equipment on either side of the border brings about a 
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failure to meet the desired targets for border control between the 
Republic of Moldova and Romania. Romania, the Republic of 
Moldova and Ukraine have already taken some steps to curb the 
above-mentioned phenomena. As far back as 1998, the three 
presidents adopted a Memorandum to combat crime, and the 
three countries pledged mutual support in the fight against 
transborder crime. Later, the legal framework was improved in 
2001, through the signing of the Agreement between the three 
governments to combat crime. After several rounds of discussions 
(which approached the main categories of criminal activity - 
organized crime, corruption, terrorism, trafficking in arms and 
ammunition, explosives and toxic substances, nuclear materials, 
drugs, contraband, trafficking in human beings, prostitution and 
sexual exploitation of children, illegal migration), it was decided to 
create a framework to stimulate the exchange of information 
between the three countries and the cooperation in combating 
such criminal activities. It was also decided to have a constant flow 
of information and to encourage exchanges of experiences at a 
local level as well as at a decision-making/political level. 
To that effect, it was decided to organize joint seminars, 
roundtables and workshops. Unfortunately, political decision does 
not always bring about (in this context) an implementation. The 
best example is that, until June 2002, no Moldovan representative 
had attended the proceedings of the working group that meets at 
the Galati center periodically. We must therefore salute the fact 
recently a representative of the Moldovan government did take 
part in the discussions of experts in Galati, and we hope that 
Moldovan presence remains a constant, from now on. 
Trafficking in human beings and illegal substances can, by no 
means, be either curbed or eradicated without the contribution of 
other agencies in the two countries (agencies that can contribute 
crucial information, logistics and expertise to the efforts of the 
border police and customs) and of international bodies, all of 
which could primarily materialize in priority assistance for:
Training of inspection officers at border checkpoints in the 
use of modern techniques by traffickers
Modern inspection equipment that would be distributed 
along the border in a balanced manner so as to reach all 
border checkpoints.
!
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Security of the external Schengen borders is an important priority 
of the European authorities and that makes it necessary for illegal 
trafficking prevention measures to be adopted and implemented 
at a certain pace and level of efficiency, in view of the 
consequences at national, but also European level. However 
permeable nowadays, borders still require a number of 
responsibilities to be taken by national states, a first condition here 
being the ability to put cooperation in place, not only between 
agencies with direct border jurisdiction, but also between these 
and the other agencies whose information is useful for enhancing 
a climate of security at the border. 
However, national political-strategic motivations that have to do 
with relations at various levels between neighbors can be quite 
different from one nation to another, when it comes to border 
control. A united Europe cannot be built in disregard of the realities 
arising from each nation's identity. This is the reason why putting 
together procedures in place on the border between Romania and 
the Republic of Moldova carries very special implications. This 
happens primarily because the two countries have a unity of 
nation, language, culture and traditions and now they are treated 
differently because of European requirements. And secondly, the 
two countries' vision of the approach to international cooperation 
seems to be quite different. 
In addition to the recommendations we made at the end of each 
chapter, there are other elements we considered in the writing of 
this study and need to mention here.
The present study has identified, as a crucial issue, the need for 
Romania to come up with a clearer definition of the notion of 
privileged and special partnership it claims to have with the 
Republic of Moldova. As in recent years Romania's circumstances 
and national options have changed, our country has assumed 
obligations that devolve from the requirements of the EU 
accession process, and thus the contents of privileged and 
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special relations with the Republic of Moldova requires an 
updated definition. 
We will therefore list a series of conclusions on the mechanisms 
for bilateral and regional cooperation.
Before working out complex interstate, or indeed international 
cooperation strategies, each of the two states needs to assist the 
way their own institutions cooperate in the matter of border 
control, of the way key institutions in the domain share the same 
vision of border control. In Romania there are still problems in the 
relationship between border police and customs, even noticed 
outside the country. That is why the current conditions for dialogue 
should be made of maximum use by all concerned parties. This is 
a reference to the Galati International Center, where constant 
meetings should take place, between agencies with direct 
jurisdiction on the borders between Romania, the Republic of 
Moldova and Ukraine. We also refer to the two Euroregions where 
frequent institutional meetings should take place and we are even 
thinking of the sectoral dialogue groups. Other mechanisms are 
also available, such as the international meetings of the Stability 
Pact for South-East Europe, or the debates and meetings 
financed by PHARE/TACIS. All these can only strengthen the 
dialogue between Romania and the Republic of Moldova to the 
advantage of both countries as well as to regional security and 
stability. 
Cooperation between counterparts in Romania and the Republic 
of Moldova requires a more determined political support. The 
reluctance of Moldovan authorities to cooperate with their 
Romanian counterparts is one of the main reasons for inadequate 
cooperation between the border police and the border troops, as 
well as between the customs authorities of the two countries. In 
the absence of complementarity between the political and 
executive tiers - especially in the Republic of Moldova - projects 
like the one for constant information exchanges, per sectors of 
activity, between the two countries, remain at an incipient stage. 
One can easily imagine the consequences such lack of trust 
brings for other programs, like prevention and combating of 
transborder crime, where trust between partners is one of the 
prerequisites of the activity. One could also speak about the need 
for a political boost in having the bilateral legal framework 
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implemented. The bilateral and regional legal framework includes 
regulations, commitments and punishments, with the aim of 
achieving prevention, detection and prosecution of transborder 
organized crime. The involved states have signed bilateral 
agreements, have undertaken responsibilities and have declared 
full commitment in the fight against transborder crime. However, 
practical effects of such regulations and commitments are not 
properly reflected in everyday realities, both at national and local 
interstate levels. It therefore becomes necessary to work out 
mechanisms and structures that would bring decision-making as 
close as possible to the local level - the border - since that is where 
unmitigated contact occurs with the criminal activities under 
discussion.
Insufficient funding is reflected primarily in the equipment 
available at the border checkpoints, but it is also visible in the 
training of the working staff, which is actually a huge problem. The 
international community is offering support to that effect, and that 
compels both states to have very clear records of:
The existing equipment, the equipment procured from 
budget money and the equipment purchased with EU 
funding;
The equipment that is still needed at every checkpoint.
At the same time, programs are needed for a cost-efficiency 
assessment (a concept that is insufficiently exploited in Romania). 
Based on a clear record at the national level and on a joint 
strategy, international donors could be approached, who have 
expressed their readiness to provide assistance in the domain, 
but this would require a transparent exchange of information on 
assistance received by each individual country. 
Against the background of decreasing trust between counterparts 
in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, this problem affects 
even the readiness of Romanian officers to share their equipment 
with their Moldovan colleagues - one of the recommendations that 
resulted from discussions at the level of experts. 
The usefulness of a periodical consultation mechanism at the 
political and administrative levels cannot be denied. This would 
allow a timely identification, analysis and formulation of solutions 
regarding problems that confront one or the other of the two 
!
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countries. Of course, another important factor for the achievement 
of this goal is the contribution of the civil society - in the sense of 
making it easier for a dialogue to exist between the institutions of 
the same state and between counterpart institutions in the two 
states. For instance, comprehensive solutions could be found for 
concerns like: the Romanian policy on citizens who live and/or 
carry out individual trade activities in localities close to the border, 
or on Moldovan individuals with double citizenship. Romania 
could thus assess both the requirements of the accession process 
it has embarked upon, and its policy towards the neighbor state 
with which it intends to continue a privileged, special relationship. 
The Romanian coordinating team of this project worked as a 
facilitator between Moldovan institutions and representatives of 
the civil society and is now doubtful that when Romania becomes 
a member of the European Union, Moldovan citizens will not still 
have a visa free treatment in Romania, especially in view of the 
statistics on the potential of trafficking activities Moldovan citizens 
engage in. In that context, preferential treatment should rather be 
expected in the field of making it easier to cross the border, 
through the introduction of several types of visa, adapted to local 
needs (small trade, family relations, studies and work across the 
border). This would also involve a sustained effort towards 
adequate training and equipment for employees working on the 
border, so as to reduce the waiting time and detect attempts at 
border fraud. 
The same goes for concerns and suggestions like those for a 
complex international mission to convince Western European 
states to open consular services for Moldovan citizens, if not in 
Chisinau, then at least as close as possible to it (e.g. in 
Bucharest), and at the same time convince those Western 
European states to simplify as much as possible, within the limits 
required by security, their procedures for receiving and deciding 
on visa applications. In documenting this suggestion, the 
coordinators of this study also noticed Romania's reluctance to 
take such initiatives, as it feels it would be primarily incumbent on 
the Republic of Moldova to approach the Western governments. 
The role of these examples is rather that of emphasizing the 
importance of periodical dialogue and consultations between 
political leaders, practitioners and independent experts of both 
127
countries. A number of ideas and proposals exist, therefore, and 
they require in-depth analysis and a joint approach in the light of 
the special relations Romania likes to speak about. The interviews 
and documentation work for the project this study is a part of have 
shown the importance of an active involvement on the part of 
Romania to the design of EU policies on near vicinity. 
It must be clear that the issue of border control is not at all the 
exclusive responsibility of the Border Police General Inspectorate 
or of the General Customs Directorate, irrespective of the country. 
It is, indeed, absolutely necessary for a fruitful cooperation to exist 
between the two. But the matter of border control has many other 
aspects that come - in Romania - under the jurisdiction and 
expertise of the Romanian Intelligence Service or the Foreign 
Intelligence Service, and there are others yet that are the 
responsibility of the Chamber of Commerce, the Ministry of 
Industry and Resources, the Ministry of Education and Research, 
and the list can go on. We have no intention of making this into a 
complete list, but the only thing that can make border mechanisms 
and programs efficient is multiple cooperation among the various 
institutions whose information can have an importance for border 
control.
Even if they operate in a domain where information is sensitive for 
national security, agencies should be more open to cooperation 
with civil society, thus using not only their human and financial 
resources, but also their expertise. Prevention programs against 
border threats, public awareness activities concerning trafficking 
in human beings and contraband (a domain which, unfortunately 
for Romania and the Republic of Moldova, is rising to alarming 
levels) should involve state institutions as well as media channels 
and NGOs.
This is therefore a complex exercise in communication and 
cooperation, which has to start from a climate of trust between 
partners. In so far as it functions inside every state - in the sense 
that state institution work in cooperation with each other and also 
involve civil society - we have no reservations in believing it can 
work at an international level as well, and by this we mean 
exchange of information and cooperation between national 
institutions and specialist international organizations.
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Finally, the relationship between the two states as well as their 
aspirations can bring them to design a joint set of proposals to 
mitigate the negative consequences of Romania's integration into 
the EU; such an initiative would then be forwarded to the 
European Union, which could work out a common European 
policy regarding the states neighboring the enlarged EU. 
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